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PART I THE FIELD OF RESEARCH 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
  
“Mostar refracts in a concentrated microcosm practically (containing) all the problems Bosnia & 
Herzegovina faces in the aftermath of the apocalypse of 1992-5” and being “the single most difficult 
local site for the international state-building and democratization project in post-war Bosnia” (Bose 
2002; 146). 
 
 1.1 General introduction research topic 
Conflicts are of all times, and so is the resolution of conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War we see an 
increase in number of conflicts within nation states, in which the international community interferes to 
end the violence. But ending violence is not where interventions stopped. In most cases where the 
international community (IC), intervened, a process was started in which stabilization was the next 
phase (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall 2005; 199). 
 
This thesis is based on the results of a 3 month field study in the city of Mostar in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; city that is well known for its dramatic war history. A war that implied the end of the 
Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), further referred to as Yugoslavia and that is considered 
to be the most violent war in Europe since the Second World War. Not only did the collapse of 
Yugoslavia lead to the creation of a new state, the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
it also caused enormous human suffering and led to a complete destruction, both physical and mental, 
of the social, economic and political structures of the country, and the relationship between its citizens 
and the state. The IC‟s intervention to end the war resulted in the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) 
being signed in Paris, on the 14
th
 of December 1995. In this agreement the political structure of the 
country was agreed upon. Characteristic to this structure is the fact that BiH is divided into two 
„entities‟, being the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). 
Both these entities have a large form of political autonomy and have their own constitution. During the 
negotiations the parties could not agree upon the division of the district of Brčko, which was therefore 
turned into a district administered by both entities. Furthermore the DPA set an agenda for the future of 
this country; creating a new state structure in which the warring parties would find a political way of 
working together on the future of their country. Providing this political structure would also make it 
possible for citizens of this new state to live together again and to develop a sense of citizenship, 
defining a new „we‟ as Kuzio (2001; 170) describes it. Therefore it was important to restore trust 
between citizens, and between citizens and the state. Some of the key elements for restoring trust and 
rebuilding the country were the restoration of law and order, and to prevent conflict from recurring. 
 
In order to achieve this, the IC got involved in and with the police service in BiH. To address the 
(Mostar) police of today in this thesis, I first used the term police „force‟. But due to what I observed 
and heard about the evolution the police went through, I feel confident to say that, in its core, the 
police in BiH should be called a police service instead of a police force now. After all, the term police 
force implies a body of police, acting as tool of the State, forcing their will upon the citizens, consistent 
with the historic image of the Yugoslav police. From my research I derived an image of the police that 
is more resembled by the term „service‟. Therefore I decided to use the term police „force‟ to define the 
police in BiH before and during the war, while I will be using the term police „service‟ for the police in 
BiH since the war ended. 
The IC‟s involvement in the police in BiH, country wide, started in March 1996, with the United Nations 
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International Police Task Force (UNIPTF). In Mostar the IC was already involved in policing before 
March 1996, through the Western European Union (WEU) police force (Task Force Mostar).  
This taskforce was tasked with advising the mayor of Mostar, Mr. Koschnik who was assigned to this 
task by the IC, on the topic of public order.  
Furthermore, the taskforce advised Bosniac and Croat police officers on their job performance (many 
of the officers had little expertise, they were merely soldiers in police uniforms), took care of VIP 
protection, and security of high-risk areas, patrolling the city and tracing missing persons (without 
having executive powers). But their main task was to unite the Croat and Bosniac police forces that 
were separated since the war (Defensie 2011). 
Later, when UNIPTF came in and they were assigned to the task of observing and inspecting police 
and judiciary, later extended by monitoring and preservation of human rights. This meant that UNIPTF 
was also involved with the restructuring of the police service and judiciary, including training of police 
officers and personnel of the ministries of justice. This mission was succeeded by European Union 
Police Missions (EUPM I, II, III and IV), missions that tried to guide BiH's police services 
managements (each entity has one or more police services) towards more effective policing, based on 
Europe's best police practices, with local ownership at its base (Huiberts-van Dijk 2009; 1), one of 
these ´best police practices´ being the concept of 'community policing' (CP).  
 
In this thesis I look at the way CP is being used as a way to improve the relationship between citizens 
and the police as a representative of the state, and the level of trust that exists between the two. To be 
able to do this I look at the way Mostar's citizens and police officers deal with each other. Therefore I 
have conducted interviews with both people representing (part of) the citizens of Mostar, police officers 
representing the Mostar police and EUPM police officers, giving an outside but expert view on things 
happening in BiH and observing all these groups in their respective environments. Environments that 
have gone through war, and post war international intervention, and that have developed their own 
political and social way of living with that historical background, and the current situation, including the 
involvement of the IC, in daily life. Due to the fact that as the focus shifted away from projects like CP 
in later missions, this thesis will focus on EUPM I (2003-2005) when it comes to the role of the IC in 
police reforms. 
 
The Mostar Police service is being chosen as research subject as it operates in a city with its own 
specific history, considerably influenced by the war, challenged by the multi-ethnic character, and 
being a key city in the new state structure of Bosnia Herzegovina. As is stated by Sumantra Bose, 
Professor of International and Comparative Politics, and author on post war Mostar, in the opening 
quote of this chapter, Mostar contains all the problems that BiH faces in the aftermath of the war. 
 
Many researchers have conducted research that focuses on the origins of war in the Balkan, the 
course of the war, the involvement of the IC to end the war. Others have focused on the social and 
political situation after the war and/or the peacekeeping and peace building efforts of the IC. Not many 
researchers have studied the current situation of the relationship (the necessary trust) between 
citizens and BiH‟s state, on ground level. In that way this thesis adds to the academic research that 
has been conducted on the situation in BiH. The social relevance of this topic is that this research will 
show the current state of the relationship between citizens and the state, on ground level, in Mostar.  
 
 
But this research also relates closely to current political debates in the Netherlands; debates on how 
safety and security could be restored in post-war countries, with the ultimate goal to restore the 
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relationship and trust between citizens and the state. Debates like the most recent one in Dutch 
parliament on the police mission to the Afghan province of Kunduz; a debate where a clear preference 
for the introduction of policing based on „best practices‟ (from the west) was displayed by the majority 
of the political parties.  
 
Having introduced the topic of research in general terms, and sketched the history and development of 
the topic of research, I will now continue with defining the most important notions, used in this thesis. 
After that I explain my personal motivation to choose this topic of research, and how it fits in interests I 
developed during my time at the university. Next part is the methodology of the conducted research, 
explaining and justifying the way I conducted my research; finishing with the design of the thesis, 
giving the reader an insight in the composition of this document. 
 
Central to this thesis is the concept of CP. When studying literature on CP I found out that there is not 
one definition for CP. For BiH definition for CP was put down in a document named 'Strategy for 
Community-Based Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. This document was composed by a 
workgroup with members representing the police services in the different cantons of the FBiH, the 
police service in the Republika Srpska and the national police agencies in BiH and was created with 
the help of a foreign NGO. Together they defined CP and made plans on how to introduce Community-
Based Policing in BiH. In the above mentioned document community-based policing (CBP) is defined 
as “an organizational philosophy that promotes partnership between police and community.” (Ministry 
of Security of BiH 2007; 5) The document states that the strategy intends to “improve the rights and 
freedoms of all citizens of BiH”, therefore public administration standards and operational 
effectiveness of police agencies need to be improved, and equal access to justice needs to be 
promoted.  
 
A topic that we cannot fail to mention in this introduction is the topic of ethnicity. As we can learn from 
the description of the most recent history of the war in BiH, referring to the different groups of citizens 
in BiH, asks for a lot of precision, as a sensitive subject such as ethnicity requires great precision. 
Often the largest ethnic groups within BiH are referred to as „Serbs‟, „Croats‟ and „Muslims‟, with or 
without the additive „Bosnian‟(Huiberts 2009, Collantes Celador 2009, institutes of the U.S. 
government and others) . Interesting to see is the difference in the way the groups are referred to. The 
terms „Serbs‟ and „Croats‟ relate to neighbouring nation states, while the third refers to followers of a 
world religion. 
Having observed this difference, and having read literature on the history and the war(s) in BiH, I 
realized that this is not the only way of referring to these ethnic groups. In other literature, the Muslims 
are referred to as Bosniacs (Popovic 2010, Aitchison 2007, OSCE, Bieber 2002). Not to be mistaken 
by the term „Bosnians‟ (any person from BiH, whether „Serb‟, „Croat‟ of „Bosniac‟). Something that even 
influential experts in the field of BiH‟s wartime and post-war history, like Richard Holbrooke former US 
diplomat and main negotiator for the IC in BiH during the war, does in his book „To End a War‟. In a 
way, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats are denied their membership of the Bosnian community by calling 
Bosniacs Bosnians (Bose 2002, Chandler 2005, Holbrooke 1998). 
 
Membership was also debated back in Yugoslav times. Then the question was whether the Muslims 
(not named Bosniacs at that time) could form a separate nation within the former Yugoslav federation. 
The Žabljak constitution of 1992 (named after the location of the meeting where the constitution was 
signed) formalized the separate nation of the Muslims within the federation (Kalyvas & Sambanis 
2005; 205). The decision to change the name „Muslims‟ into Bosniacs, was taken during by the 
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Bosniac Assembly in Sarajevo in 1993. Later the term was accepted by the other nations in the 
Federation (International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies 2005; 6). More on this in 
paragraph 6.2.  
 
Knowing all this made me realize that I also had to choose, in what way I would be referring to the 
ethnic groups in my thesis. Much can be said about what could be the best, or most correct way to do 
so, but after having read a lot of literature and having been in BiH, I came to realize that there is no 
good way of doing so. I have chosen to refer to the three main ethnic groups in BiH nowadays, as 
follows; Serbs, being the Bosnian Serbs (Christian Orthodox), Croats (Catholics), being the Bosnian 
Croats and the Bosniacs (Muslims).  
 
Although not the main focus of research (citizens and police / state are) the IC will be often referred to 
in this thesis. Therefore it is important to distinguish what comes under this term. The IC is often 
referred to, when talking about the nations of the world, like the ones gathered in the United Nations. 
But more often it refers to countries from Europe and North America, constituting only one fifth of the 
world. In this thesis, the IC is defined of the countries, mainly from Europe, but also Turkey, Ukraine 
and North America, organized in the United Nations (U.N.), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the European Union (EU), the OSCE and many other intergovernmental organizations. From 
studying the war history of BiH we can learn that for instance many Middle East countries have been 
involved in supporting the Bosniacs. I restrict myself to these countries because they were, and most 
of them still are, involved in the state building process. 
 
It can be argued that many more international organizations, groups and initiatives are present in BiH. 
And this is true. All over BiH and in Mostar their presence becomes clear. But this thesis is focusing on 
the relationship between the state and its citizens and the influence of intergovernmental organization 
in general. This research did not specifically focus on the role NGO‟s played in this process. Therefore, 
NGO‟s were consulted in this research, and will be individually mentioned, while the intergovernmental 
organizations‟ are named in one term; IGO‟s. 
 
 1.2 Personal motivation for research 
This research is supposed to be the final paper of four years studying Cultural Anthropology and 
Development studies. I started this study as someone who had pursued a totally different career 
(namely in the fire brigade), but, through personal experience developed an interest in development 
aid and international projects. What better way to create opportunities for a career change than to start 
a university study? As a university study is supposed to do, especially Cultural Anthropology, it opened 
up my eyes and made me aware of many interesting topics and in the end even seemed to have 
changed my interests from Development Aid to international politics, conflict and security matters. 
Through a minor in Conflict studies, a fieldwork research on volunteering within Dutch Fire brigades 
and a BA dissertation on the role of the informal moments during the Dayton peace negotiations 
developed an interest in post conflict situations, the relationship between the state and its citizens, and 
security matters.  
 
 
Through this interest, experience with the war history of BiH, and contacts with researchers and 
members of the IC working in the field of safety and security, specializing in Mostar, I learned more 
about the current challenges faced by BiH. One of these challenges being that BiH still struggles to 
find a sustainable way for its citizens to live together and feel protected by the state. One of the ways 
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the IC tried to improve the safety situation and relationship between citizens and the state, on local 
level, was by introducing the CP concept; a concept that gave me the possibility to look at many topics 
that I find interesting. It also offered me a possibility to come into contact with interesting organizations 
like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: OSCE, EUPM, representatives of the 
Dutch police and representatives of the Dutch Ministry of Defense. 
 
 1.3 Methodology of research 
Doing research on a topic related to safety and security in a post war city, with such a specific history 
as that of Mostar, brings about certain challenges. For one, there is the sensitive topic of the war 
history, and the disturbed relations between the different ethnic groups that try to live together in 
Mostar; a topic that has been intensively studied by many scholars. Developing my research proposal, 
I was aware of this history and it was therefore that I choose not to focus on this relationship as a 
central topic in my research. I wanted to try to get away from this topic, and look at the realities in the 
streets of Mostar in 2010.  
 
Then there was the more common challenge of getting access to the important groups of respondents 
for my research, being; citizens and police officers. 
„Citizens‟, saying it like that, it sounds as if this is an easy accessible group of respondents, since they 
are all around us. But that, at the same time, makes it hard. Because where to start? Who to talk to?; 
especially when language becomes an issue, which mainly occurred among older people (hard to 
pinpoint an age, but let‟s say 40+, depending on educational level and life experience). The first 
respondents I met, apart from the owners of the pension I was living at, were students of the University 
of Mostar, situated in West Mostar. It was the first University I was able to find and was accessible. 
Through a student I met in the faculty café, I gained access to the student association of political 
science students. Interviewing students turned out to be a good way of getting a better understanding 
of the different opinions people have about the cooperation between citizens and the police, and 
politics in BiH. But it also lead (often during  informal talks over coffee) to more insight in the way 
young people experience life in Mostar in general, and more specific, how they experience their safety 
and police conduct. 
 
Through the students connected to the student association, I also came into contact with students 
studying English literature at the University of Mostar. Besides the fact that all students that I met 
where able to speak English and could therefore represent citizens in Mostar, though with a bias, I 
assumed that some of the English literature student would be interested in acting as my „language 
assistant‟ (LA). And some of them indeed were my LA‟s. Because of them I was able to speak to more 
people. In my experience, working with an LA, meant that interviews were held at a more formal level 
and it was more difficult to stray off into personal experiences, anecdotes and more extensive talks on 
certain subjects. This was partly due to the presence of a third person (being the LA), and the fact that 
this was not a professional LA, but a student volunteering. This meant that time and interest was 
sometimes limited. Therefore I choose to concentrate the help of the LA on my interviews with the 
police officers, as many of the police officers couldn‟t, or didn‟t feel comfortable, speaking English, and 
as they formed one of the two main groups of respondents of my research.  
Furthermore, I tried to overcome this challenge of limited interest in my topic of research by finding 
more students willing to help me with translating, and I explained more extensively the reason behind 
my research and why it is so interesting. This often helped to get the student interested and motivated 
as well. During some of the interviews I noticed that, while the respondent was telling a lengthy story, 
the LA only gave me a short version of the story. In many cases this worked, but sometimes I felt I 
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missed out on funny or interesting parts. Therefore I decided to have „evaluation‟ talks / coffee brakes 
after the interviews, to ask the student, assisting me, more about how they experienced the interview, 
and what the things were that he / she noticed. This gave me more information that I could then add to 
my interview reports.  
 
Being fully aware of the two sides present in the city, I felt I should make an effort talking to more 
people on the East side. Not that I didn‟t intend to do so, but it was the way my research developed. 
Therefore I made an effort to get into contact with key respondents who would be able to help me. And 
it worked, through an acquaintance of someone I met earlier; I came into contact with a respondent 
who was working at the University Džemal Bijedić, the university in East Mostar. Besides having an 
interesting interview with this respondent on trust (or the lack of) people have in the emergency 
services, I also came into contact with an American teacher, teaching English literature at this 
university. This again gave me the opportunity to talk to this university‟s students, about their 
experiences with the police, their views on society and the challenges it‟s facing and the way they saw 
their own role, as citizens of this city and country, in this whole process.  
 
The fact that I was able to talk to students of both universities, made it possible for me to create a 
diverse group of respondents, concerning ethnicities. Especially because, different from the University 
of Mostar, that this university was considered to be a Croat only university (not completely true though, 
based on the fact that I saw two or three female students with a headscarf. A totally biased 
assumption, but still feeling that it is a strong indication), at the University Džemal Bijedić, students of 
all three ethnic groups could be found. The reason, as explained by the students, is that the tuition fee 
at the University Džemal Bijedić was considerably less than at the University of Mostar. At the same 
time the group of respondents is biased because we are dealing with a certain age group, and a 
certain social group. This certainly will have influenced their response to my questions, and I should 
therefore be careful not to generalize my conclusions. On the other hand, together with other 
interviews and observations I believe I have been able to develop a fairly objective view on the 
situation in Mostar.  
 
The fact that I met many of the students through the debates I organized, helped in hearing the whole 
constellation of opinions present in these groups of students, but also gave the students a chance to 
get to know me a bit more. During the many coffee breaks following the discussions, I was able to talk 
informally to some of the students more extensively, and develop a deeper understanding of the 
reasoning behind their answers and opinions. 
Before leaving for BiH I intended to focus my interviews on „street cops‟, the police officers that work in 
the streets of Mostar, with its citizens, on a daily basis. Reasoning for this was that I felt that the higher 
ranking officers would be more likely to give me political correct answers and I felt it would not be likely 
that they could give me first-hand information when it came down to the contact between citizens and 
police officers. It turned out to be quite difficult to interview the street cops. I was not able to have any 
interviews with the street cops. Talking to them in the street was not an option. I didn‟t meet any „street 
cops‟ able to speak English. 
And even with the help of an LA, they declined any request for even the smallest chat. This could 
indicate that they feel uneasy talking about their job to (foreign) researchers. This information needs to 
be taken into account when assessing the information derived from the interviews with CP officers, 
who were willing to talk about their work. But then, they were addressed in a different way. Because, 
when I decided to ask a senior officer, who I was interviewing about the CP project, if I could interview 
one of his police officers, he arranged an interview with the police officers assigned to CP in Mostar. 
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This first interview with CP officers was arranged surprisingly fast as many CP officers were at the 
police station. Before I knew we (three CP officers, my LA and I) were sitting in a cramped room, tying 
to have a group conversation. After this first interview I was able to arrange more interviews with the 
CP officers, which I was allowed to arrange directly with them. The fact that this senior officer arranged 
an interview with his CP officers ran the risk that he „selected‟ these employees to have an interview 
with me because they are loyal to him, the organization and the concept of CP. Because of this, they 
might have given less honest answers to my questions. This was a realistic risk that was not easy to 
prevent. Access to the Mostar police was not self-evident, so being able to interview the officers was 
an important start for my research. It all came down to very practical and bureaucratic obstacles that 
could only be tackled in a certain way. Take for instance entering a police station. It is not a building 
and an institution you can‟t just walk into. Or at least, that was not the approach I took. Entering the 
police office means that you have to pass a reception and a receptionist. If the person at the reception 
denies you access, or won‟t help you by contacting the right person, you can‟t just barge through. I 
was lucky, the receptionist at the police office in Mostar directed me to the senior officer concerned 
with CP quite easily.  
 
My approach and attitude in this matter could be explained by the fact that I work in an uniformed 
organisation (Fire & Rescue Service), resulting in understanding of and compliance with the norms 
common to this types of organisations. Respect for rules, top down approach, and hierarchy.  
Still, because the first interview took place with all three CP officers present at that moment, making it 
less likely to think that the senior officer only assigned loyal officers. The interviews that followed took 
place with only two or three of the CP officers, but they responded to my requests without consulting 
their senior officer. This gave me the feeling that the officers I interviewed were able to be relatively 
„open‟ with me, and that the answers they gave me, were relatively objective. Of course some 
desirable answers were given but in general I would characterise the answers as open and thought 
through. Another way I tried to form a complete picture of the relationship between citizens and the 
police and the views on the CP concept within the police service was by interviewing EUPM officers, 
who, through their job, spoke to police officers in Mostar and the Cantons. This way the EUPM officers 
got an insight into the way local police officers experienced abstract concepts like CP. Together with 
information from interviews with and NGO involved in introducing CP in Mostar and literature on this 
topic I feel I was able to form a fairly complex view. 
 
Access to EUPM mission members and other members of the IC working in Mostar, was gained firstly 
through the researcher at the Dutch Defence Academy, who I had met when preparing my research. 
She got me into contact with a Dutch police officer that just started working for EUPM that has one of 
its regional offices in Mostar. This contact turned out to be very valuable for my research, as it gave 
me insight into the work of the European Police Mission in Mostar and BiH. It also gave me an insight 
into the BiH police, through the eyes of an expert. Furthermore it also turned out to be an important 
personal contact, both being new in BiH, we could share our experiences.  
The many informal talks I had with this respondent and his colleagues from EUPM and other IC 
related organizations, led to a lot of useful information. In informal conversations I heard many points 
of criticism about the involvement of the IC in BiH and the success of different programs. 
Looking back at all this, I feel that the informal talks formed a research method in itself as I was not 
just there to chit chat; during conversations I deliberately asked questions related to my research topic. 
This could have led to violation of the ethical rules of scientific research. But I made sure all my 
respondents were aware of the fact that I was doing research and that their answers related to my 
research topic, were helping me to form a complete picture of the situation.  
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I discussed this with some of my respondents, who I met most regularly. We agreed that I would not 
quote them, due to our informal conversations.  
 
Besides informal talks (often over a cup of coffee), group discussions, and interviews, based on a list 
of prepared questions, I also used laminated pictures that I carried with me. These pictures showed 
different ways the police interact with citizens.  The shown images often led to reactions of the 
respondent and again gave me more information and new insights.   
 
 1.4 Design of the thesis  
After introducing the topic of my research and in general terms, my argument, it is important to place 
this research into the relevant theoretical context. This is both necessary to be able to understand my 
observations better and to be able to, later, draw conclusions based on these observations. 
In the third chapter personal stories and feelings and my observations come together with the 
observations and experiences of some EUPM officers in a chapter based on my field work. The 
notions, historic events and social and political structures need to be further explored to be able to 
better understand the situation as it is now. Whether it is the current makeup of the city of Mostar, the 
paradigm changes that greatly influenced the work of the police officers as representatives of the 
state, the social structures in which citizens of Mostar live and their opinion about their safety situation 
and the role the police has in this as do the EUPM police officer, representing the IC. The background 
of the stories, observation and experiences can be explored in many ways, both in the sense of scale 
and time and in the sense of theoretical level. Because the third chapter is both aimed at describing 
the local situation in Mostar, and giving an insight in the situation as it was at the beginning of 2010, in 
chapter 4 explanatory factors will follow with the notions core to the situation observed during my 
fieldwork period in the beginning of the chapter, gradually developing towards the national and 
international scale, going back in time at the same time.  
 
It might look as an unusual order, but it makes sure that my field work results get the prominent place 
they deserve, not bombarding the reader with all that happened before the spring of 2010,   while at 
the same time offering the reader all the information necessary to understand the complex reality of 
BiH. 
 
This introduction has already made clear that the world of the security sector and the international 
community is full of abbreviations. Therefore in appendix 8 an overview of the most common 
abbreviations can be found. Furthermore many respondents are quoted or referred to. To better 
understand their perspective it is important to get a better idea of who they are. Without breaking their 
anonymity I have tried to give a short overview of who they are in appendix 3. Before we can read 
about what the respondents have told me, and what I have observed during my three months in 
Mostar, it is important to place these observations and response concerning the relationship between 
citizens and the state in a theoretical context. Therefore the next chapter will deal with the main 
theories concerning citizenship.  
13 
 
2 THEORY ON CITIZENSHIP 
  
When studying the concept of CP, and its implementation in Mostar, the question arises, what the 
theories are, that offer us the right tools to be able to draw conclusions based on what I have 
observed. Definitions, like that of Damir Čutura (Ministry of Interior, West Herzegovina Canton) - 
“Community Policing means that there is a partnership between the police and the citizens in such a 
way that both partners work together in recognizing and solving problems in the community” (SDC 
2010; 14) - focus on the relation between citizens and the police. One of the outcomes of my fieldwork 
is that there is more to this relationship than becomes apparent from this definition. It is not just a 
relationship with the police, but a relationship with the whole state (represented by the police among 
others). This was confirmed by many scholars studying the role of policing in society. Fleming & 
McLauglin for instance state that “what the public thinks, feels and says about the police and the 
stance of citizens towards the police, can, in many respects, stand as a key indicator of confidence in 
the state‟s ability to fulfil its side of the social contract” (2010; 199). A contract that asks of citizens to 
comply with the law and to pay taxes so that other citizens (through their work for the police) can offer 
them protection (Hough et al 2010; Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002 in Bradford 2010; 179), but, at the 
same time, asks of the police officers to treat citizens with “dignity, respect and consideration”, 
something that, according to Waddington (2010; 1971) is a key element of the relation between the 
police and citizens in a liberal democracy. It ensures that citizens can trust the police, and that police 
officers should be reminded of who they work for.  
 
When we then look at theories concerning the relationship between citizens and the state, we soon 
come to understand the central theories in this research are that of citizenship and trust. 
The aim here is to learn from the theories behind the central observation of my fieldwork, that citizens 
lack trust in the state, and therefore in the CP concept (while this concept could be expected to 
increase trust), and try and find an explanation for these observations.  
 
Studying the theories on citizenship, a renewed attention for citizenship can be detected. With 
globalization of the world considered to be increasing, and the social and political situation changing, 
politicians, community leaders and governments are all emphasizing the importance of citizenship 
(Ådnanes 2004; 795). Not that there is an unambiguous definition, because there are many forms of 
citizenship that can be distinguished. Fact is that theories on citizenship originate from the Greek and 
Roman era. But this thesis is, by no means, the place for an elaborate study of the history of the 
theory of citizenship. Instead, in this introduction I try to give a short overview of the development of 
the most relevant concepts, to create a better understanding of these concepts.  
 
The Greek model on citizenship, based on the writings of Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC), presumes that 
in a city state (polis) individual citizens come together and form a community (koinônia) that brings 
together common interests and functions (as cited in Miller 2011; 2). In Politics (book II) Aristotle 
defines this as the city being a partnership between citizens (as cited in Clayton 2005; 14). In that city 
people, considered citizens (restricted only to a selective group of people), ruled the city state, which 
reflects in the Greek word demokratia (democracy), consisting of demos (people) and kratos (rule). 
Very specific to this model was the fact that it was situated only in the city and that it presumed a form 
of selfless service to the public good.  
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Democracy is said to influence the behaviour of citizens in different ways; 1) through the freedoms that 
come with democracy: freedom of speech, assembly, press, all giving citizens the information they 
need to form an opinion on the quality of the states work, 2) because citizens (and who these citizens 
are depends on the definition of membership used) get a say in who represent them, 3) democracy is 
norm setting, changing the preferences of people. When it comes to the state actors that interact with 
citizens, democracy changes their behaviour too. Through democracy citizens are able to sanction the 
state, and the state is more likely to operate in a more impartial way, with citizens having a say in the 
policies made (Levi 2001; 14).  
 
The Roman model of citizenship consists of two main characteristics. The republican model of 
citizenship is one in which the common people where able to appoint people who represented them. 
This was a new development as the common people were not fully represented before. The 
aristocracy had all powers before and found itself being confronted with chosen representatives. It 
didn‟t mean that the process of power to the people was complete. The senate was the highest 
institution in the republic and this institute was still ruled by the aristocrats. This situation resulted in a 
class conflict, in which citizenship was much more instrumental, creating a balance between the two 
groups. It was also the start of a form of democracy in which people participated in the collective, more 
for their own self-interest (Leydet 2011). The Roman republic turned into an empire when the Romans 
conquered other countries, leading to an imperial state form. Due to this expansion, the first thing that 
changed was   the criteria for membership. People from concurred lands became citizens of the 
empire. Along with this change came the introduction of legal vs. political citizenship. This meant that 
all citizens of the empire fell under the same laws, while their political citizenship was related to the 
place where they lived. This separate existence of legal citizenship and political citizenship made 
private interests and the protection thereof even more prominent. It also resulted in a situation that a 
citizen of the conquered countries fell under Roman law, but voted for representatives in the 
government in his own country. This increased legal equality, but distanced the subjects from the 
lawmakers. It meant that people were ruled, instead of ruling themselves (Allen 2007; 6). 
 
These political and legal views come back in two political traditions that are still very relevant; the 
republican and liberal tradition. The republican tradition considers liberty to be the result of laws that 
were created by citizens. Liberalism on the other hand sees laws as necessary but not preferred, and  
aims to preserve liberty as much as possible. 
 
The increasing distance between the rulers and the once that are ruled, lead to the idea that the law 
was something situated outside the people, it was either nature or a god that created these laws. This 
subsequently led to monarchies, in which there was very little consent of the people necessary to 
create a law. Most of the theories of citizenship that were developed all revolve around the way the 
social contract between citizens is being shaped.  Two 17
th
 century English philosophers, Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke debated the characteristics of the social contract. Hobbes argues that human 
beings are pursuing self-interest aggressively and distrust others. The state could offer security 
against the hard and violent world out there. Locke on the other hand saw the state as the main 
danger for the liberty of citizens. Locke said; “to think that men are so foolish, that they take care to 
avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to 
be devoured by lions”. Citizens can handle other citizens, it is the state (the lion) that it should be wary 
of. This example illustrates the dilemma of the relationship between the state and citizens (Mikelman 
2011; 2). 
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The two great revolutions related to the relationship between citizens and the state, being the 
American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789, both tried to find ways to solve the 
dilemma of the social contract. The constitutions that were formulated were contracts between 
citizens. In the American constitution „we the people‟ are the central subject, while the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizens states that every individual has the right to be a 
member of a 'nation' (Halfmann 1998; 514). Bellamy (2008), argues that in the French Declaration the 
nation is considered to be the midway between Aristotle‟s city state and the Roman empire, the “most 
viable alternative” (Bellamy 2008; 43). The city state was too small to defend itself against external 
aggression, while the empire was too big to allow meaningful political participation. Most nations are of 
a size that makes both possible. These models have laid the foundation for the theories of citizenship 
that have political participation at its core. Bellamy stresses that we should not see the later 
developments of citizenship theories as a linear development. But the fact that many later scholars 
refer back to these models shows the importance to later theories.  
 
Many current definitions emphasize the (legal) membership side of citizenship (who is a citizen and 
who is not), originating mostly from political science literature (Jonoski 1998; 10, Hirschman 1970 in 
Ådnanes 2004; 795). Roelofs, on the other hand states that „being a good citizen‟ means; knowing 
citizenship rights and tending to volunteer activities, and by doing so he defines citizenship in a social 
way (Roelofs 1957 in Jonoski 1998; 10). Tonkens, takes this active role further (Tonkens 2009; 1). She 
distinguishes active citizenship as a way of citizens taking their responsibility to contribute to society. It 
originates from the interaction between citizens and the state. The feminist political theorist C. Mouffe 
(1992: 3) states that “the notions of citizenship and community have been stripped of much of their 
content by liberal individualism, and we need to recover the dimension of active participation that they 
hold in the classical republican tradition”. It needs citizens that feel responsibility to contribute to 
society and can bare that responsibility. Furthermore it needs state institutions that invite, supports and 
equips citizens, to take up that active role. Active citizenship is defined in literature (Marshall 1965 in 
Ådnanes 2004; 798), as consisting of agency and participation. It presupposes the idea that being a 
citizen, “in the legal and sociological sense, means to enjoy the rights of citizenship  
necessary for agency and social and political participation. To act as a citizen involves fulfilling  
the full potential of the status” (Harcup 2011; 16). Where previous scholars focus mainly on rights and 
responsibilities, Rustow in Kuzio (2001; 170) emphasizes the importance of consensus on certain 
values for stable democracies, while Canovan and Miller (in Kuzio 2001; 171) state that a functioning 
democracy needs „communal solidarity‟ based on trust and a shared national identity. 
 
The introduction above has shown the different aspects of citizenship that have been emphasized, in 
ancient times, by Aristotle and others, and in more recent times, by more recent scholars. One scholar, 
instead of focusing on one of the aspects of citizenship, gave a good overview of the aspects 
mentioned by other scholars. It was Dejaeghere, assistant professor at the University of Minnesota. 
She distinguishes four main aspects; 1) membership, 2) community, 3) rights and responsibilities, and 
4) shared values and morals (Dejaeghere 2008; 359).  
 
In the next sections I address each of these four aspects and then briefly clarify how these connect to 
the focus of this research and the situation in BiH. I also explore theories on trust; because if there is 
one thing that is important in a social contract, it is trust. Trust that all citizens will do their part as part 
of that social contract, and that the state will do its part. 
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 2.1 Membership  
Membership was an aspect of citizenship that was already identified by Aristotle, when he argued who 
should be considered a member of the city-states community, and who, therefore, could be involved in 
democratic decision-making. The definition of membership has undergone several changes through 
time, and very significant changes were related to the emergence of the nation-state, in the eighteen 
century (Habermas in Dejaeghere 2008; 359). In that case membership is related to inclusion into the 
political system, which does not automatically mean inclusion into (all other social systems of) society 
(Halfmann 1998; 513).   
 
Kratochwil, describes states as follows; “it is perhaps best to conceive of citizenship as a space within 
a discourse on politics that institutionalized identities and differences by drawing boundaries, both in 
terms of membership and in terms of the actual political practices that are connected with this 
membership” (Wiener 2007; 16). So by generalizing (my interpretation) people‟s identity and the 
differences between people, and linking this to a political entity, people are made members of a state. 
It can be illustrated by a question about my own identity: in what way do Dutch citizens differ from 
Belgians? What is the unique identity of a Dutch person. Royal highness Princess Maxima of the 
Netherlands has addressed this issue in a speech that she gave at the presentation ceremony of a 
study of the „Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR)‟, a council providing strategic 
policy analysis to the Dutch government. The studies topic was the „Identification with the Netherlands‟ 
and the main claim was that there is no such thing as the „Dutch Identity‟ (WRR 2007). The WRR 
advices the Dutch government not to claim „the Dutch disposition‟, but instead to observe the ways 
citizens feel connected to the Netherlands (nos.nl 2007). Her Royal Highness Princess Maxima of the 
Netherlands endorsed the conclusion of the WRR study in the speech she gave; an opinion that led to 
a lot of critique in the media (nrc.nl 2007, network.tv 2007, Volkskrant.nl 2007), among scholars 
(Ellian, A., Scheffer, P., Kennedy, J.), politicians (Wilders, G. and Verdonk, R.) and within civil society. It 
is not my intention to go into the main arguments of the advice of the WRR or the speech of Princess 
Maxima. Something I did take from her speech was the question she raised when it comes to the 
differences between Dutch citizens and citizens of neighbouring countries. Princess Maxima points out 
there are many regional differences with the Netherlands and that there are many similarities with 
people in regions in neighbouring countries (my interpretation). Still I hold a Dutch passport and am 
therefore a Dutchman, a subject of the Dutch state. 
The legal criteria for membership are defined by law and there are two main forms of membership that 
can be distinguished around the world. There is „jus sanguinis‟, meaning that the nationality of people 
is based on the nationality of the persons parents. The other form is „jus soli‟, meaning the right of the 
soil, which results in citizenship being determined by the place this person is born. Furthermore, the 
right to citizenship is recognized by Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a basic 
human right and is also a basis for the exercise of many other rights.  
 
From the explanation above we learn that, citizenship as a legal status can be assigned to a person 
based on blood-line or place of birth, but we also learn that the legal status is not the only aspect of 
membership. On the other hand, becoming a member of a social system is far from self-evident.  
 
The constitution of the current state of BiH tries to hold three ethnic / religious groups together despite 
a recent violent relationship. In line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the constitution of 
BiH guarantees membership to all citizens of BiH, while the primary responsibility for assigning 
membership is the responsibility of the two political entities that were created.  
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The constitution of BiH states that "no person shall be deprived of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Entity 
citizenship arbitrarily or so as to leave him/her stateless". It goes on to say that no person shall be 
deprived of citizenship on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
Citizens of the republic of Yugoslavia held dual citizenship; “that of the federal state, and that of one of 
the six republics”. Citizenship of the republic became important only when inter-republic relations were 
at stake. In daily life all citizens were equal before the law, no matter the republic they were living in.  
 
Despite the legal framework defining membership, the events in BiH have shown that there is a clear 
distinction between membership of a legal entity, being the state, and membership of a community. 
Clearly the war has forced people to draw towards their ethnic communities and by doing this linking 
citizenship to the community.  
 
 2.2 Community  
One of the scholars linking citizenship and community is the British Sociologist T.H. Marshall (1950: 
28-9), he provided a definition of citizenship that is still considered by many as one of the basis for a 
modern day definition of citizenship. He states that “citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are 
full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and 
duties with which the status is endowed” (in Lister 1997; 29). When subsequently looking up the word 
„community‟ in a dictionary we see explanations like; “a group of people having cultural, religious, 
ethnic, or other characteristics in common”, “people living in one locality”, “a group of nations having 
certain interests in common”, “society”, “common ownership or participation” and “similarity or 
agreement (community of interests)” , in the World English Dictionary. 
 
Marshall was certainly not the first to connect community and citizenship. According to Aristotle every 
city-state was a sort of community, and was established and aimed at achieving good things for their 
community. Aristotle calls this a political community (Miller 2011; 3). When subsequently looking at 
Anderson‟s definition of the nation, we can see that this (political) community forms an important basis 
for the nation; “it is an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion” (Anderson 1983; 6). Or simply said; “All that I can find to say is that a nation exists 
when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave 
as if they formed one” (Seton-Watson 1977, in Anderson 1983, 7). Etzioni (2011; 336) argues that 
communities are defined by social collectivities, in which members are bound together by affection and 
a core of shared values. This clear link between community and shared values and morals is 
confirmed by research (R. Puntnam and F. Fukuyama, and before them; R. Bellah and other 
sociologists) that shows that when a sense of community is not present, this leads to detachment and 
a feeling of alienation, leading to withdrawal from society, and acting in anti-social way (Etzioni 2011; 
339). It supports what neo-communitarian scholars have said to be the strong side of communities, 
being that informal social control is institutionalized, which stimulates „moral commitment‟ to other 
members of the community (Etzioni 2011 ; 340).  
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 2.3 Shared values and morals 
According to Cogan and Morris (2001), understanding, and in many cases, accepting the values of a 
community, and committing to them, is the only way to obtain membership of a community, which 
means access to citizenship (in Dejaeghere 2008; 361).  
This relates closely to what says about a social group; “A social group involves first of all an affinity 
with other persons by which they identify with one another, and by which other people identify them. A 
person's particular sense of history, understanding of social relations and personal possibilities, her or 
his mode of reasoning, values, and expressive styles are constituted at least partly by her or his group 
identity” (Young 1989; 259). And as we have seen in the previous paragraph, the fact that people 
within a nation don‟t know each other all personally, by feeling one with the values and morals of a 
social group, someone can become part of the community.  
 
The introduction of this chapter also shows that, because of individualism, the assumption that the 
community is formed by like-minded people, is stretched. The example of BiH shows that when values 
and norms of the different groups seem to go apart too much (I say „seem‟, because in reality they 
might not differ that much, but in the minds of people, and especially politicians, they do. In my opinion 
this is a matter of negatively influenced perception), it is hard to form one community. At the same time 
scholars like Kennedy (2005) argue that multicultural societies show that different values come 
together in one country, and that, although these values might be contested and are a cause for 
debate, they may also unite. Studies into the definition of morals and values in different societies have 
led to eight distinct „value-clusters‟; democratic values, civic life and community values, fair 
government, national identity, social cohesion/diversity, self-cultivation, economic life and family values 
(Cogan and Morris 2001; 7). Its importance perceived differently, and in different combinations these 
value-clusters can be seen as the forms of values important to a community. 
 
Studies into the creation of new communities, like that of the European Union, state that when 
debating “the terms of citizenship” and “struggles for access to participation”, a process is initiated that 
can lead to the creation of shared values and norms, among all that are involved in this process. This 
can lead to the feeling of belonging to a specific group, a community (Wiener 2007; 17). 
 
Another way, through which shared values and morals create collectivity, is when they result in the 
creation of laws. Instead of restricting the individual liberties, laws are the expression of the individual 
freedoms, according to Rousseau. So, breaking the law means that the offender(s) need(s) to be 
made aware of the fact that a collective decision was violated. It is the institutions (justice and police) 
that keep up the principles of justice, “as well as a set of norms and values” (Wiener 2007; 11). We 
need to be aware that, for people to have the feeling that these laws are their laws, they need to have 
had a say in the creation of these laws. This will be explained further in paragraph 2.5 that is dealing 
with the topic of trust. In a situation where people had no say in the creation of laws, for instance in a 
dictatorship, the theory is that it will be harder for people to accept the laws, and its enforcement. This 
also relates closely to the topic of the next paragraph: rights and responsibilities, in which the role of 
citizens towards their community and the rights and responsibilities they have are further explored.  
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 2.4 Rights and responsibilities  
As argued by the British Sociologist T.H. Marshall in his definition of citizenship, all members of a 
community are, in principle, equal “with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is 
endowed” (in Jonoski 1998; 3). 
Rights and responsibilities concern the citizenship rights that each citizen has according to the 
constitution, while with responsibilities / obligations scholars mean the obligations citizens have 
towards the welfare of the community. It results in a situation that a democratic citizen is a person that 
is simultaneously, or in sequence, a person that rules and is ruled (Janowitz 1980; 3), meaning that 
citizens join in the governance of society and at the same undergo governance by the state. As we 
have seen in the introduction of this chapter, this is done through democratic processes, through which 
citizens can influence the creation, maintenance and enforcement of laws. 
Marshall (1964) states that there is a range of citizenship rights which are legal, political, social, and 
participatory rights (Jonoski 1998; 6). And citizenship rights consist of 4 characteristics; 1) 
membership: determining who is member of nation-state and who is not. This determines who has 
rights and who doesn‟t, 2) active capacities to influence politics and passive rights of existence under 
legal system, 3) being universal, applying to all citizens and, 4) equality: rights and obligations of 
citizens are balanced as much as possible (Isin and Turner 2002; 13). 
  
Finally citizenship rights and obligations exist on 3 levels; 1) the societal: development of citizen rights 
and obligations in countries, 2) the organizational: rights and obligations of groups, to form and act in 
the public arena and 3) the individual level: how do individuals see the relationship between rights and 
obligations? That last level relates most to the concept of CP, as this connects to the citizenship right 
of protection by the state, while at the same time, CP needs citizens to help the police in preventing 
and solving crimes (SDC 2010; 18). 
In more general terms, Marshall (1964) states that citizenship responsibility consists of the obligation 
to pay taxes, be educated, participation in the military service, and service to the community (in 
Janowitz 1980; 5). In many countries military services has been abolished and has been replaced by 
an army staffed by volunteers and professionals. Cooperation with the police is seen as a citizen 
obligation in most countries. In some countries (like the U.K. and the U.S.A.) the state kept relying on 
citizens for policing duties, in the form of “watch and ward”; „observation‟ and „warning the police‟. In 
these countries the state saw this as an obligation that citizens have towards the state and the society 
at large.  
How people respond to these „citizen obligations‟ in relation to their rights will be discussed below, 
based on my fieldwork results, (recent) history of BiH, and earlier experiences with CP. In general, 
what I observed was that the IC has made sure that the laws of the new state of BiH are in compliance 
with Universal Human Rights, but what seems to be lacking is that citizens feel confident enough to 
pick up the responsibilities that are bestowed upon them by the democratic system they find 
themselves in now; one of factors of influence, being the lack of trust in the state, and the trust in other 
citizens of BiH to live up to these responsibilities. As we will see later in this thesis, this responsibility is 
the key factor to the way safety and security can be provided in a democratic system; the state cannot 
perform its task in this field on its own. Without citizens taking a role in the creation, preservation and 
sometimes enforcement of the law, anarchy or a police state would be logical alternatives. 
Before we go to my fieldwork results we need to explore the role of trust in citizenship as this will a key 
factor of the relationship between citizens and the state.  
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 2.5 Trust 
As mentioned in the introduction, trust is a key factor in a social contract between citizens and 
between citizens and the state, especially in a country as BiH, where history has proven that trust 
between citizens and trust between citizens and the state has disappeared. To be able to detect and 
explain the situations where trust has played a key role, we need to get a better understanding of the 
concept „trust‟ and the way it is said to play a role in the relationship between citizens and the state, 
and between citizens bilaterally. Renewed attention for the role of trust in this process of establishing 
democratic rule was the result of the emergence of many new democracies, often in Eastern Europe 
and the former Yugoslav republics where communist regimes fell. When we talk about trust, there 
always is a chance of distrust, as before, during and after the war in Yugoslavia. Therefore, in this 
paragraph, an overview of the main views on trust and distrust, and the role of the state in creating 
trust.  
 
Trust is defined as “a variety of phenomena that enable individuals to take risk in dealing with others, 
solve collective action problems, or act in ways that seem contrary to standard definitions of self-
interest” (Levi 2001; 1). Hardin (1993 in Levi 2001) argues that trust can be seen as „encapsulated 
interest‟; meaning that both actors in a relationship play a role and that trust in the other presumes an 
interest of the other to act in the interest of the first. Therefore an assessment is being made if an actor 
is trustworthy, and can be given trust. Only if this trustworthiness is being confirmed, the trust 
continues. That is why Dasgupta (1988; 50) says; “interpersonal trust, may be „a fragile commodity‟, 
hard to construct and easy to destroy”. According to Levi (1988, 1997; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992 in 
Levi 2001) trust plays an important role in compliance of citizens, with government regulations. 
Interestingly the state and its institutions consists of individuals, and therefore, in this thesis, a 
distinction will be made between trust in an individual and an institution. “Only persons can trust or be 
trusting”, but trustworthiness can be linked to individuals and institutions. “Trustworthiness of an 
institution can be defined as the agents of institutions that are competent, credible and likely to act in 
the interest of those being asked to trust the institution”. This shows that agents of the institution need 
to prove trustworthy for citizens to be able to trust the institution, confirmed by Waddington (2010; 
197). 
 
As said, there are two sides to a medal, trusting can turn out positive, but negative as well. Then it 
turns into distrust. In a post war situation, like that of BiH, it is quite understandable that there was a 
distrust  of citizens towards the state and state institutions, like the police, and between citizens of 
different ethnic groups. By being distrustful citizens try to protect themselves from the harm that could 
be inflicted on them. As Gambetta (in Levi 2001; 4) describes, “Collective distrust can lead to an 
effective and efficient organization of a group, while it can distance citizens from members of the other 
group at the same time”. And this was exactly the case in BiH during and after the war. The ethnic 
groups distrusted each other and organized themselves, to become strong groups, and strong 
opponents.  
 
A common assumption is that development of centralized states led to the decline of social cohesion in 
communities, reduced cooperation among people, and apparently destroyed trust among people 
(Taylor 1982 and Gellner 1988). The question is whether this really is the case.  
 
By quoting both scholars that argue for these assumptions and scholars that are much more nuanced 
about this, Levi, in her article, shows that there was more than just social cohesion in small 
communities before the central state developed.  
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Distrust among family members, villages and towns, for instance, was present as well.  
Nevertheless, the state can both play a role in the decline of interpersonal trust, at the same 
time the state often plays an important role in establishing levels of trust among citizens, that make it 
possible for them to place trust in people they don‟t know personally; something that is important as 
we will see in chapter 4 (state and nation building). When the state wants to promote trust among 
citizens then citizens need to trust the state and its services in their role as „trust producing‟  
(Waddington 2010; 198). The central state has many tools at its disposal to enhance this trust. 
Through the states coercive powers the state might be able to prevent violence between groups, it is 
not the ideal tool to improve trust (Bradford 2010; 184). For it not to come to that, the state can make 
sure that essential information is available, that the relationship between citizens is monitored, and 
that problems are dealt with by enforcing rules. By doing this the state facilitates trust and enables 
social, political and economic activities. An examples is when minority rights are being guaranteed by 
the state, it enables citizens to work together, despite the initial distrust that might have been present. 
Something that is especially important in the post war situation of BiH.  
 
Levi argues that a trustworthy state is able to influence interpersonal trust within the community. The 
theory states that when all goes well the social and economic situation should improve, which 
subsequently should positively affect the state‟s capacity to govern, and should result in citizens 
becoming more receptive for the states directives, laws and demands. And, as becomes clear all 
through Levi‟s argument: when the state fails to improve trust, or as a result of this, improve the social 
and economic situation, this might adversely affect events. To prevent this from happening, a 
trustworthy state is needed, and that is not something that comes naturally in a war torn country like 
BiH. For the state to be trustworthy, it should have policies and procedures that are made and 
implemented in a fair way and that feel legitimate. Furthermore the state‟s commitment should be real 
and genuine.  
 
For the state to show its fairness four criteria are distinguished by Levi: 
1 enforcing laws so that everyone complies with the agreed rules and values, making sure these  
 policies apply to all. “When citizens doubt the commitment of the state to enforce the laws and 
 if its information and guarantees are not credible, then the state‟s capacity to generate 
 interpersonal trust will diminish” (Levi 2001; 7). Reaffirmed by Bradford (2010; 197) in his 
article focusing on trust in the police as representative of the state, in which he (based on Tyler 
1990; Tyler and Huo 2002) underlines the importance of “fair procedures and just treatment” 
by providing “uniform service” to all citizens, instead of tailored service for specific groups of 
citizens, 
2 make majorities as well as minorities feel respected by making sure “those who lose can 
sometimes win”. It relates to the fact that in democracies there are majorities and minorities 
(as we were able to see in citizenship). If the majority would be the only one benefitting this 
would likely lead to distrust within the minority. In most democracies, majorities don‟t stay 
majorities all the time, meaning that if these two groups don‟t make concessions to each other, 
once in a while, it might be counterproductive for them later on. In this way people are said to 
be more likely to accept unfavourable outcomes, 
 
3 involving people in the policy making process. This could be done by involving community 
representatives, interest groups, but also just by a fair democratic process in an elective body. 
Idea behind this is that people are more willing to follow policies that were formulated through 
a process that is considered legitimate,  
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4 establish impartial institutions that rule over disputes in a fair manner; accept making sure that  
all citizens are treated equal, makes it more likely that citizens will except the decisions taken. 
 
But none of this will work when citizens don‟t see the state as trustworthy. Therefore the state needs to 
make sure it has its own house in order. And as we were able to read before, the trustworthiness of an 
institution is defined by the agents of institutions that are reliable (not braking their promises) 
competent and working for the good of the people they are serving. This is supported by findings of 
Sandholtz & Taagepera who studied communist countries. According to them the politicians, who are 
being seen as serving their own interest instead of the public interest, are responsible for a decrease 
in trust in the state. One of the ways to regain trust in the state, according to Levi, is to sanction civil 
servants who choose for short time (personal) gains, as happens when a police officer is corrupted. By 
sanctioning them, they are expected, to work in the interest in of the state again. As mentioned above, 
in a democratic state the interest of the state should closely relate to the interests of its citizens.  
Sherman and Levi (1997) show that rewarding (amongst others, financial compensation) competent 
and honest civil servants can also contribute to the prevention of corruption. By doing so, citizens 
would place more trust in these civil servants, as they learn what they can expect of these competent 
and honest civil servants (Levi 2001; 8). Another way would of course be to hire the right personnel, 
proven its competence. This would also show the impartiality and trustworthiness of the state, 
according to Weber (1968 in Levi 2011; 11).  
 
The importance of this is underlined by Coleman who explains the mechanism of transferring trust. 
When someone is trusted by others whom you trust, you are more likely to trust this person as well. 
According to Coleman this principal also applies to trusting the state. When people have had positive 
experiences with representatives of the state, these citizens are more likely to see the state as a 
trustworthy institute (Levi 2001; 6). Same goes for trust that is developed, or not harmed, in one 
domain of the state. This trust can be adopted by other domains in the state. Meaning that, in light of 
this thesis, if people have developed trust in the new police, it is likely that they will also put more trust 
in other domains of the state (Fleming & McLaughlin 2010; 199). Unfortunately this effect is two sided. 
Lack of trust, in for instance the politicians, may have a negative influence on level of trust in the state, 
and therefore the police. Jennings (1995 in Levi 2001; 7) points out that we need to distinguish the 
different state levels and institutes, as trusting the one doesn‟t automatically mean that the other is 
trusted.  
 
Putnam states that people “who have learned to trust individuals”, for instance through non-formal 
education, are more likely to trust other people they don‟t know, until they are proven wrong of course. 
I would argue that the situation in BiH is opposite, due to experience during the war, many people no 
longer trusted their fellow countrymen. It isn‟t likely they will trust them again, until proven otherwise 
(Levi 2001, 6). When citizens feel they no longer benefit from the presence of a state, they are likely to 
distrust the state. Levi even mentions a „costs and benefits analyses‟ that citizens make (Levi 2011; 9). 
If a state is fair and capable of being reciprocal that will be able to gain citizens trust. “When they 
experience a return for their compliance with the states rules and when they feel treated with respect”, 
quote from Levi 2001; 12. Civil servants treating citizens disrespectful therefore would be very 
counterproductive. 
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To see how citizenship theories link to real life it is time to discover the streets of Mostar. To meet the 
citizens of the city that is displayed in most studies as a divided city. In the next chapter we will meet 
some of the citizens of the city, meet police officers that work in Mostar and members of the IC whose 
task it is to help improve the quality of the work of the security sector. Through interviews and 
observations I have tried to gain an insight into the relationship between citizens and the police as 
representative of the state.  
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3 EXPERIENCING THE STREETS OF MOSTAR; case study 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter both rights and responsibilities form an important part of 
citizenship, as does trust. One of my main observations was that both citizens and representatives of 
the state were struggling fill in their own rights and responsibilities, and the role they both play in the 
division and balance between the two. Despite the fact that the war seems to be history to many of the 
citizens of Mostar, the conflict undoubtedly had a great influence on the current socio-political structure 
in the country. The balance between the rights and responsibilities of the citizens and the state 
established during Tito‟s rule, evolved gradually, but changed more radical after his death (more on 
this in paragraph 4.1, describing the history of Yugoslavia, leading up the war). The war that erupted 
shook up society so badly that the social and political balance got disrupted, and people‟s trust in each 
other and the state changed radically. Neighbours who trusted each other before the war became 
enemies, police officers who people might have turned to for help in Yugoslavia took up their weapons 
against these same citizens and politicians, representing the „opposition‟, other people of Yugoslavia, 
who were working together towards an ideal Yugoslavia became each other‟s adversaries. 
 
Now, fifteen years after the war, people in Mostar and the police, as being one of the representatives 
of the state, need to find a way to live and work together. Therefore they need to develop trust in each 
other, take up their own responsibilities and be assured of their rights. My fieldwork has shown that 
key to the reestablishment of this structure of rights and responsibilities is trust. Trust between citizens 
of different ethnic groups, and trust between citizens and the state. Ever since the war the IC has tried 
to support BiH to recover. One way of doing this was by taking on the lead in the peace process, and 
by suggesting solutions in the form of state structures and later on, suggesting and pushing for the 
implementation of new work ethics in the field. 
From the moment the DPA was signed, the IC took an active role in following the agenda agreed upon 
in the DPA. But it was an agenda full of ideals and assumptions, set by negotiators; politicians, civil 
servants and military officers could not determine how citizens and civil servants in the field would fill 
in their rights and responsibilities and how this process would influence the trust they have in each 
other and the agenda that had been set. The new division between rights and responsibilities in the 
new country of BiH, set down in the DPA, had to find its own way on the streets of Mostar. 
 
To demonstrate this, in this chapter, I first describe a walk through the city of Mostar, guided by an 
anthropology student, trying to give the reader a broader understanding of this city with its multiple 
facades, followed by an insight into the experiences of some of the police officers in Mostar, mainly the 
police officers involved in CP. The main focus is their interaction with citizens and the way they see 
their role as police officers, preserving the laws. Second a description of the way citizens of Mostar 
experience their safety situation and how they see their own role and that of the police. 
 
Finishing this chapter with an unique insight into the way EUPM mission members experience their 
role in the process of re-establishing trust between citizens and the state and finding a balance 
between rights and responsibilities for both parties.  
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 3.1 Discovering the streets of Mostar 
The dramatic war history of Mostar, the symbolic destruction of the ancient bridge Stari Most, and the 
intense involvement of the IC to restore peace and cooperation across the division lines lead to a 
situation in which Mostar became both a symbol of, and a magnet for, reunification efforts (including 
many projects) and much research into this topic.  
What I have found, reading literature on Mostar, and conducting interviews on this topic, is that people 
and researches have created a standard story consisting of metaphors. Metaphors like:  „crossing the 
border between the ethnicities‟, „bridging the gap‟, and „a need for new politics‟ (respondent 39). 
Metaphors used by many, but practiced by few. In literature and project reports „bridging the divide‟ 
has become a symbolic reference to the ethnic groups opposing each other and the destroyed Stari 
Most that symbolizes that distance between the two comes back over and over again. 
The divided city is the main focus point in other researches but not the focus of my research, 
therefore I tried to make this clear to my respondents. I did not want to approach this city as being a 
divided city, but I wanted to get to know the city like it is experienced by its inhabitants. And it is exactly 
that perspective that is important to be able to place my research findings. Me not becoming part of 
the many metaphors used for the situation in this city, but based on the realities of citizens, and based 
on how police officers and EUPM members experience them in their day to day life.  
Preparing for this research one of the first things that I did was to get hold of a good map of 
the city, which was necessary to orient myself and to get a better understanding of the makeup of the 
city (appendix 2).  As Mostar was a tourist destination in Yugoslav times, and has become a tourist 
destination again after the war, most of the maps available are maps designed for tourists, with the 
touristic highlights of the city in the centre of the map. In the „field‟ I found out that the design of the city 
is quite different from the one displayed on most maps; being that the historic Ottoman centre, that is 
displayed as the city centre, is not the city centre as it is experienced by its citizens. Furthermore the 
recent history of the city makes us look at the East and West side of the city and the dividing line that 
we expect to be in the middle of the two. For those who have not studied the situation, the River 
Neretva, running through the city from North to South, is the first obvious point of orientation. But 
studying the course of the war we learn that the dividing line was not the River Neretva but the 
boulevard, running more to the West, and also from North to South, parallel to the river. The historic 
centre of Mostar, with the rebuild Stari Most as the centre piece, is not the only centre of the city. The 
part of the city situated parallel to the boulevard, in the direction to the Neretva and close to the 
Gymnasium, was assigned by the IC as the central zone designated to the cities official institutions.    
 
Talking with, and observing the people living in Mostar, it becomes clear that they view their city from a 
totally different perspective. Looking at the way they move through the city, the places they visit and 
parts of the city they relate to in our conversations, I concluded that they look at ‘their‟ Mostar from a 
personal perspective. For instance, for some the centre of the city is not so much the historic city or 
the central zone with all the local authorities‟ buildings, but they define the city centre by places that 
are important in their daily life. The young students I met told me they regularly spend their time at the 
university and at the many coffee bars that can be found all across both parts of the city.  
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Life in West Mostar centres around the Rondo, the roundabout not far from the city park and along the 
Kralia Tomislava, where the West Mostar university is situated close to. In East Mostar the university 
lies on the edge of the city located in a former military base, north of the cities‟ train station, between 
the main road to Sarajevo and the River Neretva, and is surrounded by a high wall. The landscaped 
park with the many different buildings at the outer site (faculty buildings, cafés, a mosque, sport 
facilities, but also housing for displaced persons and further away from the rest of the site, the base of 
a special police unit) is a district on its own. The city centre is much more than the historic centre that 
mostly aims for the many tourists visiting Mostar. Most Mostarians living in the East of Mostar spend 
much of their time in the streets between Musala square and the historic centre.  
 
These descriptions show that, for the people living in Mostar, the city of Mostar looks quite different 
from the city displayed in the map. It is important to be aware of this, as it is too easy to see the city as 
a two sided city, centred around Stari Most, and divided in an Eastern / Bosniac and a Western / Croat 
side, just because its war history and post war development. Despite the fact that, in general, it could 
be argued that the majority of Bosniacs live on the East side of Mostar, and Croats in the West, based 
on observation and general demographic information people in Mostar don‟t seem to experience the 
city to be a divided one, as they have everything they need on their side of the city. At the same time, if 
they need something from the other side of town, most people feel free enough to travel to the other 
side. I experienced this when I joined some young journalists from West Mostar to visit a concert in a 
discotheque in East Mostar. I also met a respondent, a Bosniac, living in West Mostar. Responding to 
my surprised question why it was that he lived on this side of the city he simply stated that he was able 
to find a good apartment for a reasonable price on the West side. And that might well be the right and 
only explanation for his choice. But in my opinion, the fact that it was this respondent that took this 
step (which might seem quite unlikely in the apparently divided city), can also be explained by the fact 
that the respondent is a young idealist, active in a liberal political party and a firm believer that the 
citizens in Mostar can work together much more closely. Due to the fact that he and his family fled to 
the Netherlands during the war, he views his fellow Mostarians in a different way, making it easier for 
him to take this step. 
 
During one of my observations sessions I sat at a coffee bar on the corner of Adema Buca and Titov 
Most, that looks out on a road connecting East and West Mostar, from the train station in East Mostar 
to Spanish square on the edge of West Mostar (appendix 2). It is a busy road, with shops, a bank, 
hotel, and coffee bars on both sides. The road lies in an area that has been pinpointed by the IC as 
the central zone when they started to get involved in the reconstruction of Mostar. They choose to 
have a central zone to host the cities‟ institutions, meant for both sides of the city, and to form a literal 
connection between the two sides of the city. It is in this zone that many communal institutes have 
their offices the city authorities, the water company, the central post office but it is also the place where 
the prison is located.  
 
Looking out over the crossroad I observed a situation that I described in my research diary as: 'land 
without rules'. During the two hours I sat there nobody seemed to be obeying the basic traffic rules; 
cars in line for a red traffic light, blocking the cross road; cars from the other street driving up the 
crossroad anyway, and by doing so blocking the whole crossroad. Extensive use of the claxon was the 
result.  On other moments cars were parked on the sidewalk, blocking it for pedestrians. 
 
 
Sitting there in the sun, doing what is so typical in Mostar, drinking coffee, the whole situation gave me 
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a relaxed feeling; a relaxed atmosphere that can be experienced all over BiH. At the same time it is a 
typical example of how daily things like traffic don‟t seem to work, at least not through the eyes of a 
Dutch research student. It relates to what one of the respondents (29), working for EUPM, made clear 
to me; “the Dutch word for traffic is „verkeer‟, derived from the word „verkeren‟, (which can be 
translated as „working or living together‟) it is this basic agreement to live and work together on the 
street, in traffic, which is not taking place, in BiH, the way it should”. Respondent 29 finds this 
characteristic for life in BiH. People, despite their differences could be expected to live together, and 
work together, to make everyone‟s life more easy and enjoyable. But people here seem to live their 
own life and don‟t seem to care so much about the life of people who are not close to them. Not 
realizing that their behaviour influences (positively and negatively) the lives of others. If they would 
realize this, respondent 29 was suggesting, this could be the first step in changing the chaotic situation 
at the crossroad that resembles the social and political situation in BiH. 
 
 3.2 Policing the streets of Mostar 
Sitting at the terrace of this coffee bar I was also able to observe the response of the Mostar police to 
this somewhat chaotic scene. Driving up to the crossroad, the first thing that I noticed was that the 
police officers were not wearing their seatbelts. Reflecting on this while writing my thesis this could 
also be explained by the fact that police officers need to be able to get out of their cars quickly in case 
of an emergency and therefore not always wear their seatbelt. In that case it says something about my 
presumptions. Furthermore they stopped in the middle of the crossroad, not giving way when they 
should, and not letting pedestrians safely cross the zebra. Clearly, obeying traffic laws - laws that 
should be common to all (and kept by the majority) - was not part of their daily routine. This made 
them blend in and not setting the good example. We could wonder if they even knew this traffic law 
themselves, but as far as I know, they did. Everybody is confronted with these laws daily, and 
therefore are taught in primary school, and later for the driving license test. So they should be common 
knowledge. At the same time enforcing the law didn‟t happen either. Despite the fact that there was a 
car parked on the sidewalk the police officers did not take any action.  
 
This was not the only moment when I observed police officers witnessing laws being infringed under 
their eyes, without taking action. I also witnessed this when I sat down, again at a coffee bar, just 
outside the police station of the Mostar police. Situated in the middle of a square of housing blocks in 
West Mostar, a little bit hidden for visitors who stroll along Mostar‟s main roads, it‟s a coming and 
going of citizens and police officers. And during the course of my research, this would also become a 
place that I visited more than once, and a place that I walked by and observed even more. 
The place where I was sitting was situated in the outside corner of an L shaped road, with the police 
station also situated in the corner of that L. 
A road mainly meant for people living in the apartment blocks situated around that road, and leading to 
a parking place for residents and visitors of the police station. But the road was much busier than that. 
It was clearly used by people trying to escape the busy main roads. One police officer was assigned 
the duty to „guard‟ the entrance to the site of the police station, patrolling „his strip‟ back and forth. 
Probably there is a parking prohibition in the street, looking at how narrow it is, and the fact that there 
are several parking lots. (Noting this I realized that in the Netherlands it would be quite obvious that 
this street would have a sign saying that it is prohibited to park cars along the road, but, here I am in 
BiH, and apparently I had been in BiH long enough to doubt these assumptions that were so clear to 
me.)  
 
The police officer points out the parking prohibition to some motorists parking their car along the road, 
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by blowing his whistle, or by addressing them. None of the motorists seemed impressed, leaving at 
their own pace, but also without any bad word being said. In the meantime while so many traffic laws 
are violated, with a police officer looking at it, that his positive actions fall in vain when I, being the 
critic that I am, see all the violations taking place. Giving right of way to people coming from the right 
… nobody seems to have heard that this actually is a part of the traffic laws. People seem to do 
whatever they chose.  
 
Later I spoke about the situations where police officers did not seem to uphold the law that actively, 
with the CP officers that I interviewed. I asked them why they thought these police officers did not act 
upon the situation they saw, and why they did not uphold the law.  
Respondents 41, 42, 43 and 44 told me; “talking is an important part of a police officer‟s job, much 
more than it was for the police before the war”. When asked, the CP officers told that; “the police 
before the war was more violent, more repressive and focused on control”. Now it is “more talk talk 
talk”. They talk extensively about the role of the police in post war BiH, that has gone through 
transition along with the political structure, from a hierarchy to a democracy. “We don‟t want to be 
repressive”, they say. They want to take the good parts of the old system and get rid of the bad parts. 
“We are there to deal with the problems of the citizens and make people understand the need to obey 
the laws that are there for the good of all”. This means they want to serve the people instead of using 
force to make people obey the laws, preventing offences from taking place and educating people, 
instead of writing tickets. And, according to them, they need to talk with the citizens of Mostar. 
 
The high ranking officer responsible for education (respondent 44) that I interviewed later on this topic 
told me; “the police had to change from an old system based on militias where the orders came from 
one place, into a new police that defends the democratic state”. When asked about the safety situation 
before and after the war respondent 44 answers; (with a small hidden smile) “It might have been safer 
before the war, but society has changed. We might even have taken over some bad habits from the 
West (meaning Europe / U.S.A). But the change meant that we took the obligation to work with the 
democratic system”. For me this shows an experienced police officer, working for the police long 
before the war that has accepted the changes that the police had to undergo. He realized that his own 
opinion is subsidiary to his responsibilities as member in the management of the Mostar police service.  
 
The CP officers define the main task of a police officer as; „offer safety to the citizens of Mostar by 
protecting them and offer them help and assistance‟. And they explain that they don‟t make a 
difference between citizens, when it comes to their ethnicity, although, at the same time they do „admit‟ 
to have assigned the CP officers to the sectors they work with (appendix 9) according to their ethnic 
background; meaning that the two Bosniac CP officers are assigned to the two sectors in the East, 
while the Croat CP officers are assigned to the sectors in the West. But this doesn‟t mean they make a 
difference in their daily work, as they also don‟t make a difference between the neighbourhoods in the 
city. Crime is crime. The city is too small to pinpoint certain crimes. “Crimes don‟t stay in one part of 
the city”. Crime is crime is a statement that I also heard from a police officer (respondent 40) who had 
clearly nothing to do with the concept of CP.  
He was one of the commanding officers of the Special Police Unit, with barracks on the outskirts of the 
campus of the University Džemal Bijedić, and assigned with police tasks concerning football violence, 
hostages, and other large forms of crime. When asked about the influence of the apparent division in 
Mostar, he simply answered “our job is to catch the big criminals, in East and in West Mostar”, 
subsequently giving examples of actions executed by his unit.  
Respondent 44, the education officer, spend more words on the topic; “The situation is normal now 
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between East and West Mostar. Projects like CP have made this possible. Police officers from the 
East side, who worked in the West were not listened to, but that is not the case anymore, all because 
of these projects. Now driving through a red light is a crime no matter what ethnicity you have”. 
 
The CP officers, at the same time, keep emphasizing that they want to keep away from repression. 
Sounds to me like the textbook of CP in BiH, which at least means the training they received, has 
stayed with them. 
 
But what about the many „small‟ offences that I see happening in the streets, like the car parked on the 
side walk, or the motorist without a helmet stopping at the sidewalk both under the „watchful eye‟ of a 
Mostar police officer? The officers passionately responded to this by explaining to me that policing is 
about giving and taking. “It is our job to assess the situation and determine whether or not the offence 
is hurting anyone, when this is not the case, we should be flexible”. And by flexible they mean that the 
police officer should not just start writing a ticket, they should (for instance) address the driver, not 
more than that. My question was if they felt that citizens understand this flexible / selective way of 
enforcing, and according to the officers they do. According to these officers, the next time, when the 
situation is more serious people would understand better, and would be less likely to commit the 
offence. When later asking the officer responsible for education about this approach he agrees with 
this approach. He explains: “a (police) officer is not just there to write tickets, he works preventive, by 
educating and explaining the people the reasoning behind the law. Then they (citizens) will understand 
why you don‟t park a car on the sidewalk. So without repression we try to deal with the challenges”. He 
thinks educating citizens an important aspect of the work of the police.  
 
This situation made me wonder, do people really understand this selective form of preserving the law 
and would this increase, or decrease the trust in the police? As the responses of many of the citizens I 
spoke to indicated this selectiveness does not necessarily help to make citizens trust the police to do 
their job (also see Bradford 2010; 197). To study this more in depth I described to them the 
conversation I had with a respondent who told me about the lack of trust she had in the 
responsiveness of the emergency services. This respondent (46), a German national who is working in 
Mostar, explained that at a certain moment her car was stolen and she tried to reach the police using 
their general phone number (112 for the police), but they couldn‟t be reached. This is why, nowadays 
she has no general phone numbers of the police in her phone anymore. She only has personal cell 
phone numbers of high ranking police officers, phone numbers that were given to her by locals in case 
she needs to reach the Mostar police. When it comes to medical services she has learned not to trust 
on the ambulance service. Local family members told her that, in case of an emergency, she should 
bring the patient to the hospital herself. And that is what she did when a family member had heart 
failure. She drove him to hospital in her own car.  
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The police officers agree that it is important for the police to respond to all calls. That will improve trust 
among the people. Respondent 44, the education officer, said that “the image of the police is getting 
better. We (he did not specify whether he meant the police or the people) are changing the way of 
thinking. Everybody (all working for the police) should be dealing with the problems of the citizens. 
There is no police when the problems of citizens are not dealt with anymore”. He continues by saying 
that “Police officers know what is stated in the law, so now they have to start working together to tackle 
the problems of the community”. It is this last statement that connects closely to something said by the 
member of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Mostar, Mr. Valentin Inzko, when he was 
announcing the closure of the OHR office in Mostar in June 2010. He explained this decision was 
“driven by what has been achieved in Mostar”. 
After 16 years of the IC‟s involvement in Mostar; a “new Mayor (is) in place, and … the 
administrative unification of Mostar (is) largely complete”. Being aware of the fact that there are still 
enough challenges he says; “Mostar‟s politicians have all the tools they need to make the city work. 
What has been missing is the political will” (OHR 2010). Both statements really support the 
conclusions of my research, namely that it is not the lack of good laws (offering people security of 
rights), but the way they are used and enforced (by police officers) that determine how citizens will 
experience the security of their rights. As we have seen in this paragraph police officers are selective 
when it comes to preserving laws. In the next paragraph we will see how citizens experience this 
police approach and whether or not this gives them the idea that their rights are being protected.  
 
What the CP officers also indicate is that the media mostly focuses on the bad news, but what actually 
should happen is that the successes of CP should be advertised, for instance via the spokesperson of 
the police. When more people know about CP and its successes, than people will be more likely to 
participate. Of course the CP officers confirm that there are officers that are less active in doing their 
job, but all officers are bound to an ethical code for civil servants (RAI Steering Group 2010; 4). If they 
don‟t follow this code they will have to face the consequences. But the CP officers are quick to come 
up with an example from the Netherlands, showing that, also in the Netherlands there are police 
officers not taking their role so serious. Interestingly enough the education officer did the same thing. 
When I asked him about the inactive role of some police officers, he gives an example from the 
Netherlands in which the police did not take action (he says he has relatives living in the Netherlands).  
But he agrees that inactivity can lead to a bad image. There is an ethical code, which he finds in his 
pile of papers, by which police officers are evaluated. A poor assessment can lead to their dismissal. 
 
During my interviews with the CP officers I was interested to find out whether they considered CP to 
be a new concept. So I asked them; “When did you first hear about CP?”, respondent 42 answers; 
“When it was (put) in my job description by my superiors”, continuing by explaining she was a police 
officer assigned to patrol duties (I get the impression that she did not volunteer for this job, but was 
asked by her superiors). Respondent 44 later explained that, as the Mostar police joined in the CP 
project, officers were recruited as special CP officers, and they received a specific job description to go 
with it. Respondent 42 continues to say; “it (CP) was not new to me or any of the other colleagues. 
Contact with citizens is every policeman‟s job. But then it got called CP, and it became more than just 
listening to citizens”.   
 
Because of the apparent change in approach, compared to the approach of the pre-war police, the 
officers told me that in general it is easier for the young officers to become CP officers.  
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This is because the young officers are still in, or have just finished their training, while the older officers 
have been working in the police service for many years and find it harder to change their way of 
working. But all CP officers confirm that CP is an approach that they see as the core to police work 
since the police are there to protect and serve citizens. This is supported by the fact that all police 
officers in Mostar have received a basic training in the „CP approach‟. The education officer says the 
same as the CP officers and he adds that with this training, acceptance came, also for those police 
officers who worked in the old system from before the war.  
 
These answers show that the approach was introduced as core to the police work. But the fact that all 
police officers, especially the ones that worked for the police before the war, needed training, in my 
opinion showed that it was not something that came naturally. And that conclusion is being 
collaborated by the CP officers that say that the police had to change its approach, from a repressive 
approach to an approach in which talking to citizens, and convincing them of the need to obey the law, 
became the norm. I would argue that this change of approach, and the firm rejection of repression as 
the police approach makes many police officers feel insecure. They don‟t feel secure about the way 
they should enforce the law anymore. Should they give an offender a fine, punish the offender by 
sending him to jail or should they talk and convince the offender to obey the law the next time? The 
result of this uncertainty is that the police officers become very selective in preserving the law. More 
often than necessary, and more often than citizens can understand (as will become clear in the next 
paragraph), the police choose not charge the offenders for the small offences, that take place on the 
streets of Mostar every day. 
 
During an interview I asked the education officer how the CP concept was introduced in Mostar. He 
explained that it was introduced by UNIPTF and EUPM and that it was part of 5 projects. One of them 
was aimed directly at the safety of the citizens. As part of this project the CP concept was introduced. 
“Did the EU play a big role in this?” I asked him. Respondent 44 answered; “actually the CP project 
was a Swiss supported project which was introduced by EUPM. Besides the Swiss NGO, a UK NGO 
was involved. The idea was to make a (BiH) strategy with a team of experts coming from all over the 
country and from all kinds of police departments. They had intensive meeting and developed a 
strategy together. Members of the expert committee visited European countries to get ideas”. 
 
When the strategy was taken to the field a local approach was developed for Mostar, resulting in a  
focus on education and meeting people in their neighbourhoods. Respondent 47 explained that the 
focus on education meant visiting primary schools and teach them about safety and about the work of 
the police. According to her this focus on kids by CP officers is good. It gets them to trust the police 
and that is good for the future of the safety situation in Mostar.  
The CP officers were all assigned a certain sector (see appendix 9) in which they maintain these 
contacts. Furthermore, all police officers in the Mostar police service received a basic training to better 
understand the meaning of CP, and this led to a better acceptance of CP among the officers. (more 
information on the organization of the Mostar police in paragraph 4.1.2) 
When interviewing the education officer (respondent 44) I told him that I had always 
understood the CP concept to be all about consulting citizens. I derived this idea from an article (CSS 
2007) on the CP initiative in Brčko District, Bijeljina and Mostar, being initiated by the Centre for 
Security Studies (CSS), in cooperation with a UK based NGO.  
This article states that in Mostar the project was focused on two local communities of Mostar, MZ 
Podhum and MZ Brankovasc (see appendix 2). There, the local administration, the local police and 
citizens were brought together to form Security Forums (more on this initiative in paragraph 4.1.1). 
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Respondent 44  (the education officer) confirmed this and explained that initially (when CSS helped 
introducing CP in Mostar) there were two forums in Mostar. Because the CP officers told me that they 
don‟t use these forums, it led me to believe the forums are not in (active) use anymore. When asking 
the education officer  if people were really attending these forums, I didn‟t get a straight answer. The 
education officer continued explaining; “The forum is an independent body and is in contact with the 
police when necessary”. He continues about new initiatives to bring the police closer to the citizens, for 
instance through a bike and motorbike patrol that will start in Mostar from the 1st of May. I tried to ask 
the question again; “are people actually coming to the forums, as they are such a key part in the CP 
concept?”  He then gave me examples of occurrences where people complained about certain 
situations and where problems were solved through discussion in the forum. For instance, about 
unsafe roads and as a result of the discussion lights being installed. Again no straight answer, but his 
hesitation to answer, his body language and the fact that the CP officers say that they don‟t use these 
forums, led me to believe these are not in (active) use anymore. 
 
This is something that I found really interesting because through a local employee, now working for 
EUPM and before that, working for the previous police missions, I came to understand that a form of 
meetings, similar to the citizens’ forum, introduced by CSS, was in place when Tito‟s communist party 
still ruled over Yugoslavia. When asked if there was a community / neighbourhood structure in which 
people could share their needs and problems with the municipality, as representative of the state, 
respondent 47 (local employee of EUPM and of previous police missions) answered that there was. 
She stated that “this was organized by the municipality. Every building had its own representative that 
represented the tenants in a committee consisting of all the representatives. They came together once 
in a while”. The meetings, among other things, where meant to discuss city wide projects. The 
municipality leader needed approval of the representatives for big projects. Problem was that most of 
the decision had already been made, making the meetings a farce and causing scepticism.  
 
During our second interview, the CP officers mentioned, when asked about the way they come into 
contact with citizens, that they contact building block chairmen, schools and local community 
representatives. I wasn‟t aware of this last form of representation (local community representatives) , 
so I asked them to explain. The CP officers told me that these people are paid by the local community 
to represent a certain neighbourhood and to work in that neighbourhood to improve the situation there, 
based on the indication given by the residence. I found the fact that these community representatives 
are being paid interesting, because I was expecting volunteers representing the inhabitants of a 
certain neighbourhood and instead they seem to function more as a link between the inhabitants of 
these neighbourhood and the city authorities. Volunteers of the neighbourhood don‟t seem to exist, 
according to respondents 41 and 42, and this fits the observation of respondent 36, a politically active 
young man who stated that “people lack a feeling of personal responsibility for the governing of their 
country”, according to him, the fact that people are not taking action means that; “the situation is not 
bad enough yet”.  
 
The CP officers continue, telling me that it is actually these community representatives, „by nature‟ 
respected citizens in the neighbourhood and school teachers, to be the most useful sources of 
information, while the volunteer building block committee members are said to be not a big source of 
information to the police. Respondent 42 explains this; “building block committees are more concerned 
with the maintenance of their building, and are less concerned with safety issues”. Therefore 
respondent 42 hardly visits building block meetings, but she does act as an advisor to these 
committees and can answer their questions.  
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The officer responsible for education (respondent 44) adds; “within the CP strategy there were several 
goals; traffic police would work on road safety and at least one school a year would therefore be 
visited. Then there was also this game they played with the kids.. couldn‟t really figure out what the 
game was about. Furthermore the police visited high schools as part of the CP project. They tried to 
stop the calls of bomb threats that came from high school students that wanted to avoid exams“.  
When I ask respondent 44 to explain what other ways there are for a CP officer to get into 
contact with citizens in their sector, he explains that an idea box was introduced. The idea was that the 
chairman of the forum would be responsible for opening the box and directing the suggestions to the 
right organization or government body. Besides that, a survey has been conducted in the last couple of 
years, and this year the third survey will take place. Goal is to find out how citizens experience their 
safety situation. The survey will be conducted by an independent research institution and will be paid 
by the Swiss, and the outcome can be used by the police, to set their (new) priorities.  
 
 3.3 Meeting Mostar’s citizens 
One of the things I wanted to find out during my research in Mostar was how the people in Mostar saw 
the police, and how they thought about topics like safety and the role of citizens in their own safety. 
Observations, like the traffic situation at the crossroad in the „central zone‟ and the one close to the 
police station, gave me the impression that citizens are somewhat reluctant to take up their own 
responsibility when it comes to safety and security. I gained access to (a part of) the people of Mostar 
through journalists from a local newspaper and through students of the two universities of the city.  
The Mostar University (the university at the West / Croat side of Mostar) proudly stated to be the only 
university in BiH to teach in the Croat language. Which, in itself, is an interesting fact as this language 
emerged when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved and evolved out of the common 
language for the largest part of Yugoslavia; Serbo-Croatian. The uniqueness of the language, 
compared to the other languages in BiH, is highly debated among scholars, but the fact is that it is 
used by Croats in BiH to distinguish themselves. I conducted a group discussion with political science 
students that are members of a student society. They regularly organize debates on political issues 
and make field trips to places like the Croat and the BiH house of parliament. When I asked if they 
would be interested in a debate on the safety situation in Mostar / BiH and the role of police and 
citizens, the board of the student society responded positively. They indicated that they were giving me 
the opportunity to organize a debate on the topics I suggested, and through that, gaining access to a 
group of students.  
On the 8
th
 of April members of the student association came together and we debated eight 
statements. From literature and interviews with members of EUPM, and with respondent 36 (a political 
active NGO worker, who grew up in the Netherlands during the war), I came to understand that the 
Cantonal police service, is very ineffective. Any solution for improvement of this situation is closely 
related to the political organization of the country. At this moment the police in the FBiH is organized 
along the lines of the political structure, meaning that there is a federation police and a police service 
in all cantons.  
 
Many foreign politicians and diplomats have suggested a reorganization of the police service, to 
increase its effectiveness (Muehlmann 2007; 43). This effectiveness should be increased by assigning 
responsibility of police matters to state level and by changing the police areas. These areas are 
designed for effective policing, and not on political grounds. Lastly the reorganization should reduce 
the political influence on the work of the police. (More on this in chapter 4, paragraph 4.2)  
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Based on this knowledge, the first 3 statements that I formulated, were; (1) local safety would be better 
served with a police service that would be locally directed instead of a cantonal police service, that is 
being directed by the cantonal government (as it is  now), (2) fighting organized crime in BiH should be 
a priority of the police. For the police to be effective it should be reorganized and be organized in such 
a way that it overlaps canton borders, (3) if the organization of the police (effectiveness, response 
time, costs etc.) would benefit from organization based on operational areas, then this would be 
favourable over the current organization per canton. (Note: operational areas are part of a police 
reform proposal, done by the IC in 2004-2005. More on this proposal in chapter 4.2, page 49) Biggest 
argument against this idea is that entities will lose control over 'their' police.  
 
During the weeks that I got to know the students, through conversations, but also through checking 
out their Facebook pages, I developed an image of them, an image that indicated me that the political 
sympathy of most of them was for the Bosnian Croat nationalist parties like HDZ and HDZ 1990. I 
derived this image because some of the key figures (male) in the student union were expressing their 
preference for a 3 republic solution for BiH (the opinion of both HDZ and HDZ 1990), a solution that is 
ruled out by both the IC and the Bosniacs. Besides this, some of them displayed flags of the republic 
Herzeg-Bosnia (the unrecognized entity created by the Bosnian Croats in 1991), pictures of the 
Croatian president and the Croat national football team on their Facebook. Due to the image I 
developed of them I was expecting answers of most of the students present that would represent an 
outspoken nationalistic, Croat, viewpoint. But when it came to the organization of the police, the 
statements I had prepared (see appendix 4, statement 1, 2 and 3) did not lead to a debate and the 
students did not seem to be familiar with the organization of the police. I thought that, as political 
students, they would, but probably I was comparing them to myself. As I am working for the 
emergency services myself, I might not be the best reference. A more scientific explanation is given by 
Bradford (2010; 184) who explains why young people might be more likely to have a neutral or even 
negative opinion about the police; neutral because they have no recollection of times in which the 
general opinion of the police was more positive (in the U.K. where research was conducted by Reiner 
2000) or negative (in the case of BiH). 
 
In general, all students were in favour of an effective police service (the concept „effective‟ not further 
defined by me during the debate, and not made more explicit by the students, but a conclusion based 
on the range of answers given during the debate) even if this meant the police would be organized 
differently, in compared to the way it is organized at this moment.  
 
Being in favour of a different type of structure, means that the police would no longer be controlled by 
an ethnical majority in the city or canton anymore. This could happen when the police, for instance, 
would be more centrally structured. I was surprised to see that the students did not argue against such 
a solution.  
Leaving me with the observation that, different from what I expected, a large part of these students are 
more critical towards the political opinions within the conservative Croat political movement (main 
political parties in that movement being HDZ and HDZ 1990) than I expected. I asked respondent 36, 
who was present at the debate, how this difference between my earlier observation and the outcomes 
of the discussion, concerning the structure of the police, could be explained. He explained that, of 
course these students are critical towards the solutions that politicians suggest, because they too see 
that there is a huge gap between the promises made by the political parties and actual political 
achievements.  
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At the same time it is likely that these students grew up in families of which a majority strongly 
supports HDZ and HDZ 1990 (people from outside the city of Mostar are said to be more conservative 
and therefore more likely to vote for these parties, than those living in Mostar). Combining this fact with 
the fact that one‟s future career can be positively influenced when becoming a member of a large 
political party (in case of the Croat side of BiH, being HDZ or HDZ 1990), might explain why many of 
them will support these parties in the end, while they were critical towards them during the student 
debate. 
 
When talking about the safety situation in Mostar, some students, mainly men, argued that the other 
side of Mostar (East / Bosniac) is an unsafe place for them to go. Other students in the group rebut 
this argument and ask them if they really visited „the other side‟. One guy answers; “yes, about three 
times, once when family living in the US came over and they wanted to visit the Stari Most, and the 
other times for a football match”. The debate continued in Croatic. On another occasion I was able to 
ask this student what made him feel unsafe. He told me he had the feeling he was looked at because 
of the cross he was wearing around his neck. It showed me that some young people easily fall back on 
the story of ‘the divided city’, while more and more young people are critical about this story. They try 
to look at the facts and make up their own mind. They don‟t visit the other side that often, not because 
they can‟t, but because they don‟t need to. 
 
Besides the issue of the two sides of the city, the general feeling was that the police are not doing a 
good job, this despite the fact that I informed them on the statistics that show, (and confirmed EUPM 
police officers) that the Mostar police has a good crime – solve ratio. Students responded by saying 
“the police thinks and says they are doing a good job, but they are not”. Furthermore the students had 
little trust in the democratic control over the police. They explained this emphasizing the slow decision 
making process within the Mostar city council, that makes that governing of the city often stalls. It is 
caused by the major differences between the representatives within the council, based on the ethnic 
divide, but it is also due to political and personal interests. The students indicate that they would rather 
go to the media when they want to address a problem. 
 
During an interview with two journalists (respondent 32 & 31), one working for a local newspaper 
(Dnevni List, the only newspaper published in Herzegovina, written in the Croat language) and the 
other working for a local radio station (considered Bosniac) I asked them about the apparent tendency 
of people to turn to the media instead of the politics or the police. Why would this be, I asked them? 
According to both respondents this happened because of a general disappointment in politicians and 
the police service. “The same people have been in power for a long time, and they did many things 
wrong”.  
 
But how can a journalist change this situation? “A journalist can bring things to light”. But does it help? 
“Sometimes”, but both respondent 31 & 32 are not really positive about changes that can be made 
due to the work of a journalist. “People will call a journalist when the official structures don‟t help…, so 
it also leads to many small problems being magnified”. 
 
I further explored the ability of journalists to help change the situation of citizens with respondent 33, 
who is working for Dnevni List as a reporter on crime. He tells me that he gets his information off the 
internet and the official channels, like the police spokespersons. When it concerns local crime news, 
he tries to find out the names of the people involved / eyewitnesses and calls them or visits them. But 
time is limited. He gets about 3 hours per article.  
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When asked what sort of crimes the police should focus on more he tells me; “I think Mostar is a safe 
place and the police are doing a good job. But people often complain. Complains that are brought to 
the newspaper are often concerning petty crime. The complaints are made by people who are not 
happy with the way the police took up their complaint or call”. On my question if he publishes stories 
like that, he answers; “no, for my articles I am depending a lot on the information of the police. 
Therefore I need to keep up my good relationship with the police”. He says, he makes sure he asks 
the police for their side of the story. I ask him if he does the same when a story is coming from the 
police. Does he check those facts too? Respondent 33 says this is difficult. “It is hard finding a witness 
of an event, when you don‟t have a name, and your time is limited”. What does happen is that people 
respond to an article through the website, saying that the newspaper articles are too one-sided. Even 
the police sometimes responds to certain newspaper articles (as far as I know, not through the website 
though), their comment is that most stories have more than one side to it. Is the police right to say 
this? Yes, often they are, but there just isn‟t enough time to do more research on a story. Same goes 
for reports on corruption. The topic is not off limit in their newspaper, but there just isn‟t enough time to 
research the report. And when they do write about this, then this doesn‟t automatically result in an 
investigation. Even in cases that, so respondent 33 thinks, would lead to an investigation in other 
countries. And equally important, he says that citizens/readers don‟t respond to the articles.  
 
The insight these journalists gave about how they work, (realizing that these journalist represent just a 
fraction of the journalists in BiH) doesn‟t give an explanation for the fact that people seem to trust them 
more than politicians. At the same time, it might say a lot about the (lack of) trust people have in 
politicians. It may be that, although journalists are not able to change their situation, they can give 
citizens the feeling that they are being heard, and that their concerns are taken serious. The fact that 
readers don‟t seem to respond to articles about corruption for instance, to me, shows a great deal of 
reluctance among citizens, reluctance to take action. And in my opinion, this relates back to the lack of 
trust in institutions like the police and the state; a lack of trust that is explained by, amongst others, the 
fact that corruption is present at all levels of BiH society.  
 
The journalist, who, through his work, had an insight in the work of the police , stated that the police 
are doing a good job, meanwhile many of the students state that a tougher and more active approach 
of the police would increase the amount of respect people have for the police and the law: knowing 
that one will get caught if committing a crime.  
Scientific literature that zooms in on the work of the police, mentions that research into public trust in 
the police service is not that common. Two trends are being observed in the UK; 1) trust and public 
confidence has shown a decline since the 1950‟s.  
Back in the 1950‟s the police was unchallenged and was seen as protector of “law and order” 
(although Weinberger 1995 puts this in perspective by warning for „nostalgia‟) and being the “moral 
representatives of both community and nation” (Branford 2010; 179). Since then an increased level of 
debate can be observed when it comes to police action and policies. A trend that, in a changing 
society where people, who have always trusted the police, turn to the police as a beacon of stability 
and law & order, is being observed by Loader and Mulcahy (2003, in Bradford 2010; 180). According 
to Jackson and Sunshine 2007; Jackson et al 2009) this support for the police is connected to a fear 
for disorder. Something that has become reality in BiH, and therefore a clear situation in which citizens 
might have lost trust and confidence in the police force of pre-war BiH. Although, it can also be argued 
that the police turned to protection of their own group, which could have resulted in trust for the 
ethnically divided police, explaining the lack of trust in the united police service.  
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At the same time public confidence and trust in the police is high on the political agenda in many 
Anglophone countries (Fleming & McLaughlin 2010; 199, Waddington 2010; 197, Bradford 2010; 179) 
and has been there for many years. This might explain why CP has been introduced in BiH by the IC 
since the expectation is that CP will improve the relationship between citizens and the police, and 
therefore trust and confidence in the state. Based on Fukuyama 1996 and O‟Neil 2002, Fleming & 
McLaughlin put forward the question whether a decline in trust in the state can be explained by a 
general trend observed in a consumer society. I would argue that the phases BiH‟s society went 
through are incomparable to countries like the UK where Fleming & McLaughlin‟s research refers to. 
Still it is important to understand this international context, especially because the IC was the initiator 
of the CP concept in BiH. Understanding the history of the concept and the experiences countries had 
with this concept can explain the expectations the IC had for CP in BiH. And it can help analysing the 
effects (or lack of) of the CP concept on public confidence in the police and the state.  
 
Referring to the call of the students for a tougher and more active approach of the  police in my 
interview with respondent 44, the police officer responsible for education, he strongly rejected the 
suggestion of a tougher police approach to improve respect. “No, police will not act repressively (in 
their daily conduct) anymore”. Again he points out the existence of the code of ethics and continues; 
“Now there are rules for everything and you cannot just do what you (as a police officer) want 
anymore”. It shows close resemblance to the answers the CP officers gave me when talking about the 
difference between the police before and after the war. The new approach, being just talk, talk, talk‟, 
was everything but repressive. That repressive approach is done and dusted.  
 
This strong rejection of everything that was even remotely repressive led me to believe that the police 
management, due to the police‟s war and pre-war history, has emphasized a contrary (non-repressive) 
approach, strongly encouraged by the IC. Understandable when considering the history of the police, 
at least considered more repressive during the Yugoslav era, and violent during the most recent war. 
Still, the effort to restore trust through a totally different and non-violent approach seems logical, but 
the remarks of the citizens, arguing in favour of a stronger approach by the police, indicate that the 
scale has flipped to the opposite side too much. A good balance between the soft and the tough 
approach needs to be found. People need to be able to trust the police again and rely on a swift 
approach. 
 
During the student debate at the University of Mostar I suggested that the source of the solution, for 
many of the problems that the students say their country faces, lay with the people themselves. If 
people would take more responsibility for their own situation, and that of their society, and therefore 
live up to the laws that were democratically decided upon, more problems would be solved. Some 
students support this statement. They connected this to the discussion about the economic situation, 
stating that if the economic situation were to improve many of the problems would be solved as well. 
The student‟s opinion differs when it comes to how to improve this economic situation. Some feel that, 
firstly, the ethnic discussion needs to be solved, for many students this means, that in future BiH 
should be consisting of 3 entities, based upon the ethnic divide; so, 3 entities, a Croat, a Bosniac and 
a Serb entity. To me the fact that there is no consensus on the way forward for the improvement of the 
economic situation, but more general to find a way forward for the political impasse, is one of the 
reasons why citizens are reluctant to take up any responsibility for their society. Why bother when, in 
the end, on political level, developments reach a deadlock.  
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I wanted to find out how critical these students were about the laws of their country, and about their 
role as citizens in creating a situation that is aimed for by means of these laws. As an example I took 
road safety, because I was informed by one of my respondents, that at night there is a ban on driving 
for drivers younger than 21. Students think traffic safety is an important issue and tell me that many 
young drivers drink and drive. Most of the students agree with rules like this ban to prevent accidents. 
They argue that it is mostly young people causing accidents while driving late at night and drinking. 
When asked if any of them sticks to these rules, the majority answered negatively. So there is 
a discrepancy between their reasoning and the actual reality. They agree with the reasoning of the 
above mentioned ban, but don't stick to the rule themselves.  Furthermore I came under the 
impression that the students lack a sense of criticism towards the rules, and the effects of these rules 
on things like personal freedom. This lack of criticism was not present during a political debate 
between youth representatives of the main political parties in Mostar, organized by the student society. 
I found the students much more liberal now than when I got to know them earlier during the debates of 
the student society. The representatives were asked to present their parties policies specifically aimed 
at youth. Most of them could only present their charity work for youth and the rhetoric of the big parties 
was that if young people want to achieve something in life, they should join their party. The students 
were critical of the rhetoric of the political parties. One student stated: “I don‟t want your meat”, 
referring to a political party of which is said to have handed out free meat to people who did vote for 
them, and said: “people should vote for a Liberal party like LDA” (referring to the last speaker, 
respondent 36).  
 
The question arises why students were critical in a debate, but not critical when it comes to laws, or in 
general, towards the challenges within society. Talking about this with respondent 36 (young, political 
active, working for his own NGO, from Mostar but fled to the Netherlands during the war), he explains 
that for the future career of these students it is important to become a member of one of the big 
political parties. This explanation is confirmed by Devine and Mathisen in their CMI report on 
Corruption in BiH 2005. In this report they point out that the public sector is an important employer in 
BIH and that the nationalist parties are greatly influencing this public sector (Devine & Mathisen 2005; 
11) 
 
In my opinion the criticism can be explained by youthful enthusiasm in the setting of a debate, together 
with the fact that the statements of most of the political representatives were so trivial, that I was not 
surprised it provoked a reaction, also due to the more critical and appealing statements of 
representative 36 (the only representative of a political party not openly Croat), fuelling the discussion.  
From interviews and observations many examples were given that can be linked to my general 
argument that the citizens and the state of Mostar struggle with the balance between rights and 
responsibilities: 1) political parties don‟t seem to take their (youth) policies seriously, 2) that some 
parties „buy‟ votes, and 3) that membership of a political party helps your career.  This, to me doesn‟t 
seem like the ideal circumstances for a healthy social and political climate and greatly influences 
peoples trust in the state. 
Later I was able to arrange student discussions at the University Džemal Bijedić of Mostar, the 
other University of Mostar, situated at the east side of Mostar. It is considered the Bosniac University 
of the city. Access to this university was made possible through my contact with an American teacher 
working at the University, providing English classes through a program of the American Embassy in 
Sarajevo (Respondent 45). Part of her English course was debates, which made the students use their 
English skills and had them practice expressing themselves in English. For these debates she was 
looking for a suitable topic. Both our needs came together and resulted in me preparing two forms of 
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debate for two of her classes. The first form was a pro – con debate in the style of the British House of 
Commons. The House of Commons debate, presumes two teams, one arguing in favour, the other 
against a certain statement. One week before the debate all the students received information through 
e-mail about the topic for the debate (see appendix 5), and a list of statements and the question 
whether they would be pro or con. Which team was in favour and which team against was determined 
by the teacher. This meant that I was not able to determine the real opinion of the students concerning 
the addressed statements. On the other hand it did help me to get to know the students, and for them 
to get to know me. The second debate form was a Public Forum Debate (PFD) in which the students 
needed to display a logical argument, based on sound reasoning and an in depth analysis. This should 
be done based on evidence, and countering/refuting arguments of the opposing team. The debate was 
based on topics I suggested (appendix 5) and this debate offered me a lot more information and 
insights into the students thought about the topics like corruption and crime, their views on laws that 
were effecting them, contact with and views on the police and the role they considered the IC to play in 
their country. 
 
For these students safety and security was not the most obvious topic for a discussion. A link with the 
war history of BiH is easily made, despite the fact that this is not the focus of my research. Students at 
the Džemal Bijedić University made it clear to me from the start; they were willing to participate in the 
discussions, would debate the topic, and were okay with me using the information for my thesis, but 
they were not willing to debate the war history and the ethnic unrest. They explained to me that the 
reason for this was that the student population was mixed. Where the vast majority of the students at 
the University of Mostar is Bosnian Croat, at the University Džemal Bijedić the student population is 
much more mixed, from Bosniac, Croat and Serb families. This made these topics a delicate matter, 
and besides, they said, they were fed up with this topic. That is what they indicated to me from the 
moment I introduced my research topic. 
 
Starting the debates with their image of the police, the students pointed out that they did not see the 
police in Mostar that often. They mainly see them conducting traffic controls. Controls that seem very 
random (some cars are stopped, most are not) and not well organized (3 police officers standing along 
the road, not a big fyke that traps all cars, in order to have everyone checked). The students don‟t feel 
this adds anything to the safety situation in Mostar.  
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Figure 3.1 Random traffic controls by Mostar police officers 
 
Interestingly enough, traffic and traffic controls were often mentioned, in both literature and interviews 
with police officers. According to respondent 29 traffic controls are an effective way for the police to 
catch criminals, who, like anybody else, need to move around. Policing literature indicated the 
increase in car ownership (in the UK) has led to an increase in encounters with the police. Especially 
the middle class, who, before, had little experience with the police, do now meet up with them on a 
regular basis influencing their opinion of the police (Girling et al 2000; Smith 2007a in Bradford 2010; 
182). 
 
Still these students say they feel safe in Mostar. They are not afraid to walk in the street during the 
night. That doesn‟t mean that there is not (organized) crime around. Many of them have examples of 
organized crime, examples from their own experience, or from their immediate surroundings, and can 
even point out connections between the criminals and public servants. This makes them distrust the 
system, but they say they don‟t relate this to their own safety situation.  
More than during the debate with the students at the University of Mostar, these students were critical 
about the laws of their country. But all in all they felt the intentions of the ban on driving at night for 
drivers younger than 21, for instance, were good, they just felt the police should enforce these rules 
more, but they were not explicit on how the police should do this. This shows an interesting 
contradiction, they say they can understand the reasoning behind certain laws, and even agree with 
them, but at the same time they say they need someone else to make them aware to obey the law.  
 
I also asked journalists I met, about their sense of safety. On the question “how can you be made to 
feel safer?” Respondent 32 answers; “we need more police”, respondent 31 responds to my question 
by saying; “more police in the streets can also lead to more fear” (The number of police officers is an 
indication for the level of insecurity). Respondent 32 continues, and seems to alter her answer a bit. 
She says; “it is more important that the police comes when you need them / when you ask them to 
come”. 
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Typical when talking to many people in Mostar is the prejudice people have towards police officers. 
They consider them, so to say, not very smart.  One striking example was the student who helped me 
translate at many of my interviews. She stated that “the police officers (that we met) were actually nice 
people you could talk to and laugh with”. She did not expect this beforehand, and this first visit to a 
police station was different, in a positive way, from what she expected. 
The students at the University Džemal Bijedić were laughing at the police officers and 
considered them, and the political system they are representing, to be incompetent. At the same time, 
when asked for it, they couldn‟t come up with good examples or experiences they had with the police, 
which would prove this incompetency. When asked if they think people will contact the police in case 
of problems, these students felt this was highly unlikely, due to the lack of trust in the police they had. 
Part of this could be explained by the fact that the media is not reporting any success achieved by of 
the police. When I asked respondent 33, one of the journalists, if he knew the police campaign 
Krimolovci (the police hotline to call in large crimes to the national police agency SIPA. Crimes related 
to corruption, drug trafficking, illegal weapons etc.), he told me that journalists do not get excited by 
success stories. They want the negative stories. When asking him if people trust the police, he 
answers; “the police spokesperson told me that they want a better relationship with the citizens of 
Mostar. They need to see the police as a friend and a service. In the past the police was considered 
bad. And they still are, due to corruption and bribes”. These answers show a lack of trust in the police, 
rightly or wrongly. 
 
Talking to the students at the University Džemal Bijedić about my feelings that citizens hold the key to 
the solution for many of social and political challenges faced, they tell me that theoretical knowledge of 
the societies‟ structures made them feel that, idealistically speaking, people do hold that key. The main 
problem is that people developed an image of the police and the state in general, that caused a lack of 
confidence that the police / state will be able to help them in facing these challenges and solve the 
problem they are all presented with. This lack of trust is based on the stories they hear (hearsay), and 
the little interaction they have with the state representatives like the police.  
Exceptions confirm the rule; I met only one respondent (52) that could give me an example of 
a citizen initiative to make a change in their own society. In the neighbourhood of this student, 
(studying political science at the University of Mostar, and active in church life) which is positioned just 
outside Mostar city which can be called a suburb of Mostar, despite the fact that many people are 
travelling by bus to Mostar there was no bus stop. Some young people of her age started a campaign 
to get people to sign a petition to get the city council to place a bus stop. And they were successful! 
I asked her how they achieved this. Did they have special contacts within the city council? “No, it was 
actually the campaign that was convincing! They went to the people in the neighbourhood to ask for 
their support. People know each other and had something like „let‟s see how far we can get‟ if we don‟t 
try we won‟t get anything‟. What helped was that there was a clear need for the bus stop, there are 
many people using the bus stop, so why wouldn‟t they get the bus stop? And it worked! The bus stop 
was placed”. 
 
Trying to discover the cause of the distrust in police and the state, unavoidable led to a debate topic 
on corruption. This because BiH scored 3.1 on a scale of 10 in Transparency International‟s 2004 
Corruption Perception Index and citizens in BiH see corruption as the second largest problem in their 
country, after unemployment (Devine & Mathisen 2005; 8). And according to Devine & Mathisen 
corruption is not new to BiH, it was already present in pre-war Yugoslavia.  
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This is explained by Sandholtz & Taagepera who state that in a communist / socialist system 
competition is lacking among entrepreneurs and civil servants (Sandholtz & Taagepera 2005; 111). 
When asked, people agreed that corruption is an important reasons for this feeling of distrust. 
According to Sandholtz & Taagepera a working democracy is important to fight corruption and I agree 
with this. But this is the big picture, in the streets there are two parties involved in corruption. There is 
not only the police officer accepting the bribe, there is a citizens giving money to a police officer as 
well. In BiH they have a special term for the money that people give to a police officer, to make a fine 
disappear. It is called „coffee money‟, supporting the police officer in his or her daily activity; drinking 
coffee. This is something that I considered an example of police that are not taking its tasks seriously. 
But one of my respondents, respondent 47 objected to this view. She told me; “drinking coffee is part 
of their job. Not only is a police officer‟s entitled to a brake, the coffee bar is also an important place to 
retrieve information. Do you really think that the police officers are not listening to the stories the other 
visitors of the coffee bar are telling each other? This is their way to get information about things that 
are going on in the neighbourhood”. I guess that is the moment that a Cultural Anthropology student 
knows that he is being made aware of his biased nature. And looking back at my research period, 
even I have used the coffee bar as a key research site, using it for interviews and for observations. 
 
When people give coffee money to a police officer, they are being corrupt, and are supporting this 
corruption, the corruption they see as one of the causes of the ineffective system, aren‟t they? Yes, the 
students joining in the debate agree with this, but they try to explain their situation by staying; “it is 
cheaper for me to pay, 20 KM (10 Euros) coffee money instead of a fine of 50 KM”. They defend this 
choice saying; “the police officer can also decide not to suggest the option of the coffee money, and / 
or accept the coffee money”. Especially because these students feel that police officers in Mostar earn 
good money (1000 KM a month). This example supports my argument that citizens and state are still 
trying to find the right balance between their responsibilities and their rights.  
 
The fact that the students believe that police officers are earning good money is interesting, because 
among my respondents (students and many others) there is an inconsistency when it comes to the 
payment of police officers. Some think police officers earn very little money. For instance two of the 
journalists I spoke to took it up for the police officers; “their pay is small, so they need to take coffee 
money to earn enough money”. Both respondents (31 & 32) express a general disappointment that 
corruption keeps everyone trapped. “If you want a job you need connections, if you want to earn a 
decent living as a police officer you need coffee money”. Others, like the students of Džemal Bijedić 
University feel they earn a lot of money. It might have been My Dutch upbringing that prevented me 
from asking the Mostar police officers themselves what they earn. The information derived from EUPM 
states that the average income in BiH is 789 KM, and that of a police officer in the Herzegovina-
Neretva Canton is 1038,05 KM, including meal allowance (EUPM 2010). More on this in paragraph 
4.2. Sandholtz & Taagepera argue that corruption is part of BiH‟s culture (2005; 111 and Hutchcroft 
1997) and the longer corruption is present amongst the countries elite, the more likely citizens are to 
develop a disbelief in the integrity of the elite and are more likely to develop corruption amongst 
themselves as well (Rose in Sandholtz & Taagepera 2005; 114). It is Sandholtz & Taagepera‟s 
analyses that communism has influenced the cultural values and has made self-survival and self-
expression necessary, making corruption a necessity within the communist society.  
Although there are also arguments against this view, it lead to me asking my respondents if this kind of 
corruption might be part of the way of doing things in BiH, and if maybe, people like me, shouldn‟t just 
consider this corruption, I got mixed responses.  
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I felt a contradiction between academic opinions and their own actions in the street. What I did derive 
from their reactions was a general sense of hopelessness. They saw an inconstancy between their call 
for a more effective police apparatus and their own actions, and they didn‟t see a way out of this 
situation.  
 
Many of my interviews ended with a question about the role of the IC. What do people in Mostar think 
when it comes to IC? Are they better off with or without IC? Most students of the University of Mostar 
agreed that it would be good for the IC to leave BiH. The reason behind this being that the current 
presence of the IC leads to a lack of self-initiative with the locals.  
The 3
rd
 year students of Džemal Bijedić University were very outspoken about how they saw the role 
of the IC. According to them the aim of IC is unclear. They don‟t know much about what the IC does for 
BiH. The only information they get, is what they tell me, is what they hear through TV shows and other 
media attention, speaking about big projects (road safety campaign, drug busts and anti-corruption 
campaigns) or large arrests (like the criminals that robbed gabling offices in Mostar, or drug criminals). 
What is not said is what the structural progress is, due to the involvement of the IC. Apparently this is 
not interesting enough. Based on this lack of information the students are of the opinion that the IC‟s 
contribution to the safety situation in BiH is limited.  
This lack of knowledge about the role and the achievements of the IC also became clear when asking 
the journalists, respondent 31 & 32, about this. They were not sure what would happen if the IC would 
leave, although they do say that war wouldn‟t start again when they leave, they also feel now is not the 
right time for them to leave either. When talking to them about the IC it became clear to me that they 
had only little knowledge about the involvement of the IC in BiH, because they kept talking about 
SFOR when they meant the IC. SFOR was the NATO lead military Stabilization FORce stationed in 
BiH between January 1996 and December 2005, and it was succeeded by EUFOR (EUropean lead 
FORce), which is, on smaller scale, still present in BiH. Both were military missions, while there were, 
and still are, also civilian missions, like EUPM (European Police Mission) present in BiH. 
 
From the exam candidates of Džemal Bijedić University, with whom I discussed my debate topics, I got 
the impression that they were more informed about political and social issues.  
When discussing the role of the IC one student was very negative about the OHR. In his opinion the 
OHR should change things structurally, with (political) force, before the people of BiH could take over. 
Like the 3
rd
 year students, they were also quite negative about politics in general. They referred to the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDA), who brought a donkey to a city council meeting in Mostar, to protest 
against the time it took to elect a major for the city of Mostar. This election took more than a year, from 
October 2008 till the end of 2009. By that time the OHR had ordered the election of a Mayor by the city 
council, something that had been tried by the council itself 17 times before (OHR 2009). To force a 
breakthrough, the OHR altered the rules for election. Instead of the 2/3 majority that was needed, a 
50% +1 majority was enough. On the 20
th
 of December 2009 the Bosnian Croat Ljubo Beslic (HDZ) 
was elected as the new Mayor of Mostar (Dnevni Avaz 2009). 
 
Interestingly, among the exam students there was also a student that was much more positive about 
the police. She came with examples of police officers not skipping their patrols, something that is 
considered abnormal by many students, and police officers reporting colleagues taking coffee money. 
She considers this as a positive development because this could reduce the problems with corruption 
and increase peoples trust in the police.  
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The fact that she was using actual examples was quite refreshing. In the same group there was a 
student that, more than any other student, was very negative about the situation in BiH. She related all 
the negative situations to nationalism and politics, but when asked for examples, she went silent. 
 
All these reactions show that whatever the actual influence the IC has on the balance between rights 
and responsibilities between citizens and the state, many citizens don‟t feel the IC has any positive 
influence on the stalemate between citizens and the state. Like the students bring forward, when 
giving an example of the inability of the IC to help (either in a diplomatic or a more forceful way), ”get 
the different parties to reach a consensus on the way forward in the economic and political debate”. 
On the other hand, I would like to argue that it was the IC in the first place, who got the warring parties 
to sit around the table and later to sign the DPA.  
And following that important step they have helped to bring the country to where it is now. One 
respondent (28) illustrates this evolvement by telling me about the experiences he had in BiH. Before 
he became a member of the EUPM mission, he was in BiH as a mission member of UNIPTF. Right 
after the war had ended he was stationed in Srebrenica and was transferred to Mostar at a later stage.  
From that time he remembers that he had joined patrols with Mostar counterparts. It was not abnormal 
for them to run into a fight between East and West Mostarians, which meant that they were throwing 
hand grenades at each other near the boulevard. Compared to that time, things have really improved 
in Mostar. 
 
    3.4 Strangers’ eyes on the streets of Mostar 
By chance I had the opportunity to meet some of the police officers working for EUPM. Talking to them 
gave me an insight in the world of the „mission members‟ as they are sometimes referred to.  
As EUPM, as was its predecessor UNIPTF, was actively involved in setting the standards for the „new‟ 
police in BiH - and trained, took part in, and now mentors and monitors the work of the police - and 
they played an important role in the process of regaining trust of citizens in the work of the police. 
 
This latest role, to monitor and mentor their BiH counterparts, was quite different from the work 
respondent 29, a Dutch police officer that just started working for EUPM, was doing back home, he 
explained to me. We need to be aware that most of the EU police officers working in BiH are very 
experienced officers, in doing their specific jobs, not so much in monitoring or being a mentor. Most of 
them have had a long career within their national police service. Now they choose to sign up for a 
mission of one year in a foreign country. One other Dutch mission member, based at EUPM‟s HQ in 
Sarajevo, jokingly told me that there are three different motives for police officers to join an 
international mission; “the high salary, problems within their marriage, or both”, and looking at his 
medals he had participated in more than one mission. Monitoring and mentoring takes place at 
management and senior level, meaning that EUPM officers come in contact with high ranking officers 
in management positions and those leading large investigations. This approach is meant to decrease 
the selectiveness of the police in BiH. Now not all criminal cases are being investigated and 
prosecuted, thus leading to a decrease of trust among citizens in the police and the law. EUPM 
officers need to see to it that investigations are being done in a proper way and that cases are really 
being taken to court. Within the Mostar office the EUPM officers are assigned to a certain geographical 
area of responsibility, connecting them to a cantonal police, and to local police stations. 
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The monitoring and mentoring role of EUPM shows that the mission is based on a completely different 
paradigm than that of its predecessor, UNIPTF. That mission started right after the signing of the DPA 
and the mission can be characterized as „hands on‟ involvement with the police in BiH, like joined 
patrols, training, selection, education and the authority to impose changes. EUPM can‟t impose any 
changes, but needs to mentor their counter towards these changes, and should report the (lack of) 
progress, so that the IC can adjust its approach towards the BiH state, the local state institutions and 
political institutions.  
 
During an informal conversation respondent 29 explained to me that he experienced his task as 
difficult. He found establishing contact with his counterparts difficult and he felt like it took him quite 
some time. It is interesting to notice that the counterparts from BiH meet a new EUPM contact person 
every year. Respondent 29 felt it was easier to perform the monitoring part of his task (observing and 
reporting), in comparison to his mentoring task. He felt that mentoring jeopardized the relationship with 
his counterparts, because he would need to confront his counterpart with the things he thought 
needed to be improved. A mission member working with EUPM for several years explained to him and 
me that the mentoring part, telling the counterpart what can be improved, is a very important part of 
the mission. He pointed out that mission members don‟t need to be afraid of the effect that their 
comments might have on the relationship between them and their counterparts.  
He had experienced the „Balkan way‟, by which he meant that the counterparts accepted the 
comments that the counterpart gave them directly, or through reports to the EUPM HQ. They will work 
with their mentor(s) again the next day, despite possible negative comments.  
 
I wanted to know how the local counterpart, the Mostar police, experienced the involvement of the 
subsequent missions, UNIPTF and EUPM. Therefore I asked respondent 44, the education officer, if 
the CP project felt imposed.  According to him it did not feel forced. “The project is a big advantage for 
the police”. (Whenever I asked a question that could lead to criticism towards the IC, this officer kept 
far from criticism. When I asked him “What will happen when EUPM leaves?”, respondent 44 only 
answered; “they (EUPM) have been very helpful. They are good workers who came to our help”.) For 
me, this statement made it painfully clear that there was an involuntary connection between the 
counterparts. Over the years the IC has taken up a decisive role in the development of BiH‟s state 
institutions. Despite the fact that the IC is decreasing its influence on the ground, there is still a need 
for the state institutions of BiH to live up to the IC‟s standards. Not doing so could have all kinds of 
negative consequences: one of the biggest being the denial of the reward that has been „offered‟ to 
BiH; membership of the EU. 
 
To be able to keep performing their role of monitoring and mentoring, EUPM needs to be flexible and 
willing to make adjustments, according to respondent 47. Although this paradigm of change, which 
took place from UNIPTF to EUPM, might seem logical when thinking of an exit strategy for the IC from 
BiH, respondent 30 tells me “we can only achieve the goals of the mission, when we have executive 
powers to force changes”. Now goals are often not reached according to respondent 30. At the same 
time, hearing the argument of the respondent working for EUPM Mostar for about 5 years, and 
listening to the mission members of EUPM Mostar, I feel the main problem is that some of them lack 
specific mentor abilities, which makes it harder for them to fully implement EUPM‟s mission. This 
raises questions as to the way EUPM members are recruited for the mission, and selected for specific 
jobs within the mission. An anecdote that gives a good impression of the failure of these procedures is 
given by respondent 29.  
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He says an EUPM mission member that is an expert on corruption, and is in BiH to mentor and 
monitor his BiH counterparts on the topic of corruption, came from the Ukraine and needed to bribe his 
boss to be able to sign up for EUPM. 
 
The difference between the experience of individual EUPM officers and the goals of the mission is 
significant because it highlights the difference between the goals of the IC‟s approach and the 
execution of the way to achieve these goals. This discrepancy does not contribute to a feeling of 
regained trust that developments are on the right track.  
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PART II EXPLANATORY FACTORS 
 
4 NEW WAYS OF POLICING 
 
“Bosnia is a wonderful country, fascinating, with nothing ordinary in the habitat or people…. 
Undoubtedly Bosnians are rich in hidden moral values, rarely found… But, you see, there is one thing 
the people of Bosnia must realize and never lose sight of – Bosnia is a country of hatred and fear… 
Yes, Bosnia is a country of hatred. That is Bosnia.” (Andric 1945 in Bose 2002; 95).  
 
Many of the things that respondents said and observations that I made, need to be interpreted, placed 
into context, against a theoretical background and linked to historic facts, to be able to assess their 
value to my research. Only then will it be possible to draw conclusions about the relationship between 
citizens and the police (as a representative of the state) and the level of trust that exists between the 
two.  
 
The central topic in chapter 3 was the city of Mostar, its police officers and its citizens. In this chapter, I 
explore more fully, concepts like Community Policing, security sector, state and nation, and how these 
can be used to better understand the relationship between the police and citizens in Mostar. 
Additionally, the historical circumstances that led to the current situation in Mostar are clarified, 
including the way the IC established a new police service in Mostar and BiH, the way the security 
sector and police were reformed and the way the states and nations of BiH were built. Lastly an 
overview is given of the historic process that led to the war. This process offers explanatory factors for 
the current relationship between citizens and the state, the relationship between citizens and the 
political structure of BiH.  
 
 4.1 Background of Community Policing  
As explained in the introduction of this thesis, CP was used to look at the relationship between citizens 
and the state and to determine how concepts like CP have influenced the way citizens and the state 
interact. Many studies have shown how to achieve a growing partnership between police and 
community, divided in two categories; Community-Oriented Activities - mainly school and sport 
projects, media campaigns and community groups, and Police-Oriented Activities - training of police 
officers and modernizing equipment and buildings (DeBlieck 2007; 5).  
 
To develop a better understanding of the concept of CP as it was introduced in BiH, it is important to 
study this history of the concept and the definition of CP as applied by EUPM in BiH. When EUPM 
took over from UNIPTF they focused on improving the effectiveness of policing, based on best 
European practices (Huiberts-van Dijk 2009; 1). One of these ´best police practices´ is the concept of 
'community policing'. They hoped that by positively influencing the relationship between the state and 
its people, trust would increase, and people would be less reluctant to work with the police to create a 
safer society. 
 
Defining community policing is not an easy task according to Van Os (Program manager at the Dutch 
Police Academy). He states that it was by no means possible to come up with a European definition of 
community policing, when attempting to do so (van Os 2005; 1). This can come as no surprise when 
studying national examples of police practice, like the example of the raging debate in France between 
right and left over policing in the banlieues (Collantes Celador 2009; 237). 
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In light of this knowledge it is most interesting to see what definition of community policing was used in 
BiH. An interesting document is the 'Strategy for Community-Based Policing in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina'. A document composed by a group of local experts consisting of (police) representatives 
of all ministries of interior and national police agencies of BiH, supported by the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC/DEZA). Together they have formulated a strategy for introducing 
Community-Based Policing in BiH. In this strategy community-based policing (CBP) is defined as “an 
organizational philosophy that promotes partnership between police and community. It is based on the 
premise that both the police and community work together to identify problems such as crime, drugs, 
the fear of crime, and antisocial behaviours.” The philosophy is based on the principles of partnership, 
empowerment, problem solving, accountability, service orientation and project management” (Ministry 
of Security of BiH 2007; 5). The document states that the strategy intends to “improve the rights and 
freedoms of all citizens of BiH”, therefore public administration standards and operational 
effectiveness of police agencies need to be improved, and equal access to justice needs to be 
promoted. All these efforts should lead to BiH becoming an EU member state. The strategy resulted in 
the creation of a manual, to be used as an educational tool for new police officers and as a handbook 
for police officers in the field. For the creation of this manual again a large group of representatives of 
national and local police services worked together, using Swiss material produced on the topic of CP 
(SDC 2010). 
 
Mostar Police officers assigned to the CP project (respondent 41 & 42) told me: “it would be better for 
everyone to have more trust in the police. When a citizen sees a police officer they should have the 
feeling they can turn to him. I wished everyone would realize that every police officer will help”. They 
see trust as a key factor in the relationship between citizens and the police. It is an example that 
stresses the importance of a good relationship between the state and its citizens for the police to be 
able to work properly. The police officers have the feeling that the citizens of Mostar do not get enough 
information about the success of „their‟ police. This results in a lack of trust in the police to do a good 
job and book results. Whether or not these successes are really there is being disputed by citizens, 
NGO‟s, IGO‟s and members of the IC. What respondents do agree on is the lack of trust people have 
in the police. Respondent 18, working for a research institute, focused on security issues, mentions 
that people are lacking trust in the police as they don‟t see the result. Furthermore the police are said 
to be impolite toward citizens. Another reason for the lack of trust in the police mentioned is the 
unequal treatment of people, by the police and other government agencies. All this shows the 
relevance and importance of the introduction of CP.  
 
But the introduction of CP was not self-evident. This is illustrated by one of the EUPM respondents 
(28), a police officer from Hungary. He remembered the introduction of the CP concept in his own 
country. He described to me how, in Hungary, the neighbourhood police officers, during communist 
times, were seen as the eyes and ears of the regime. The concept was known, the connotation was 
less likeable. Like in BiH new European practices, like democratic policing and community policing, 
are being introduced in Hungary. There CP is also seen as a form of crime prevention, which is not 
always the most popular part of policing for Hungarian police officers.  
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 4.2 Creating the new police of BiH   
As we have seen in chapter 3 the image many citizens have of the police is a negative one. Many 
people lack trust in the police, and don‟t have the feeling that the police are able to help them when 
needed. For people to be able to trust the police, the police should be able to address people‟s needs, 
which means that the police should be „effective‟ in doing their job.  Based on information from 
respondents who have studied the political structure in BiH and organizational structure of the police, 
and studied literature on this topic, it would seem that the organizational structure of the police might 
even have negatively impacted its effectiveness. 
 
To be able to understand the relationship between the negative experiences of citizens with the police 
and the structure of the police, I‟ll give an outline of the way this structure has developed and what is 
said about the effectiveness of this structure. Bellow I discuss corruption which is another factor that 
greatly influences citizens‟ trust in the police. As many respondents mention, coffee money is a 
concept known to all citizens in BiH, and is widely accepted as a way to bribe police officers. At the 
same time (part of the) citizens I spoke to, understand that corruption has a negative influence on the 
way the state is able to function. Cause for the continued existence of this practice, as indicated by 
many, is the low average wage of both citizens and police officers, and of course, the short term 
effects for both citizens (no fine) and the police officer (extra income). To get a better understanding of 
the background of this explanatory factor, in this paragraph I examine more closely the payment 
structure of the police in BiH and the average wage of police officers. Finally we will look at the role the 
IC had  in establishing a new police in BiH right after the war, and how the different missions of the IC, 
(there have been six different missions) focused on the police over the years. The first missions tried 
to influence the work of the police, while missions that followed were focused, among other things, on 
creating a police apparatus based on the outcomes of the DPA that would answer the political needs 
and the criteria of effective, dependable and accountable police services.        
 
Organizational structure of the police 
A new structure for the organization of the police formed the basis for all efforts of the EUPM that 
followed. Studying the organization of safety and security of BiH, it is important to realize that, in 
general terms, the central state has to share its control over the police with the entities. There are two 
main entities, being the FBiH and the RS. Besides that there is Brčko. In this chapter the focus is on 
the FBiH in which Mostar is situated.  
 
Article 3 of the constitution of BiH states, that the central government has the responsibility for 
International and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol. The Entities 
are responsible for „providing a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective 
jurisdictions, by maintaining civil law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with 
internationally recognized standards and with respect for the internationally recognized human rights 
and fundamental freedoms referred to in Article II (of the constitution), and by taking such other 
measures as appropriate‟ (Constitution of BiH 1995). This is based on the assumption that the state 
holds the monopoly on “ the means of legitimate force.., whether through the  application  of  coercive  
sanctions  by  police  to  regulate  interpersonal relations within a community, or through the protection 
provided to state and society by armed forces against external enemies” (Bayley 1975; 328 in Caparini 
& Fluri, 2006; 4).   
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Control over the Ministry of Defense was in the hands of the entities right after the war. Only through 
the 2005 Defense Reform Agreement a national Ministry of Defense was created, that took over the 
coordination of the two entity armies (RS Army; VRS and the Federation Army; VF). Now, the Army of 
the Republic of BiH is one army, with the two entity armies merged into one. The only residue of the 
previous organizational structures that is left is the fact that in each of the countries are 3 infantry 
brigades; there are at least 3 battalions, each of these 3 formed by soldiers from one particular ethnic 
group. So, for the different ethnic groups there is still a need to have something of an „own‟ army. 
There are organizational choices like these that show if at all and how the other groups are trusted. In 
my opinion, the fact that the current organizational structure is much more integrated than before is a 
hopeful sign for everyone believing in the possibilities of one BiH.   
 
When it comes to criminal law enforcement, the state, through its Ministry of Security, is responsible 
for inter-Entity (FBiH and RS) and external (BiH – other countries) criminal law enforcement and the 
relations with Interpol. To do this there are 4 organizations active at state level; SIPA (State 
Investigation and Protection Agency), the Border Police (protecting the boarders of BiH), the Interpol 
office and the directorate for coordination. Furthermore, there are departments, like an educational 
department and a forensics department that support the efforts of all police organizations in BiH. The 
FBiH, through its Federation Ministry of Interior, is responsible for a safe environment for all its citizens 
and should therefore take care of combating terrorism, inter-cantonal crimes, drug trafficking and 
organized crime within the Federation. The Federation consists of 10 cantons, within these cantons 
the cantonal Ministry of Interior is responsible for establishing and controlling police services in its 
canton (EUPM 2010).    
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Police structure BiH (EUPM 2010) 
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Through this complete structure the police services within BiH should be able to work in cooperation, 
functioning as an independent state towards other police organizations outside BiH. Unfortunately it 
doesn‟t, as this structure holds in itself, a large degree of independence for the different elements (the 
FBiH and the RS and within the FBiH, the cantons) of this structure. This is inherent to the general 
solution that was found in the DPA, for the, almost incompatible interests of the ethnic groups making 
up BiH. As is shown in chapter 3 and will be shown in the rest of this thesis, the layered and defuse 
structure, together with the underlying reasons for this structure, make cooperation and 
communication difficult. Because the police structure is directly linked to the political structure, 
politicians are able to influences almost all levels of the police organization. Therefore it is almost 
impossible to implement national police policies, when they are politically controversial, and 
cooperation between police authorities is easily disrupted by that same political interference.   
 
Ineffectiveness  
One of the reasons citizens gave, for not trusting the police to do a proper job, is its ineffectiveness.  
Respondents gave me four main reasons for the ineffectiveness of the police. One was the strict laws 
on the police organization. These laws make the organization inflexible and rigid when it comes to 
promotion and rotation. This is the conclusion of respondent 27 (an EUPM mission member who was 
at the end of his one year mission when I met him) who worked closely together with police 
commissioners of the 4 cantons in his EUPM sector and who developed a feeling for the challenges 
they face during their job. He told me that the police commissioner is an independent official, 
appointed by an independent selection review board (ISRB), but in many ways he is under close 
scrutiny. The media, the different ethnic groups and the minister of Interior all look closely and critically 
at the work of this police commissioner. The ethnic groups want to make sure that one of them is in 
this position, while the minister of Interior tries to influence the police commissioner through the police 
budget, because it is the minister of Interior who approves the police budget in his canton. This leads 
to a situation where the police commissioner needs to go to the minister of Interior and get approval 
for all expenditure, even stationary.     
This situation makes the police commissioner dependent of the minister of Interior, although this 
minister can‟t officially interfere with police matters. It is the lack of power over money that makes the 
police commissioner dependent on the minister. This increases the danger that a police commissioner 
needs the follow a political line that is based on ethnic considerations, instead of safety oriented 
politics, meant for all citizens of BiH. 
 
According to respondent 47 (local employee of EUPM and previous police missions) this does not 
mean that police officers lack motivation to do a proper job. “Even when the police officers were not 
paid, due to budget negotiations that were stalled by political disagreements the police officers kept 
working”. When asked about the professionalism of the police commissioners, respondent 27 said that 
“many police commissioners are professionals, more than politicians. They are good at their police job, 
but are less good at retaining the necessary budget”. According to respondent 27 this professional 
approach also shows in the cooperation between police services in the different cantons. This 
cooperation is not self-evident, and is a cooperation between Croats, Bosniacs and Serbs. The 
cooperation that does take place is cooperation based on a personal relationship and not on the 
organizational structure. The problem that surfaces here is that the police organization is vulnerable to 
the politicians, which leads to insecure police officers and distrust among citizens. 
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According to respondent 2 (working as an advisor on security sector reforms for a diplomatic mission) 
the second reason for the ineffectiveness of the police is the generation of police officers that was 
trained and had worked before the war. These old police officers apparently keep the police from 
developing in a positive direction, partly confirmed by the statements of CP officers (41, 42 & 43) in 
Mostar, who stated that new police officers are asked to take up the CP task, although the police 
officers are still „in‟ the repressive system of policing. 
 
Ethnic division  
A third reason that is brought up by respondents involved in the police is the way the different 
leadership positions in the state institutions of the new county are divided amongst the ethnicities. The 
general agreement that ethnic groups will equally share governing and management positions is 
anchored in the DPA. For the police service this means that all management positions are shared 
along the lines of ethnicity. The result is a situation where, when the police commissioner is of one 
ethnicity, the deputy commissioner should be of another ethnicity. An understandable approach based 
on the ideal of having the different ethnicities working together, but this approach also results in a 
situation that any advancement of police officers is being stalled. As respondent 27 observed, due to 
this ethnic distribution key, it is hard for the police management to reward police officers and to keep 
them motivated. Since promoting one employee is only possible when the other position (for instance 
the deputy) is filled in by someone of the other ethnicity. This ethnic distribution condition therefore 
creates congestion when it comes to human resource management, blocking promotion possibilities.  
And the problem that occurs then is that police officers, who are not motivated, cannot be expected to 
perform the best job they can. 
 
Payment 
The forth reason is the payment of police officers. As said before in chapter 3, this payment differs 
strongly between cantons and state levels and is considered insufficient.  
Many citizens link payment, or the lack thereof, to the topic of corruption. And that corruption relates to 
the lack of trust they have in the police.  
According to several citizens and journalists, police officers in Mostar are underpaid, which, according 
to these respondents (31 & 32), has influence on their work. It is interesting to question why people 
are under this impression. EUPM information states that the average monthly wage of a police officer 
in the federation was KM 789,- (approx. €403,-) a month (in 2008). As this is an average this means 
that much higher and lower salaries are being given, depending on the canton and the number of 
citizens within the canton. Besides the basic salary the income consists of several allowances, like the 
transportation allowance (that varies hugely among police services in the different Cantons) and a 
percentile increase according to the length of service. Police officers in the Herzegovina-Neretva 
Canton earn an average of 1038,05 KM a month, including meal allowance (EUPM 2010). 
 
Average wages are only interesting when we can compare them to the average household 
expenditure. In 2008 this was circa KM 1,550 with a minimum expenditure around KM 1,100 (average 
household of 3 members), according to the BiH Statistics Agency. As we can see there is a 
discrepancy between the income and expenditure. It is not hard to imagine that because of such a 
negative difference between income and expenditure a police officer is more likely to be open to 
corruption and second jobs, both possibly interfering with the effectiveness of his police job, and 
therefore forbidden.  
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The fact that there is a difference in payment of police officers between the cantons can have an 
additional influence on the relationship and cooperation between police officers from different cantons. 
Differences among cantons are the obvious result of the fragmented political organization and can 
negatively influence the effectiveness of law enforcement across cantonal boarders. And that is 
something BiH really can‟t use as criminals don‟t stop at canton boarders. It was even jokingly said 
(respondent 29) that, where politicians can‟t seem to find a way to work together in BiH, criminals on 
the other hand don‟t seem to have any problems, no matter what ethnicity they are, they find a way to 
work together.  
 
Effectiveness 
Many foreign politicians and diplomats, among many others the former prime minister of Belgium, 
Wilfried Martens who chaired the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC), have suggested a 
reorganization of the police, to increase its effectiveness. The initial proposal of the PRC consisted of 
three main changes to the structure of the police in BiH: 1) the “exclusive constitutional competency 
for all police matters vested at the state level” (such as legislative and budgetary authority, 2) the 
adjustment of the policing areas of the local police to areas designed according to practical and 
technical criteria (the result being that the interethnic division lines would be crossed, and that police 
areas would include Serb, Bosniac and Croat areas which would raise issues concerning sovereignty, 
an issues mostly raised by the Serbs, but also felt by the Croats), 3) the political influence on the work 
of the police should end (Muehlmann 2007; 43).   
 
All this information, the diffuse structure, the influence of the minister of Interior on the daily operations 
of the police, the (lack of) payment for police officers and the difference in payment among cantons, 
raises the question; can the police in BiH really be effective? EUPM officers (27 & 29) tell me that the 
crime rate is fairly low, especially in combination with a high number of crimes solved by the police. 
They see this as a hopeful signal that the police in BiH is indeed able to do a good job. At the same 
time respondents, both citizens and EUPM mission members, point out that law enforcement on street 
level is not taken serious. They refer to the situation in the streets of the city centre (see chapter 3, 
paragraph 3.2). Law enforcement and the responsiveness of the police to citizens‟ calls are an 
important way by which the police can improve citizens‟ trust in the police. Striking example is that 
when I asked if respondents would call the national phone number to report a crime, many of them tell 
me they do not trust that there will be any response given to their call. This raises the question wither 
or not the crime rates and numbers on solved crimes are accurate. It can be argued that, as the 
number of crimes is often determined by the number of reports, the willingness of people to go to the 
police and file a report, is a key factor when it comes to the crime rate that is recorded. If people don‟t 
trust the police to solve the crime / make an arrest, they might not go to the police to file a report, 
hence, keeping the crime rate low.   
 
When asking respondent 41 and 42, both CP officers in Mostar, they say they realize that “for people 
to trust the police we need to show result”. As we have seen in chapter 3, concerning the minor 
offences at street level, they suggest a soft approach of „talk talk talk‟. But when it comes to serious 
crimes they indicate that the police needs the help of the prosecutor‟s office. They need to prosecute 
based on the information that the police delivers to them. Respondent 29 (working for EUPM) agrees 
with this argument and says that he observes that the prosecutor‟s office is reluctant to take up big 
cases. 
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When asking for an explanation this respondent explains; “in big cases telephone taps are common, 
even in BiH. The techniques for phone taps are there and the law allows the police to use them when 
the prosecutor‟s office agrees. The danger with telephone taps is that you never know who will end up 
at the other end of the line. Prosecutors are afraid that politicians turn out to be on that other end.  
This would not be good for their careers and therefore prosecutors find these techniques 
unfavourable”. While respondent 29, he being a very experienced detective, finds these techniques 
invaluable to police work. This example shows that even when the police organization is made more 
effective, results can only be achieved when all agencies in the chain do their job. Only then safety 
and security for all citizens of BiH can be achieved.  
 
Trying to improve the cooperation between the many different police agencies of BiH and prosecutors 
office in big criminal cases is one of the current priorities of the IC police mission EUPM. But BiH has 
seen many police -, military - and civil missions over the years, all with their own goals and 
approaches. The speed, with which the missions follow each other, raises questions whether or not 
the goal of each mission is being achieved.  
 
UN led missions 
When the UN involvement in BiH started on 21st of February 1992, UNPROFOR (United Nations 
PROtection Force) was created. This protection force had the task to create conditions that would 
make it possible to start negotiations on an agreement that would lead to peace and security in the 
former Yugoslavia. Ending the war was done through diplomacy and military force. When the DPA was 
officially signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris, UNPROFOR transferred its authority to IFOR 
(multinational Implementation FORce), led by NATO, tasked with monitoring the peace treaty between 
the warring factions. On the 21th of December 1995 the Security Council of the United Nations 
adopted resolution 1035 through which the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH) was established. Part of this mission was the Mine Action Centre (MAC), the representation 
of the Secretary General (Boutros Boutros-Ghali at that time) in BiH and the UNIPTF. UNIPTF‟s task 
was connected to two main responsibilities of the UN; coordinate humanitarian assistance and take 
the lead role when it came to dealing with issues relating to refugees and displaced persons and help 
the parties in BiH to carry out their law enforcement responsibilities as agreed upon in the DPA. 
 
During the first mandate UNIPTF‟s general objectives were, maintaining public order and supporting 
the entities with rebuilding the country. One of the main goals during this first mandate period was 
ensuring a successful first nationwide election. Concerning the police, UNIPTF mainly observed and 
inspected the police and the judicial system. The mandate of UNIPTF was prolonged on the 12th of 
December 1996 by the UN Security Council. UNIPTF was asked to also monitor the human rights 
situation, investigate allegations of human rights abuses by police officers, monitor the police activities 
in Brčko and supporting the restructuring of the police and judicial system. This included educating 
police officers and public servants in the judicial system, with a focus on drugs and organized crime 
fighting. From 2000 to 2002, UNIPTF focused on organizing a police service that would function 
according to: “internationally recognized humans rights and fundamental freedoms‟” (Chandler 1999, 
51 in Huiberts 2009; 7). "The most fundamental principle of democratic policing is to ensure that the 
human rights of the population are respected," said Mr. Robert Wasserman, Deputy Commissioner of 
the UNIPTF. This meant restructuring the post-communist and post-paramilitary police forces and 
judiciary through training, selection, certification and de-certification procedures.  
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Besides that the police force was to be democratized, “by establishing a de-politicized, impartial, 
accountable, multi-ethnic police service that  represented the society it served and abided by the rules 
of community policing” (International Crisis Group 1999; 44). Right after the war the police of BiH 
witnessed a large influx of former soldiers, due to the fact that the number of soldiers had to be 
reduced. This resulted in a large group of untrained and often unskilled police officers. When UNIPTF 
was deployed in BiH, one of the first actions they took was to look at the war history of the police 
officers that they met in the police force. 
 
UNIPTF had to develop standards to downsize the police services to a size that was in balance with 
the number of citizens and was comparable to the number of police officers in other Western 
European countries. Selection and vetting were part of the process of downsizing; the goal was to end 
up with a police service with a size that fits the countries characteristics and its budget. Furthermore 
these police officers had to be trained in modern police practices, and the whole police organization 
had to be offered technical assistance to become an effective law enforcement agency. This political 
correct description was put in perspective by respondent 47, a local who had worked as a language 
assistant for the several international missions and remembered that role of UNIPTF. She told me; 
“one of the main tasks (of UNIPTF) was to clear the Mostar police forces from these ex- army police 
officers, first of all them that 'had blood on their hands' and then those that did not perform according 
to the standards”. Nowadays the new recruits have finished high school and go through a full police 
training, which should increase their knowledge on laws and their abilities to enforce these laws. 
 
UNIPTF can be characterized by the fact that, as it was a UN mission, mission members came from all 
over the world, as were their ideas on policing techniques. Respondents working for the Mostar police 
during the time UNIPTF active in Mostar remember these mission members and their training methods 
very well. For my interview it was even an icebreaker. When asked, police officers were not very 
willing to give their opinion about EUPM, they said; “don‟t bite the hand that feeds you”. But asking 
about experiences with UNIPTF police officers, for instance the Indian police officers that apparently 
told BiH riot police to use snakes to scare off protestors lead to a lot of reactions and opinions on the 
involvement of UNIPTF in BiH. 
Respondents 41 and 43 even felt offended by the fact that the UNIPTF mission members approached 
him and his colleagues as if they did not know how to perform as a police officer. The UNIPTF were 
even explaining to the Mostar police officers the basic skills of a police officer, like how to stop a car.  
It is important to take this information into account when looking at newly introduced concepts, like CP. 
Experiences like these with international police officers and projects introduced by them can influence 
their attitude towards projects like CP. 
 
Members of UNIPTF were mainly members of military police units in their own country, and they were 
working in a war and post war situation that was all but calm. For instance when NATO bombed the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in spring 1999 UNIPTF mission members were confronted with 
protests (partly) pointed at them. Compared to UNIPTF and other missions, the EUPM mission is 
referred to, by some mission members, as a holiday mission (like respondent 30, a military police 
officer from Italy, who was a EUPM mission member in 2010, but was also part of the military mission 
KFOR, in Kosovo). The apparent peace and the improved living conditions in BiH make it a much 
easier mission.  
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When I asked respondent 47 if she saw a difference between the pre-war and post-war police officers, 
she answered “I can‟t see that much difference, but if I have to point out a difference I would say it is 
their attitude towards the public. Pre-war police officers in general were more distant and stricter. The 
post-war police officers are more relaxed towards the public”. 
 
Since 1997 the IC “arrogated to itself more and more powers of direct intervention in Bosnia‟s public 
life” (Bose 2002; 7), mainly through the office of the OHR. This office was responsible for supervising 
and coordinating the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The OHR received many 
governmental and legislative powers, including the power to remove government officials from power, 
who did not or do not comply with the implementation of the DPA. This was done because of the non-
compliance of many officials, which resulted in little progress in the implementation process of the 
DPA. An example of the use of these powers was when, by the end of 1999 and in 2000, the OHR 
ordered the ministry of Interior in Mostar (responsible for the police service), that was still divided at 
that time, meaning there was a Croat Ministry-, and a Bosniac Ministry of Interior, to implement a 
directive. This directive stated, among other things, that police officers were obligated to wear official 
uniforms, a uniform that is identical in the whole Federation, with a cantonal insignia, patches etc.  
 Furthermore, the directive was very specific about the use of flags and coats-of-arms, and 
official seals and stamps. These needed to be either representing BiH (for instance through the coat of 
arms of BiH), the federation (with its flag being a combination of a Bosniac and a Croat symbol, and 
the European stars), the canton (with a symbol designed not to refer to any ethnic group, but to the 
River Neretva, forming the centre of this canton), or the city (in the case of Mostar, a symbol referring 
to the River Neretva and the Stari Most) and should not be related to one ethnicity (see appendix 6). 
The problem was that the people working in the Croat wing of the Ministry Interior in Mostar, but also 
by Croat police officers, working in the city and the rest of the canton, were using and wearing the 
checkerboard, being the symbol for the Croats. And they didn‟t wear the official symbols on their 
uniforms either, identifying them as working for one of the cantons of the Federation (Bose 2002; 78). 
Their Bosniac colleagues on the other hand, did wear the Federation insignia on their uniform, and 
therefore kept to the directive, as they were supposed to. This unwillingness of the Croats working for 
the Mostar police, to work as part of a united police service, could be seen in every joint activity police 
officers at both sides of the city were undertaking. Whether it was joint patrols, working jointly on any 
of the police stations, or attending at a crime scene, everybody could identify a police officer‟s ethnicity 
right away. This turned the ideal of a unified and neutral police service into a farce (Bose 2002; 128).  
 
This situation did improve over the years; UNIPTF was able to enforce the reunification of the two 
police forces in Mostar, resulting in one police organization for Mostar. Important factors for this result 
were the directives mentioned above together with the effect of “the strangers eyes (that of the IC) that 
„forced‟ change” (respondent 27) because of the constant presence of the IC. Still some things needed 
to improve through a change of attitude of the police officers themselves. An example given to me by 
respondent 47 shows this changing attitude of the police officers. “The name tags, that were part of 
the new uniform of the police officers in Mostar, and were introduced by UNIPTF, made it possible for 
citizens to see the ethnicity of the police officer (as both first and family names can be linked to ethnic 
groups). At a certain point in time most police officers felt this was something undesirable, and they 
removed the name tags”. It shows a change in the mind-set of the local police officers and it shows 
that the local police officers themselves have played an important role in this process of change. 
Without their cooperation, change could not have been accomplished. 
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EUPM 
The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over from UNIPTF in 2003, being EU‟s first 
international police mission under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). An example of a 
gradual shift of responsibilities from the UN to the EU, something that BiH‟s authorities had no say in. 
Something that, according to Chandler (2007; 345) is undesirable, as there transitions were part of an 
informal and unaccountable mechanism, imposed from above, and without any involvement of the 
people or elected representatives of BiH Chandler 2007; 345) 
 
As with many of the missions, the goals of the mission(s) changed over time. EUPM 1 (2003 – 2006) 
was orientated on projects and programs. The mission focused on sustainable policing (Council Joint 
Action, 11 March 2002 in Huiberts 2009; 8) and local ownership, all to create a police service that lives 
up to international standards. To achieve this, a „functional hierarchy of local decision making‟ was 
created and an effort was made to do more on the development of managerial skills, and through that 
on capacity building (Collantes Celador 2009, 236-237 in Huiberts 2009; 8).  
 
Furthermore the mission statement was translated in 4 goals for the period of 2003 – 2005; 
1)   development of police independence and accountability; 
2)   the fight against organized crime and corruption; 
3)   financial viability and sustainability of the local police; and 
4)   institution- and capacity-building. 
  
The principal of local ownership makes that EUPM aims for local participation in reforms necessary to 
achieve the above mentioned goals. In 2009 Collantes Celador signalizes the downside of this 
approach, as she mentions the inability of EUPM, unlike the OHR, to “remove or discipline reluctant 
police officers” (Collantes Celador 2009; 235). Unlike UNIPTF, EUPM is not present at local police 
stations. Their focus is the management level of the Bosnian police services.  
On invitation of the Bosnian authorities the EU decided on a follow-up mission of EUPM I; EUPM II, for 
the duration of two years (2006-2008). This „new‟ mission‟s focus was monitoring, mentoring, and 
inspection. Goal of this new approach was to create a professional and multi-ethnic police service, 
which can be sustained and operated according to the best European standards. Furthermore, during 
this second mission there was more support to increase the capability and capacity of the local police 
to identify and disrupt organized crime and corruption. EUPM II (2006-2007) was extended into EUPM 
III (2007-2009) focused on: police reform, the fight against organized crime, and inspection of the 
police. EUPM III was extended (2009-2011) and the focus shifted more to the fight against organized 
crime and corruption. As we can see the mission objectives have been revised several times, 
emphasizing more and more on the fight against major and organized crime, whereas the role of 
police in local society (community policing) seems to have disappeared; more about this subject in the 
next paragraph.    
  
This fight against Organized Crime and Corruption is felt to be important, by the EU, as BiH is said to 
host a large number of criminal groups, which are involved in serious and organized crime. BiH is seen 
as an important link in international criminal activities that threaten EU countries. The police seemed 
incapable to fight these criminal organizations, even worse, they sometimes seemed to be involved in, 
or at least corrupted by, these criminal organizations. Fighting the criminal organizations is made more 
difficult because of the ineffective politicians, corruption, and fragmented infrastructure. All examples of 
an ineffective police, influencing the impression people have of the police. 
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To improve this situation EUPM actively supports police restructuring based on three EU principles for 
police restructuring (see the political agreement adopted by the RS National Assembly, the Federation 
Parliament and the BiH State Parliament in October 2005). Furthermore EUPM aims to improve police 
management and operation capabilities, and the cooperation with other law-enforcement agencies, 
mainly on state level. To improve the overview of politicians over the police, EUPM works together with 
the OHR, this way they hope to reduce the involvement (inappropriate interference) of politicians with 
police operations. Fighting the criminal organizations EUPM assists the local police in planning and 
conducting their operations by mentoring and monitoring. These actions should also lead to the 
identification of structural challenges, corruption and criminal links within the police.       
 
Very important when comparing UNIPTF with EUPM is the fact that EUPM has no executive powers. 
In case of non-compliance or misconduct EUPM cannot take any direct action, like UNIPTF could. 
EUPM needs to take a written recommendation for action to the OHR. Many respondents argue that 
the lack of executive powers makes their work more difficult and less effective. 
It makes many mission members feel as if they are there only to create and/or keep peace and 
stability, and that the only other goal of EUPM leadership is to say; “mission accomplished” 
(respondent 1). This feeling is confirmed by researchers that state that the local ownership mantra can 
be seen as an exit strategy, or even worse, as a cover up for failing reforms led by the IC; “Bosnian 
input or ownership of the policy-making process has been little more than rhetorical” (Chandler 2007; 
337). Citizens confirm this feeling; to them the local ownership approach feels like the IC is losing 
interest in BiH (respondent 1). Whether this explanation is the only possible one, is debatable.  
 
 4.3 Security sector, police reforms and local participation 
Much of the literature argues, and EUPM officers confirmed to me, that CP was 'overshadowed', by 
the Police Reforms (reconstructing / centralizing of police service) and the (unnecessary) politicization 
of „European police standards/practices‟ to fit a model of statehood not shared by all local 
stakeholders” (Collantes Celador 2009; 231). In simple words: the fact that the IC was trying to 
establish a police service that operated according to EU standards, but that is also organized in a way 
the IC seems fit for BiH, caused resistance among the nationalist politicians. The suggested changes 
in the reforms meant that their power and interests were harmed. This meant that the suggested 
changes were under fierce political debate within BiH. In this process of politicization, the Office of the 
High Representative, OHR, (which has executive powers exceeding that of the presidency of BiH) 
played an important role.  
    
As said in the introduction of this thesis, people lacked trust in the state. To “uphold the illusion of the 
law being omnipresent and effective, law enforcement must appear to be predictable, procedural, 
regulated and, above all, visible to the public” (Hansen 2006; 282). Therefore, the IC tried to restore 
this trust. The important role of the state is to provide security in an effective and efficient manner, 
within a democratic framework and within the country (Hänggi 2004; 2). And it is the police‟s job to do 
so. Due to this reason the IC focused on the police in BiH through UNIPTF and later EUPM. Like the 
IC‟s missions in BiH, peacekeeping missions in post conflict countries undergo a certain sequence, to 
restore or built local law enforcement capacity. This sequence can be organized, among others, along 
the lines of the form of security offered, and the institutes that supply this security. It is important for 
the argument being presented here to get a better understanding of the effect of the reforms, because, 
as we will see, it influences the relationship between citizens and the state.  
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As shown below (figure 4.2), in the sequence of peacekeeping missions, according to Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse and Miall, the supplier of security shifts from being a foreign military force to an 
international police force that hands over its powers to local law enforcement agencies. 
  
 Figure 4.2 Peacekeeping mission sequence (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall 2005; 219) 
 
This process that started on national level, is aimed at restoring (and improving) the security sector. 
“The security sector… incorporates all state institutions, which are mandated to ensure the safety of 
the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion. This ranges from the military, the 
police, military police, paramilitary forces, the intelligence and secret services, border and customs 
guards and the  judicial and penal institutions” (Hänggi 2004; 2).  
The British non-governmental organization „Saferworld‟ adds to this definition; the civil structures that 
have a responsibility for management and oversight of the security sector (Forman 2006; 4). Important 
to point out in the case of BiH is the argument Foreman (2006; 2) makes concerning authoritarian 
regimes like the former Yugoslav state: “Unlike other areas of public sector reform, security is a 
complex issue where the state has been weakened by some form of authoritarian regime.”  
 
This can be easily illustrated by the statement of respondent 47 (local employee of EUPM and 
previous police missions) as cited on page 32. She mentions the meetings organized by the 
municipality that where meant to discuss city wide projects. The municipality leader needed approval 
of the representatives for big projects. Problem was that most of the decision had already been made, 
making the meetings a farce and causing scepticism. This is important because it caused citizens to 
distrust the state‟s institute‟s responsibility to provide safety and security, which makes it more difficult 
for people to trust the state. Another reason for this distrust was that during the war the national army 
fell in the hands of the Serbs, while all the ethnic groups established their own para-military groups 
and even small armies. Police officers took side and did not represent the Yugoslavian state police 
anymore. These forces committed atrocities against people of other ethnicities, and after the war many 
of these soldiers and police officers ended up in the post-war police force (at that time still separated 
per ethnic group). So both the experiences with the police before the war, using a concept similar to 
CP, but not really involving citizens in their safety situation and the war, in which police officers played 
an ambiguous role, lead to a great deal of distrust amongst citizens of BiH. 
 
 
The capacity to provide safety and security needed to be restored and therefore distrust needed to be 
overcome in order to the necessary trust in the police and the state again. 
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Generally speaking, for most post-conflict countries “the overarching goal of police reform is to move 
from a model of policing based on repression and social control to a model based on prevention and 
investigation” (O‟Neill 2004; 7). Restoration or building the capacity to provide security was done by 
creating a new army and police, and by reequipping and training these new institutions. But often this 
is considered insufficient by the IC and therefore it often takes the lead in post conflict reform 
processes. Security Sector Reforms (SSR) deals with (a post war) security sector that in many cases 
was non-democratic controlled (by government) and not overseen (by population), inefficient and 
dysfunctional, as it was the case in Yugoslavia, where the police and the army were used to protect 
the interest of the politicians in power. The goal of these reforms was to change it into a democratically 
controlled and overseen, efficient and effective security sector (Huiberts and Teftedarija 2009; 2). The 
examples of SSR's in countries like Bosnia Herzegovina, Burundi and Afghanistan show, that SSR's 
are no easy processes and encounter many difficulties, like, among others, the security sector which is 
resistant to public input (Caparini & Fluri 2006; 5). This means that the security sector is not ready to 
include citizens in their work, and is not open for critique and suggestions of citizens. The process of 
SSR is mostly initiated by external parties, and/or is being demanded by external parties. Within the 
field of SSR‟s, police reforms are a small and understudied sub-field.  
 
The police service, concerned with the day to day safety of the citizens, plays a key role in the sense 
of security that people feel. Being able to end the external actors‟ (the international peacekeeping 
forces) involvement in BiH security, means that the civilians need to be able to trust the state and its 
police (Huiberts 2009; 3). To achieve this, the international community takes on an active role in 
guiding the police service. Literature states that the key concept in this process has been local 
ownership; giving the local community an active role in the direction the police is being taken. 
 
Local ownership 
Local ownership is a concept often used in development projects, but a concept that was not used in 
the post-conflict and security sector reform field until the end of the nineties. The concept was 
declared central to the EUPM activities in BiH and was already mentioned in the first mission 
statement, “sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European 
and international practice, and thereby raising current BiH police standards”. But what the definition of 
local ownership is, is debated. What is clear from this discussion is that „control of the peace process 
and the future, must at least be in the hands of local actors‟. The question is in what phase of the 
process that the local community should be in control (Huiberts 2009; 4). In this research I have used 
the more elaborate definition of local ownership by Collantes Celador: “local participation in the reform 
process but also local capacity to govern policing matters” (Collantes Celador 2009; 234).    
 
EUPM found it important to gradually hand-over the responsibility of this reform process to legitimate 
representatives of the local population, thereby creating „local ownership‟, and not creating top-down 
and imposed reforms. This resulted in a hierarchy of local decision making, from the political level 
down to the local police unit. On the political level the Ministerial Consultative Meeting on Police 
Matters was re-established. On the level of Police Commissioner/Director of Police, the Police 
Steering Board was re-established, both established by the mission in 2003.  
 Local ownership was shaped by the development of Project Implementation Boards, as 
advised by EUPM, which have now been established throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. “The 
Boards are responsible for developing projects at the local level and involve both the local police and 
EUPM advisers”.    
61 
 
 
Besides organizing local ownership through state organized panels, like that of the Project 
Implementation Boards, there is also another approach to local ownership, that of local ownership 
through civil society‟s involvement. Increasingly Bosnian civil society is involved in reform processes. 
We see an increasing number of campaigns that call on civil society and the community to be involved 
in the fight against organized crime. An example is the campaign called „Usudi Se‟ (Dare) that tried, 
through a hotline, to raise awareness about the „harmful impact of crime on the citizen‟s daily lives‟ and 
motivate civilians to notify the police when criminal activities are suspected. (Vainio 2008; 5). 
According to Annan this “all [is] an essential step forward, in that the responsibility for implementation 
is delegated to the level where police services are delivered, which in turn maximizes the principle of 
local ownership” (Annan 2005; 6). Local ownership was also necessary as part of the „exit strategy‟ of 
the international community and external donors (Huiberts 2009; 3).  
 
Civil society 
According to Caparini & Fluri (2006) the security sector reform literature states that another form of 
inclusion of citizens is through civil society. Civil society can contribute to a good functioning security 
sector by acting as a watchdog, mainly by representative organizations, interest groups and NGO‟s 
taking up this role. Looking at the situation in BiH, we need to be aware, that civil society (like many 
other parts of society), as we know it, is underdeveloped, as in most former authoritarian regimes and 
post-war countries. Looking at the examples in chapter 3, we still see a lack action taken by civilians. 
This does not mean there aren‟t any NGO‟s. Contrary, there are plenty NGO‟s in Mostar. But most of 
them are created with support from the IC and international NGO‟s and they are not rooted in the 
Mostar society. And as we can see in this chapter, this has a negative influence on the overview over 
the security sector, as the political oversight is also disrupted by ethnic politics. It relates closely to the 
observations that citizens are reluctant to take up their own responsibilities.  
 
It was Benjamin in 1921 who foresaw some of the complexities of modern policing. He stated that the 
democratic police (a constructed concept, which is therefore arbitrary) must be seen to protect and 
represent, both the „people‟ – represented as series of communities – and the state.  Key 
characteristics for this are transparency and accountability. The police must appear to be protecting 
the good citizens, while identifying the criminals and preventing crimes, and to be active in the 
community to identify potential criminals. This makes it much more complex, intensive and time-
consuming then a more authoritarian form of policing. At the same time it asks of citizens a voluntary 
consent, when it comes to this power of the state, in exchange for protection (census and censura) 
(Ball 2006; 1, Waddington 2010; 197, Bradford 2010; 179) This explains the general problem that 
(poor) people in (the former) non-democratic countries, complain about, which is, the police being 
unresponsive, corrupt and brutal. The fact that they come from a former non-democratic country 
means that an opinion is developed that the state takes care of everything, at the same time they 
might not always trust the state.  
 
Where the police services function as may be expected of them, “corrupt justice systems can 
significantly undermine their effectiveness. Inadequate and corrupt public security and justice systems 
have often led people to attempt to provide their own security”. 
 
The poor are more likely to turn to „self-help‟ justice and security, including vigilantism (Human Rights 
Watch 2002; 7) My observation is that the situation in BiH has gone through this phase and has 
moved on, respondent 28 with UNIPTF mission experience directly after the war (1996-1997) and 
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EUPM mission experience in 2010. This does not mean that we shouldn‟t take this information into 
account. This is a situation where the police in BiH also had to go through.  
Like Caparini & Fluri (2006), Ball emphasizes the importance of democratic checks and balances to 
prevent the security forces to be used for partisan political purposes or intervene directly in the political 
process (Ball 2006; 2). As I have argued in chapter 3, the doubt that is still present among many police 
officers is that they feel unsure about what kind approach to choose, fearing that they are to 
repressive, while at the same time we see citizens that are reluctant to take their own responsibilities.  
 
State – police relations 
Besides the above mentioned practical challenges, the scientific discussion also touches upon the 
academic discussion of state – police relations and the role the police (and military) play in legitimizing 
the state. This is relevant, as it is the exact same situation as we have in BiH, where the complete 
police structure (cantonal and national) represents the structure of the BiH state. Benedict Anderson 
studied the role the military played in legitimizing the state in post-colonial countries, like Indonesia. 
Based on his studies he argues that the absence of countervailing domestic powers, ethicized basis 
for recruitment, and military forces being used to maintain internal power structures in a country, all 
contribute to the central role that national armies have played in the process of the post-colonial state 
and nation building (Anderson 2002; 268). To me this shows great resemblance with the recent history 
of BiH, since the Yugoslav regime had many state forces (the JNA; Yugoslav National Army, the 
UDBA; department of state security, SDB; the state security service and MUP; the special police unit), 
including the police, at its disposal to uphold the internal power structures. These state institutes have 
shown great disrespect of the rights of the citizens of Yugoslavia. Like during the years 1961-1974 
when student protests were beaten down by the police (Robertson; 1), but also in the nineteen 
eighties when the secret police pursued underground nationalist groups. And this is what they were 
used for; upholding and supporting Tito‟s regime. During the war the police were part of the inter-
ethnic aggression. Therefore the police in BiH can be compared to the military in the post-colonial 
countries in Andersons‟ studies. By taking control over the reestablishment and reforms of the security 
sector, the international community seems to try to avoid the „mistakes‟ that Anderson warns us for. 
This effort has resulted in monitoring the recruitment process (with the EU standard being introduced), 
reforming the police structure and in supporting a further „democratization‟ of BiH state and entity 
structures. I also argue that the CP project can be placed under this umbrella, as CP creates a 
relationship between citizens and the state in which they are expected to work together, and gain each 
other‟s trust. Trusting that rights are guaranteed and protected and responsibilities are taken by both. 
This should act as a balance in the two roles of the police; repression when necessary, prevention and 
pro-action as much as possible.  
As mentioned earlier, it is important to realize that police reforms in general are part of security sector 
reforms and the process of state building. The same goes for the police reforms in BiH; they play “a 
key role in Bosnia and Herzegovina‟s internationally-supervised state building process. It is one of the 
four key conditions to move the country closer to its European future” (Collantes Celador 2009; 231). 
This means that we should see the police as legitimizing and enforcing the state of BiH, being multiple 
nations in one state. A fragile construct, but a construct that could, if proven to be sustainable, be 
exemplary for other post conflict countries. In the next chapter this construct of multiple nations in one 
state will be studied more closely.  
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5 INSTITUTIONALIZING PEACE IN A NEW BIH   
 
“The 1995 peace agreement was a treaty „designed to end a war‟, not to built a state.”  
Mantra of the international officials (Chandler 2007 ; 336). 
 
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), that was signed in December 1995 ended the 4 year war 
between the warring parties in BiH. It also created a new country and a state structure, that 
significantly differed from the previous state structure; one that should ensure peace and stability.  
In this chapter the theories of state- and nation building are explained, to offer the theoretical 
background of the state- and nation building process that BiH went through since the war. This should 
help to better understand the relationship between citizens and the state in the new reality.  
A new reality in which the relationship between citizens and the state and peace between citizens, is 
institutionalized through the state structure on national, federational and local level. 
 
 5.1  State- and nation building  
 
The DPA (and especially the appendixes) deal with state-building and the reconstruction of society and 
thereafter with ending hostilities, according to David Chandler (2007; 339). Now, 17 years after the 
DPA was signed, BiH is considered a weak state (Chandler 2007; 346). According to Bose, who 
studied BiH and other countries where a state building process is taking place, the state needs 
strengthening, because a weak state is an ideal breeding ground for criminal networks and networks 
of 'elite' that “exploit public resources for personal enrichment” (Bose 2002; 26). Chandler is more 
cynical, he states that the political process since Dayton can be described as “the continuation of war 
by other means” (Chandler 2007; 336). And this is exactly why the abstract topic of state- and nation 
building, but also security sector reforms, relates closely to the feeling of citizens in Mostar, that not 
only the police are inefficient, but that this can be linked to the weakness of state institutions on 
cantonal and national level in BiH. 
 
Theoretically the dominant political institutions are; state and nation. In a post-war situation, like that of 
BiH, both need to be rebuilt. It is important to understand that in most common theories the two are 
inseparable. To create a better understanding of both concepts, these concepts need to be defined 
first, before I can explain the process of state- and nation building per concept. 
 
The state 
The state is defined by Weber (in v. Hoof & Ruysseveldt 1998; 187) as a human society, bound to a 
certain territory, with the monopoly on the use of force and raising taxes, that enable the state to 
govern the country. The state is legitimized to constrain and coerce people, and maintain behavioural 
norms, and the state controls the definition of public interest (Nagengast 1994; 116).  
In addition, the 'modern nation-state' can be characterized by a claim over one territory by only one 
authority. The nation-state is supposed to provide a homogeneous order and peace within the 
territorial borders and to provide citizens with equal rights. Other theories describe the state as being a 
social contract on the use of violence, also described as law preserving and law making powers.  And 
in yet another theory the protection that the state should provide is defined more specifically, pointing 
out that the state should protect against violence from outside the territory and emphasizing that the 
“locally powerful demand tribute in order to stave off their own violence” (Tilly 1985 in Kelly & Shah 
2006; 251).  
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Despite this, it still results in a definition of the state being the political management of a specific 
geographic territory and its inhabitants, done by a centralized government, with its institutions and 
public servants. These institutions and its public servants need to act 'impersonal', while they are said 
to be a mirror of the society (Nagengast 1994: 116).  
 
There are two theories concerning the origin of the state, the first being the conflict theory, that sees 
the emergence of the state as a way for the elite to remain in power over their subordinates (amongst 
others Kelly & Shah 2006; 250). The second sees the emergence of the state as providing stability for 
increased complexity, beneficial for the growth and development of that state. 
 
Theories that define the state make it clear that the state should be able to manage state-society 
expectations and is only successful when it is considered legitimate in the eyes of its population. The 
state can only do this based on a minimum administrative capacity. It should have a functioning civil 
service and a „public financial management system‟, that is able to raise funds, mainly in the form of 
taxation (Fragile States Group 2008; 38). State building subsequently, is the process through which 
states are supposed to (re)function more effectively and according to certain standards. The OECD-
DAC‟s Fragile States Group (2008), states that it is therefore necessary to develop “capacity, 
institutions and legitimacy of the state, driven by state-society relationships”. In the situation of BiH this 
definition of the OECD-DAC‟s Fragile States Group proves inadequate. Legitimacy of the state still 
needs to prove itself in BiH. In the DPA the new state of BiH was recognized, a state covering most of 
the geographical area of republic BiH that existed before in the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, but with a new state form and apparatus, different from that of former Republic of Bosnia 
Herzegovina. It is my opinion that the layered and diffuse structure of the state of BiH, that is so 
characteristic for the current state, and a result of the war history and international political 
considerations, makes that people‟s loyalties are not always connected with the state of BiH. State 
building had to take place and the legitimacy of the state, being the FBiH and the state of BiH, needed 
to prove itself. In other words; “the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubts 
or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to” (Bose 2002; 3).       
 
During a visit to BiH, in October 2010, Mrs. Clinton, Secretary of state of the USA, talked about the 
importance of putting differences behind you, as the love for the same country should be put above 
that. Like she did after she opposed Barrack Obama, when running for office, and lost. Working under 
president Obama meant putting the differences behind her. A student present at the venue told her; 
“You said that you love the same state. Unfortunately, that is the major problem we have here. Our 
politicians often prefer other countries more than our state”. She seemed to be referring to Milorad 
Dodik, the newly elected, outspoken nationalist Bosnian Serb leader who is now president of the 
Bosnian Serb republic (RS). Mr. Dodik has called Bosnia an 'impossible state' and has said he wanted 
his republic to secede (Cooper 2010; 2). The layered and defuse structure, makes it almost impossible 
for BiH to become one state, to which all groups feel the same loyalty. This is partly due to the 
underlying motivation behind the layered and defuse structure, being the fact that the ethnic groups 
are given as much independence as possible. Something that finds its origin in the negotiations, that, 
according to David Chandler (2007; 336), were conducted by the nationalist political parties of the 
ethnic groups, parties that were also the instigators of the war in BiH and who were also influenced by 
the fact that both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats get their support from an influential 
neighbouring country. 
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This fact causes all kinds of problems, for instance when it comes to the role of the state in the 
provision of safety and security, because, as said before, the state has a monopoly on the use of 
violence. In return, the state is responsible for providing safety and security to its citizens. This can be 
seen as a social contract. The common institution responsible for the provision of security within BiH, 
(as compared to external, done by the military) is the police. When looking at the organizational 
structure of BiH the questions arise, what is the state, on what level does it operate, and what state 
level is then responsible to provide safety and security. There is a central state (BiH), which is 
consisting of the FBiH and the RS. To make it more complex, in the FBiH there are 10 cantons (among 
which the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton in which Mostar is situated), that are, to a large extend, 
independent when it comes to safety and security policies. Crimes do not have the tendency to stop at 
the borders of a canton, or the tendency to restrict itself to one ethnic group. As we have been able to 
read in the previous chapter, the police structure is connected to the political structure, and therefore, 
in FBiH, it‟s the canton that is responsible for its police. Considering the fact that there are 10 cantonal 
police services, chances are that criminals are able to get away, due to (communication) problems 
between the different police services. As is confirmed by respondent 27, a EUPM police officer 
working on management level, who states that cooperation between the cantonal police services, is 
depending on personal relationships between police commissioners. When it comes to practical 
cooperation he sees that in many cases the cooperation is good (there where the personal 
relationship between police commissioners is good), but sharing information is a bigger problem. 
 
The IC has been actively involved in creating institutions and thereby trying to organize the countries 
state structure, from the moment the DPA was drafted. In the DPA, article III, for instance, the division 
of responsibilities between the state and the entities (FBiH and RS) is being defined. Some say that 
the attempts of the IC have been aimed at centralizing the organization of BiH, suggesting a 
preference of the IC for the mono-national federation, based on the common theoretical ideal of a 
nation-state, meaning that there would be one state (as there is now) but also one nation. The 
assumption being that this would decrease the animosity among the different ethnicities within BiH. 
 
The nation  
What is considered to be a nation? When studying literature on this topic, we can distinguish many 
different definitions. Mauss for instance, defines a nation as follows; “We understand by nation, a 
society integrated in material and moral terms, with a stable and permanent central power, fixed 
frontiers, and a relatively stable moral, mental and cultural unity among the inhabitants who 
consciously respect the state and abide by its laws (1969: 584, translated), and by this he is 
incorporating the state and the nation. Kuzio underlines Mauss‟ description of the nation by stating that 
the nation is characterized by a collective power, creating a „we‟ and by citing Dahl (1989) who argues 
with Mauss the presence of „fixed borders‟ and „a people‟. According to Dahl, if these presuppositions 
are not present and if there is a political community who calls these borders into question, 
democratization will not be conciliated (Kuzio 2001; 171). Amitai Etzioni, in his article „citizenship in a 
communitarian perspective‟ (2011; 336), focusses more on values, traditions, identity and the ideas 
about the future. All these descriptions show a resemblance and focus on similarities between the 
values and morals of people living in a certain geographical area, creating a sense of belonging to that 
place and togetherness with these other people. 
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Benedict Anderson takes another approach and goes into the question, what makes a nation? He 
defines a nation as; “an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign” (Anderson 1983; 57). 
„Imagined‟ because members of a nation, even the smallest ones, will not get to know each other. 
Feeling part of the nation means you will have to imagine this nation to be present. Althusser 1971 in 
Bowman (2003; 334) states that in the case of Yugoslavia national aspirations of the different groups 
within the country were combined with the image of the Yugoslav nation. People recognized that they 
were addressed by this „new‟ community, and that they were part of it. Anderson ascribes an important 
role to communication done by the media. Bowman is critical about Benedict Anderson‟s theory. He 
argues that communication can help promote the abstract idea of a community, but it is all about the 
meaning of the idea that is communicated that determines if people are able to identify with it and fight 
for it. Identifying is done based on an identity that is already present, and the individual needs - the 
worries this individual has - being addressed in the media. When this happens than the worries that 
individual experiences become a collective phenomenon as they are explained in nationalist terms. 
The image people have of the nation is determined by the way the nation is being displayed, but just 
as important is the way people see the nation themselves, based on their own experiences (Bowman 
1994; 142). Even though people might be chasing a fantasy, when it  feels as a coherent world this 
can be cause for citizens to take (violent) action (Bowman 2003; 321). This violence is an important 
aspect of nationalism, as, according to Bowman, nationalism seems to originate from violence. This 
violence can be imaginary, when people of a (non-existing) nation feel that violence is inflicted on 
them, making them feel that they can only be safe when they embrace an independent state (Bowman 
2003; 319, Tilly 1985 in Kelly & Shah 2006; 251) . This new nation functions as an antidote to the 
(imagined) violence that is threatening them. The fact that people, who have not felt part of that certain 
community or nation before, now suddenly become part of it, due to the imagined threat.  
 
Gellner (1964; 169) helps us answer the question if nations are created by nationalism, because it is 
present below the surface. He argues that nationalism invents nations where they do not exist. This 
theoretical statement can be best illustrated by the case of former Yugoslavia. Although large parts of 
the territory of Yugoslavia were under Austria-Hungarian rule before WWI, it was only when Yugoslavia 
became a country (Kingdom of Yugoslavia) after WWI, that the ideal of one nation came up. By hard 
repression King Alexander perused this ideal. As did Tito, who lead the liberation of Yugoslavia after 
WWII and who brought the different republics together into the federation of Yugoslavia. Through 
media and education, but also through repression, (imprisoning many „nationalistic‟ leaders) Tito 
created a common history and ideology, and through that a new nation was created. But as we can 
see in this thesis, recent history of that same Yugoslavia has shown that Yugoslav nationalism, as it 
was created by Tito, did not last for eternity. Because from the 1980‟s onwards, nationalistic 
movements mainly in Serbia and Croatia picked up again, that ultimately led to the war that broke up 
Yugoslavia. Studies of transition in post-communist states (showing close resemblances to the 
socialist Yugoslavia) show that where a national identity is present, transition becomes more easy. 
Examples of the easier transition, for the author, are Poland and the Czech republic (Kuzio 2001; 172). 
Taking these historic events in account, the process of existence and disappearing of nationalism 
never stops. We can see this all around the world, but also close to home. The Netherlands emerged 
out of individual states to form one nation state. But now, in an age of globalization, new alliances are 
formed. Where European cooperation and unity is increasing on one hand, regional sentiments are 
also increasing on the other. 
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Nationalism finds its origin in the industrial revolution. Because of the increasing mobility, ties based 
on kinship, religion and local communities weaken and decrease and there is a need for a cohesive 
ideology. Like theories on the state there are two main theoretical explanations on the origins of the 
nation.  
-  One argues that a nation existed naturally before the emergence of the states, with the nations 
 being unique and distinctive (Nagengast 1994; 117).  
- The other theory states that nations are constructed by its members by a sense of collectiveness 
 and commonality. (Anderson 1983, Camoroff 1987, 1989, 1992, Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1990, 
Kedourie 1985, Smith 1987, Tambiah 1988 in (Nagengast 1994; 118).    
 
There are different mediums that contribute to homogenization, necessary for nationalism; the art of 
printing and a common language that both offer an opportunity to share knowledge and create „shared 
knowledge‟. When we observe the current situation in BiH we see that newspapers are often 
connected with ethnic groups; Croats in Mostar reading the 'local' Dnevni List in Croat language, or the 
Zagreb based newspapers, while the Bosniacs read the Sarajevo based newspapers. A common 
spoken language is present, although Serbs use the Cyrillic language in writing. All people can 
understand each other when talking. It was only when Yugoslavia fell apart, differences within the 
language were highlighted, to create distinct languages. The last medium to contribute to 
homogenization, necessary for nationalism is the education system. According to the constitution of 
FBiH (1995), "cantons are solely responsible for developing educational policies, including 
declarations for education, ensuring education, as well as developing and implementing cultural 
policies”. Like many things in FBiH, the education administration is organized on several levels, 
including federation, canton, municipality, and school levels, resulting in many challenges when 
implementing the education policies, regulated by law. “One dilemma concerns the question of 
whether to organize the public education system into special national schools with separate curricula” 
(Pasalic-Kreso 1999; 1). 
 
This situation is resembled by the Gymnasium in Mostar, the oldest and highly respected educational 
institution in Mostar. Once home to the intelligentsia of the city, now, under huge pressure from the IC, 
offers secondary education to students of all ethnic groups, but at separate times during the day. While 
an educational institution is a place where the youth of a country can come together to learn a 
common language and history, in BiH they are separated and are taught their own language and own 
history. According to Bose, young generations can be brought closer together by encouraging schools, 
that are teaching different curricula in the same school, to introduce „shared and common‟ elements in 
the curricula. It is his opinion that this strategy can only be realized if the IC can persuade the Serbs 
and the Croats to accept “that the „shared and common‟ heritage pertains not just all Bosnians cutting 
across distinctions of denomination, nationality and entity, but the peoples and successor-states of 
former Yugoslavia as a whole” (Bose 2002; 136). 
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  Figure 4.3  Gymnasium in Mostar 
Like Mauss, many theories have connected the nation and the state with a society (Grillo 1980 in Reis 
2004; 252). The result of this is that citizenship is being seen as the outcome of the connection 
between 'authority, dealing with power of the state, and 'solidarity' and the feeling of belonging through 
a common identity, being the nation (Bendix, 1964; Reis, 1988, 1997 in Reis 2004; 252). Or as Weber 
says; "One might well define the concept of nation in the following way: a nation is a community of 
sentiment which normally tends to produce a state of its own" (Weber, 1946:176). It all relates to the 
current situation in BiH where there is one country, one state, (although very defuse), but more than 
one nation.  
 
The following quote of Alija Izetbegovic (former president of BiH) shows the immediate challenge when 
suggesting such a solution for BiH. “If we hold a rally for democracy, a few intellectuals show up; but if 
we hold one for the (ethnic) nation, thousands of people will take part” (Izetbegovic in Hayden 1993; 
73). Thus indicating that, by no means, is there one nation in BiH. Despite the fact that officially there 
are only two entities (the FBiH and the RS) it becomes clear from all observations, interviews and 
literature, that a large majority of citizens still do not share the feeling of being „Bosnians‟, or being 
member of the Federation of BiH (Croats and Bosniacs), for that matter. It‟s only the Serbs in the RS 
that can be considered to have a semi-nation state.  
 
According to Kuzio (2001; 174, based on Bunce 1999 & Offe 1991) there is an ideal sequence in 
rebuilding a „civic state‟; 1) state & nation building, 2) establishing a market economy, 3) democracy. 
But instead, in BiH all these this are happening at the same time. Many scholars argue that the lack of 
civic nationalism (opposed to ethnic nationalism) influences this process of transition negatively. This 
makes political and economic improvements less supported. 
 
Scholars today argue that in many countries this concept of the nation-state is outdated. Some have 
even said the days of the nation-state, as we know it, are over (Van Creveld, 1999). And whether or 
not this is completely true, we can see this change in the form of the increased formation of 
independent regions with their own nationhood (Basque in Spain, the nations making up the U.K.), but 
also in Africa (the creation of South-Sudan) and the situation in the Middle East.  
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Despite this change I experienced the need among the politicians and the citizens in BiH for a nation-
state, or states. But they all have totally different views on the makeup of this nation state, depending 
on the group they belong to. The case of BiH does clearly show that the different national affiliations 
do not overlap the design of the state. The state of BiH has to deal with affiliations of three different 
nations, being the Croat, Bosniac and Serb entities, with a further difficulty that the Croats and 
Bosniacs form one federation. At the same time these nations are closely related to the neighbouring, 
and more homogeneous, nation-states of Croatia and Serbia. This last means that for the Croats and 
Serbs in Bosnia there is little need and little interest to work together for the BiH state. Combined with 
the lack of trust in politicians and a lack of experience with the concept of accountability through 
elections means that a majority of the citizens of BiH is not investing in political participation (Devine & 
Mathisen 2005; 10).  
 
The situation described above is a clear example of people living in a structure where multiple loyalties 
are present. They need to determine their loyalties within their canton, their entity and in BiH as a 
country. This all seems to be in contradiction with theories concerning the necessary circumstances of 
a „successful‟ country. Scholars like Mill say that citizens should share a common nationality, with 
common sympathies. This would make people more willing to work together and be under the same 
government (Mill 1861 in Baubock 2000; 7). Cosmopolitan liberals denounce ethnic nationalism and 
promote civic & constitutional patriotism which could be transformed to larger units (Baubock 2000; 7). 
Both views on the loyalties of people seem far from reality in BiH.    
 
The problem in BiH is that none of the representatives of the ethnic groups, that are in power, want to 
be in either of the federations (FBiH or the federation forming the state of BiH). The Bosniacs and 
Croats need to be in the FBiH, to counter balance the Serbs, while all 3 need to be in the federation 
BiH, as any other solution would lead to the collapse of BiH. And that option is not accepted by the IC. 
According to Chandler it was because the IC foresaw this position of the different groups, that the 
state structure was not submitted for any parliamentary procedure or election. Instead the elections, 
nine months after signing the DPA, based on the constitution, had to restore BiH‟s ownership 
(Chandler 2007; 339). In general the Bosniac representatives always preferred a federation as a 
solution for BiH, hoping that this would lead to a centralized and unitary state, while (again in general) 
the Bosnian Croat representatives prefer a solution in which three equal entities form the BiH 
federation. The Bosnian Serbs representatives prefer a similar solution with responsibilities 
decentralized to the entities as much as possible. 
 
The information on the content of the newly created constitution of BiH and the knowledge on the 
situation on the ground, being that people are citizen of the state of BiH, but are part of different 
nations referring to the entities, supports Halfmann's argument that “the erosion of the state's capacity 
to uphold the fusion of 'nation' and state” is “a consequence of the functional differentiation of modern 
society”. But Halfmann's conclusions are based on the observations of processes in, what he calls 
'modern society'. Without wanting to go into a debate about how modern BiH is, I would argue that the 
events on the time path of BiH are very different from the events on the time path of other countries 
where the capabilities of the state, to uphold this fusion, seem to diminish. But, where his argument 
does fit the situation in BiH is when he states that the current state's weakness “results from the limits 
of territoriality as a basis for membership vis-a-vis the transnational membership”. Bosnian-Croats 
ascribe membership first of all to their ethnic group, then to an ideal of an own state; Herzeg-Bosna, 
and thirdly to the state of Croatia, many having a dual citizenship, both that of BiH and of Croatia.  
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The Bosnian-Croats I have spoken about this matter, do make a clear distinction, they are first of all 
Bosnian-Croats. They feel much more related to the state of Croatia (and to the nation) than to the 
state of BiH. A similar situation exists with the Bosnian Serbs).  
 
This is confirmed by the observations of the former Slovenian president Milan Kučan. He stated that 
“these three concepts (the three conflicting views on what kind of a state Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs 
can share) never really met, let alone reconciled..” (Crisis Group, Bosnia Briefing N°62 6 May 2011). It 
shows that Baubock is right in saying that “expanding democracy across borders cannot be 
accomplished by an appeal on morality or reason even when the appropriate institutions are being 
created, especially when the loyalties and interests of people are being 'threatened' by this new 
authority” (Baubock 2000; 5). In my opinion this means that many people will keep defying the 
authority of the state and its institutions as long as they don‟t feel represented by these institutions. 
And the same goes for the civil servants working for these institutions, they constantly need to juggle 
with their loyalties. Loyalty to the law of the state that they are representing and enforcing, but also 
loyalty to their social background and their personal beliefs. It shows that there is a gap between the 
theories on the state and the nation, and the realities in BiH. While the organisations and the 
structures of the state are being provided legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens of BiH cannot be 
provided. It needs to be earned. The legitimacy, in my eyes, is closely related to the nation, that, as we 
have been able to read, is present in many different appearances, making it hard to fit the available 
theories. In the next paragraph more will be clarified on how the state structure were created, and how 
the design tried to form a bridge between the theories on the state and nation, and the realities in BiH.  
 5.2 How peace in BiH was institutionalized 
To end a war, all kinds of tools are available, both military and diplomatic. Preventing war from 
happening again needs totally different tools, and more importantly, as we have been able to read in 
the previous paragraph, prevention needs a sustainable solution. In Dayton Ohio, the IC tried to find 
that sustainable solution in the form of a new state structure for a new nation, being Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, “on the basis of little more than the ruins and rivalries of a bitter war” (Bose 2002; 1). 
This state structure was defined in the DPA, and its main focus was safeguarding the security and 
position of all ethnic groups within BiH. As we have been able to read in chapter 3, this structure has 
great influence on the effectiveness of the state and its institutions, and the way citizens perceive and 
trust the state. To be able to better understand the reactions of my respondents, a better knowledge of 
the new state structure and the ideas behind it is necessary. Therefore in this paragraph an overview 
of the state structure and how this structure came to existence, characteristics of federations, 
preferred state form by each of the ethnic groups and information on the governing structure of the city 
of Mostar. 
 
To safeguarding the security and position of all ethnic groups within BiH, decentralization was 
introduced. Post war BiH was divided in two entities, the FBiH consisting of Bosniacs and Croats (51% 
of the territory) and the Republika RS (49% of the territory). The proportions were the result of the 
situation on the battlefield, where the Bosnian Serbs were still strong despite the offensives of the 
Croat and Bosniac armies and the involvement of the IC, together with the diplomatic aim to have the 
FBiH to form a counter weight for the Bosnian Serbs.  
The country as a whole is governed by a three man presidency and a Parliamentary Assembly 
consisting of two chambers; the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. The presidency 
consists of one Serb, one Croat and one Bosniac, directly elected by the people from their own 
entities.  
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The state of BiH has only limited powers. It deals with foreign politics, foreign trade, customs, 
monetary policy, inter-entity communication, international and inter-entity law enforcement, and 
transportation (Chandler 2000; 67). “The Federation is given exclusive responsibilities for defence, …. 
combating terrorism, inter-cantonal crimes, drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime;.. “ 
(Bose 2002; 70). 
A federation is defined as a constitutional division of decision making power, between two or more 
territorial levels of government (Bose 2002; 241). Federations are said to be one of the two ways to 
built new political communities, based on former national identities (Baubock 2000; 7). Federalism is 
based on loyalties to the unit(s) that make up the overarching federation. That is way it is possible to 
address the internal demand for self-government while being able to work inside a larger unit of the 
federation. The other way would be 'assimilation' into the larger community that replicates the 
particular traits of nationhood.  
 
There are many possible designs of federations, but in general two designs can be distinguished; 
- National(izing) / mono-national federation is aiming to make a sovereign polity with a national 
 culture. The federation is a step towards a centralized state that should create this polity and 
 culture, which, in general, is the ideal of the Bosniacs.  
- Multi ethnic / multinational federalism, a design based on two or more national or ethnic cultures, 
 that will be expressed, institutionalized and protected in the design. The design rejects integration 
 and assimilation, and instead believes in the possibility of multiple national loyalties, a design 
 that is more in line with the ideas of the Croats and Serbs as more autonomy is guaranteed. 
 
Currently BiH is structured along the lines of this second design. The problem is that they were not 
dealing with two or three equal entities who each could take up an equal share in the federation. 
Instead they were dealing with two entities; the FBiH and the RS. The FBiH is a federation consisting 
of Croats and Bosniacs. The FBiH is made up of ten cantons, being federal units, all with a 
decentralized form of self-governance. This means that “all governmental functions and powers not 
specifically assigned to the national level, among others law enforcement, are the responsibility of the 
canton governments” (Chandler 2000; 67). Out of the ten cantons five are predominantly Bosniac, 
three predominantly Croat, and two have a mixed populations, among these two is the Herzegovina-
Neretva Canton (Canton 7). As we could see in paragraph 4.2 with the example of the logo‟s designed 
for the different levels of the state, it is stipulated that the cantons shall be named solely after the cities 
which are the seats of the respective cantonal governments or after regional geographic features. 
Interesting enough this approach for the names of the administrative regions was also taken during 
Yugoslav times, when it was meant to “banish names of Serbian or Croatian national(ist) connotation“ 
(Bose 2002; 77). Within the RS on the other hand there is a strong central form of governance, with no 
cantonal structure; instead there is a national government and sixty-plus municipalities. The police 
services are centrally governed, with five police districts (Brčko district not taken into account). 
 
This structure was both the outcome of negotiations and of the work of a team of American diplomats 
and lawyers who were involved in preparing suggestions for the state model during the negotiations in 
Dayton. This can be read in the book of the chief negotiator Holbrook (1998). The result of this work 
on the state structure ended up in the DPA as annex 4; the constitution of BiH. This made Bose (2002; 
60) claim that BiH is “a state by international design and of international designs” a rightful one. 
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In practice, this federal structure of BiH means that citizens are both members of their entity and of the 
federation(s) (Bosniac – Bosnian-Croat federation and the federation of the two entities, FBiH and RS) 
and this last one, the federal state of BiH itself is “composed of individual citizens as well as of the 
states”. Sovereignty of the state BiH (foreign policy) is located at the federal (BiH) government, while 
the internal sovereignty (amongst many other, education, police, healthcare etc.) is shared between 
the state of BiH and the entities, and in case of the Bosniacs and Croats, also within their cantons 
(Baubock 2000; 11). 
 
Under constant debate 
A returning debate is that of the favoured state form of BiH. Outcome of the DPA was the division of 
power based on the population proportions (favoured by the Bosniacs), while the Croats wanted an 
equal division, resulting in three entities (Bose 2002; 88). This choice indicates a choice for the 
multinational federation model. The recurring argument is that the current state form is not working the 
way it should. Therefore many Croats argue that a change of state form should be allowed, meaning 
that the DPA principals should be omitted. This change could develop in two directions. One direction 
advocates action by the IC to further integrate BiH into a federative association, while the other 
direction advocates that the IC should allow a „hard partition‟, meaning the disintegration of the 
country. It is mostly leaders of the Republika Srpska, and in lesser numbers the Croat political leaders, 
that advocate for a „hard partition‟ (Bose 2002; 92). One of the reasons for this disagreement on the 
future of BiH can be found in the explanation of the cause of the war. Most Croats and Serbs in BiH 
see the most recent war as a „Civil War‟ while, most Bosniacs see it as an act of „external aggression‟. 
They argue that the republic of BiH was founded in April 1992, that was reaffirmed by the Dayton 
Peace Agreement at the end of 1995 (Bose 2002; 19), and through that became a legitimate state that 
was invaded by „foreign‟ troops, like the YNA, led by Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, and the 
Croat National Army assisted by militarized groups from the local Serb and Croat population. 
According to David Owen (negotiator in BiH between 1992 and 1994), the “borders - the internal 
boundaries of the six republics in the former Yugoslavia and the boundaries of the current independent 
states - should have been negotiable”. Not allowing this greatly hampered the EC‟s attempts at crisis 
management in July-August 1991” (Bose 2002; 49). By saying this he meant that he was open to the 
creation of new countries with a different map. By not allowing a „hard partition‟, not many other 
solutions are left. The solution chosen in Dayton, a decentralized organization of the country divided 
along ethnical lines, is what is left. A „soft partition‟, with a weak (central) government and ideally, more 
mixing of people each year (Bose 2002; 46), might well be the only possible solution, according to 
Robert Dahl; “a complex system with several layers of democratic government, each operating with 
somewhat different agenda” (Bose 2002; 94).  
 
The most important question remains however; is the solution that the IC seems to propagate a 
solution that fits the realities of BiH. Does this solution take into account the historical context and 
institutional precedent that combined make the national-collective identities (Bose 2002; 93)? For now, 
the path chosen did not get full support of everyone in BiH. “Paris studied this approach and 
concludes: “it still provides a better basis for international engagement with conflict-torn societies that 
the alternatives- giving up on the challenge of building co-existence between groups and effectively 
sponsoring partition” (Pars, R. 1997 in Bose 2002; 90). While F. Whelan (1983, in Bose 2002; 48) 
argues that when the politicians dispute the boundaries, or “the extent and compositions of the political 
community”, the sovereignty (the democratic power of the state over the citizens in the country) of the 
unit (being the country BiH) is being disputed. During my research I have heard several employees of 
international organizations say that the Dayton Peace agreement is not sufficient anymore.  
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Because of how the political system of BiH was designed the political situation is now in a deadlock 
(respondent 1). But as the researchers mentioned above argue, the question is whether or not there is 
a better solution for the problems faced. All of the described solutions come with another set of 
challenges. And that is where the problem starts. No one knows what to go for anymore. Politicians on 
all sides have not fully accepted the chosen solution and stall every important decision that needs to 
be taken, until the OHR forces a solution (see among others, the election of the mayor in Mostar). This 
situation contributes greatly to the lack of trust between citizens and the police as representatives of 
the state. If the politicians responsible for the creation of laws and supervision of state are not able to 
agree, why listen to the directives of the officers representing that state and the law? 
 
As mentioned, the IC was closely involved in drafting the constitution of BiH, not only in the field of the 
state structure, but also in other parts of the constitution. One of the things that really changed for the 
people of BiH, with the new constitutions, was the in-cooperation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in article II of the constitution (in Annex I of the constitution, an overview of the additional 
human rights agreements that now apply to BiH, is given). This does not mean that citizens had no 
rights in Yugoslavia. Just as today, the state of Yugoslavia was responsible for securing the rights of its 
citizens (Le Monde 2006), but the war made people experience that citizen rights were neither 
universal nor secure. Trust in these (new) rights needs to be restored by the current state.  
 
 5.3 The city of Mostar 
Mostar is one of the few cities in the federation of Bosnian-Croats and Bosniacs that is made up of 
almost equal numbers of both ethnic groups, and has only a small percentage of Bosnian-Serb 
inhabitants. Before the war the population of Mostar was divided along the following numbers;  the 
largest number of the population ,34,6%, was Bosniac (43.930), 34% of the population was Croat 
(43.037), 18,8% was Serb (23.846) and  the smallest group of the population,10,1%, was the 
Yugoslavs (12.768) (fsz.ba; 1991). This percentage of people that choose to identify themselves with 
the „supranational status of Yugoslav‟ was remarkably high, compared to the rest of BiH (5,5%).  
Mostar was a vibrant, cosmopolitan and tolerant city, while the surrounding area can be characterized 
as being inhabited by traditional and rural communities. The closest town to the west of Mostar is 
Siroki Brijeg, with a 99 per cent Croat population.   
 
The war influenced the numbers strongly. Many Serb inhabitants were driven out in 1992 as Bosnian-
Croat and Bosniac troops opposed the occupying Serbian, controlled YNA and Serb paramilitary 
forces, and eventually drove them out of Mostar. Out of the twenty thousand Serbs in Mostar before 
the war, only a thousand remained. After the war, new citizens came to the city from the countryside 
where they were either driven out because of the war, or they came because they sought new 
opportunities in the city. Since the war both ethnic groups (Croat and Bosniac) have argued that they 
are the largest group and therefore are entitled to more (political) power. But no census has been 
conducted, so there is no exact data on the number of people, and their ethnicity, in Mostar. As 
respondent 27 explained to me, having that census could lead to an unpleasant conclusion for one of 
the ethnic groups. Respondent 27 even argues that it is not good for the people in Mostar to know the 
exact number of (ethnic) people and they should rather settle for the idea that both groups are 
approximately the same size, meaning that they should work together to govern the city. 
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Governing the city 
To govern this city a complex structure of the division of power has been created based on the Interim 
Statute of the City of Mostar. The goal was to give all inhabitants of the city a (fair) share in governing 
the city and its surrounding area.  
The IC took the initiative to negotiate a Statute of Mostar, and getting the local strongmen to agree. 
This did not happen without fierce discussions and the IC showing its muscle by ordering a structure 
for Mostar. Local Croats reacted by protesting and attacking the IC representative(s) in the streets of 
Mostar. This led to an emergency EU meeting where the pressure of the large neighbour Croatia, 
through EU member states, was applied, and the plan altered. It finally resulted in a structure in which 
the city of Mostar was divided in sectors (3 and 3) assigned to the two ethnicities, while a central 
sector was meant for the city authorities, that would both work from that sector and govern it. The city 
council is made up of members of all ethnicities, so this sector was seen as the central sector. 
When talking to two Croat Mostarian students studying at the University of Mostar (respondent 37 & 
38), they were quick to mention the political construction in Mostar and in BiH as an important factor 
for making the society dysfunctional. When they refer to the political construction they mean the power 
division within the local government in Mostar and the power division in the state of BiH. According to 
these two respondents the Croatian citizens of Mostar were “deprived of their fundamental rights”, 
namely that the Croatian citizens should be provided with a political system that recognizes the 
majority vote. According to them “it is the most democratic system after all”. Respondent 37 is sure the 
Croats have a majority in Mostar, and argues that; “it is only fair, as in other cities in BiH, like Banja 
Luka and Sarajevo, the other ethnic groups (red. Being the Serbs in Banja Luka and the Bosniacs in 
Sarajevo) have a democratic majority (red. and therefore political power).” 
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6 RISE AND FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA    
  
It is undeniable that the war that destroyed all that was left of Yugoslavia has had great influence on 
the current situation of BiH. Whether it was the social and cultural makeup of the country, the 
relationship between citizens and the state, or the situation in the city of Mostar. In this chapter a short 
overview of the war in Yugoslavia that led to the independence of BiH and of the country that the 
socialist state of Yugoslavia was before, and how it came to be that country. Aimed at putting in 
perspective that what I observed, what people told me and what literature refers to, concerning the 
relationship between the current situation in Mostar, and the history of the country. 
 
 6.1 How war in Yugoslavia led to independence of BIH  
In 1990, nationalistic and separatist sentiments led to the collapse of Yugoslavia. Milosevic‟s call for a 
Greater Serbia grew and Slovenia and Croatia representatives left from a tense and heated congress 
of the communist parties of the federation of Yugoslavia. It was the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. 
Each and every republic belonging to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had to 
decide whether to stay in the Federation or to declare its independence. It was in this year that 
elections were being held in BiH. Alija Izetbegovic, the later president of BiH, participated in this 
election and it was his political party that won the elections. In 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared 
their independence, in the case of Slovenia this involved only a short battle, but in the case of Croatia 
the Serbs in Croatia resisted a separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia by declaring the independent 
republic of Srpska Krajina. These Serbs wanted to become part of Milosevic‟s Greater Serbia. Now, 15 
years after the war we know they didn‟t succeed. BiH had two choices, declaring an independent 
state, like Slovenia and Croatia did, or to join Milosevic‟s Yugoslavia. In 1992 a referendum was held 
among the citizens of BiH and the majority of the people voted for independence and implicitly for a 
war with Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. 
 
On the 6
th
 of April 1993 the EU and the USA recognized the independence of BiH. Soon thereafter 
Serbs managed to capture more than half of BiH and as the war raged on, both in the Serb and in the 
Croat and Bosniac controlled areas, ethnic cleansing took place. Politicians that orchestrated these 
atrocities were cooperating with criminal networks, a way, these politicians said, to defend the interest 
of their people, but a cooperation that turned out to last till after the war, and therefore decreasing 
citizens trust in politicians even further (Devine & Mathisen 2005; 9). The Croats and Bosniacs formed 
an alliance to fight off the Serbs, but in the meanwhile the Croats founded the „Croatian Republic 
Herzeg-Bosna‟. It was not until 1995 that the „Croatian Republic Herzeg-Bosna‟ was dissolved under 
pressure of the UN.  
 
The war in Mostar 
In Mostar, the alliance between de Bosniacs and the Croats turned out to be weak and while tensions 
rose and the number of conflicts between the two parties increased. In 1993 fights over the reign in 
the city, broke out, between Bosniacs and Bosnian-Croats. This led to the destruction of large parts of 
the city, including the bridge in Mostar of the 16
th
 century, which was built by the Ottomans and a 
symbol of the cultural diversity of Bosnia that connected the Croat side of the city with the Bosniac 
side. The fights made large numbers of citizens leave the city, but the conflict was not fought along 
clear lines of division. While Bosniacs fought together with Serbs against the Croats in Herzegovina 
(Mostar area), Bosniac groups fought each other in North-West Bosnia, and at the same time in 
central Bosnia the Croats and Serbs joined to fight the Bosniacs.  
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It was in these years that the UN started to install their safe havens to protect the Bosniacs in 
Sarajevo, Gorazde en Srebrenica. Between July 6 – 16, 1995 the „safe haven‟ Srebrenica was 
captured by the Bosnian Serbs, led by the Bosnian Serb Ratko Mladic. Thousands of Muslim men and 
boys were being separated from the rest of their families and later killed, despite the presence of UN 
soldiers (NIOD 2002; 2533). 
 
Diminishing trust 
In all of the wars that took place between 1990 and 1995 in Slovenia, Croatia and BiH, nationality, 
ethnicity and religion played a key role. Not only armies, but also paramilitary groups, police officers 
and civilians faced each other with violence. The police, divided among ethnic lines, took part in the 
military campaigns against armed forces - army, police and militia units - of the other warring parties. 
These warring parties did not stick to military campaigns only, they also terrorized citizens. 
Where police officers could be expected to protect civilians, during and after the war in BiH the police 
forces often had been protecting their own ethnic civilians and encountered the civilians of the other 
ethnicity with violence. Striking examples were the police assisting in the removal of the local people of 
another ethnicity, leaving an ethnic homogenous area, a process that can be called „ethnic cleansing‟ 
(ICG 2000; 18 and CPCS 2011; 98). Ethnic cleansing is more than just a horrible human crime and 
catastrophe, it can also be seen as a deliberate policy to alter the socio- geographical makeup of 
(parts of) the country.  
 
An important observation made by one of my respondents working in the education sector was that 
the power of the state, and people‟s trust in that state, was lost during the war (respondent 19). The 
state that once was strong and united, was not anymore. Their state, which always knew what was 
best for its citizens, wasn‟t there anymore. Instead, there was violence all around, and the state(s) that 
existed was only interested in the benefits of their ethnic group, the safety of people no longer seemed 
to be a priority. Leading to distrust among citizens and distrust between citizens and the (other) 
state(s). 
 
We could say that the one positive thing was that due to the fall of the safe havens and the ethnic 
cleansing that followed, the IC committed itself to end this war. It led to an increase of their negotiation 
efforts, but probably more importantly, to the increased use of military force. A series of intensive 
military campaigns by the West, against the Bosnian Serbs, altered the proportions on the battlefield. 
For the first time, the Croats and Bosniacs were able to drive the Bosnian Serbs out of large areas 
they occupied, resulting in a situation in which there was almost a 50-50 division between the Bosnian 
Serbs and the Croats and Bosniacs together. This changed the willingness of the parties to engage in 
negotiations. Holbrook, the American negotiator, was able to get the parties together and have them 
agree upon the DPA in the end (Bose 2002; 2).  
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 6.2  Socialist Yugoslavia; unity and diversity 
The history of BiH before the most recent was can be described as tumultuous, with wars playing an 
important role in this history of the country, as did the political changes that followed these wars. For 
this thesis it is important to have an understanding of this tumultuous history, as it formed the 
foundation for the new country of BiH that came into existence. As we can read in chapter 3, this 
history also had impact on the social structure in BiH and in Mostar specifically, and on the relationship 
and trust between citizens and between citizens and the state. 
   
 
Over the past 1000 years Bosnia and Herzegovina have been confronted with occupation, annexation 
and foreign influence. From 1180 to 1463 Bosnia was an independent kingdom, but thereafter foreign 
influence started to grow. It were the Ottoman Turks that invaded the region at the end of the 14th 
century and ruled there for some 500 years. From 1580 to 1878 Bosnia became an „ayalet‟, being the 
largest territorial unit in the Turkish Empire (Izetbegovic 2001). This Ottoman influence can still be 
seen, for instance in the name Balkan which derives from Turkish and means mountain. The name 
has been used for this area since the early 19th century. At the end of the 17th century the Austro-
Hungarian Empire gained influence in the region. It managed to gradually take over the power in the 
region of the Ottoman Turks. In 1878 the Austrians occupied Bosnia and in 1908 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire (BBC s.a.).  
 It was during these Austro-Hungarian times that the administrators concluded that “Integration 
(the effort to encourage a nationally neutral „Bosnian‟ identity that would eliminate appeal of national – 
particularly Serb- identities), in the conventionally understood sense of the term, is simply not an 
option in Bosnia” (Bose 2002; 31). Instead the different „nationalities‟ were given a place in the 
governing structures of the country. This continued until Yugoslav times (Bose 2002; 45). And it were 
the nationalistic powers during Yugoslav times, that led to the nationalistic inspired wars in the 
Balkans. It shows that the political (ethnic division in the political structure) and social challenges that 
are faced now in BiH, are not new. And this example makes clear that the one nation-state solution 
that is also propagated at this time was considered unrealistic back then. 
 In response to this unrest the Austrian-Hungarian Emperor‟s heir, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, 
was send to the area. His assassination (28 June 1914) by a Bosnian Serb student, Gavrilo Princip, 
triggered the First World War. After the First World War the Austrian-Hungarian Empire collapsed and 
under the Versailles peace treaties BiH became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
that was given the name; Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  
 
WWII 
Peace in the Balkan was short lived, on the 6
th
 of April 1941 German troops invaded the kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, and World War II began for this part of the world. The administration of parts of the country 
was granted to the „Independent State of Croatia‟, considered to be ruled by fascists that wanted 
people to convert to Catholicism and Jews, Roma, Serbs, Muslims and anti-fascist Croats became 
victim of this puppet state of Germany. Serbia came under control of the Germans, Montenegro was 
occupied by the Italians, and so was Kosovo. As we can see, the different ethnic groups present in the 
kingdom were divided and  by being so, were instigated against each other, because they “promoted 
incompatible national aspirations as a means of dividing and ruling the area” (Bowman 2003; 328).  
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Creation of the Socialist state of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
In April 1945 Tito marched his partisans into Sarajevo and liberated BiH. In so doing, Tito (re)united 
Yugoslavia and established a Socialist state of Yugoslavia (SFRY), encompassing the geographic 
area that is today BiH. A federation of six republics, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Macedonia was created.  
To decrease the power of the largest country within the federation, Serbia, the provinces Kosovo and 
Vojvodina were given an autonomous status. This structure was designed to contain the national 
aspirations that were present in the republics of Yugoslavia. It created a “supra-national state” above 
all other national aspirations (Bowman 2003; 331). Aspirations especially of the three largest groups in 
Yugoslavia being the Slovenes, the Croats and the Serbs. All for their own, but comparable, reasons, 
being autonomy and unity amongst their own group, which, in most cases, is spread over the territory 
of Yugoslavia. By creating republics, to reduce the power of Serbia (Montenegro and Macedonia), new 
nationalities were introduced.  
 
The new federation also strengthened the position of the Muslim population in Yugoslavia, mostly 
living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All this was recorded in the constitution of 1967 (Allcock 1992 in 
Bowman 2003; 329). During the whole period of Tito‟s rule, the leadership of the country tried to 
overcome challenges of nationalism and inter-ethnic tensions and promote the sense of being one 
nation. Tito framed this as „brotherhood & unity‟ (Godina 1998 in Bowman 2003; 328) and placed the 
enemy outside of Yugoslavia. First this enemy was fascism (during World War II), then the threat of the 
Soviets, and later the capitalist west. Whether or not Tito was able to create a sense of unity can be 
debated, but history makes it clear that the most recent war drove people away from each other again 
and created a situation in which there are three nations, with mutual values and morals, but not feeling 
that they are one.  
 
Despite the efforts of Tito to create unity the reality was that  the Yugoslav state was highly centralized 
due to political control exercised by the Communist Party. In 1963 a new constitution was adopted that 
led to more decentralization. The process of decentralization was completed when in 1974 a new 
constitution was adopted that saw the republics and autonomous provinces as the sources of political 
power (they had veto power over federal legislation). 
 Tito‟s rule led to a period of relative stability and foreign loans led to economic progress. The 
Federal  state protected the Yugoslav nation and the national minorities living in the Federation and 
tried to help the republics that were economically behind (Bowman 2003; 329). But in 1980 Tito died, 
without having a successor, and many expected the federation to break up. Through a presidium of 
representatives of the different republics Yugoslavia managed to survive for another ten years (BBC 
s.a.). But the central state, was less able to protect the citizens and their (economic) situation. 
Moreover politics, economics, art and culture were seen as opposites between the state and the 
people (Mastmak 1991 in Bowman 2003; 330). At the same time these sentiments lead to negative 
feelings amongst citizens in Yugoslavia. The state kept trying to improve the unity and the 
homogeneity which led to more anti-reaction amongst citizens. 
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Power to the people 
During Tito‟s time different constitutions were introduced that showed a development of state ideology. 
It changed from being a Soviet Satellite state, with primary Marxist-Stalinist-Leninist vision of the state, 
to a state based on socialist ideas that went its own way, away from the Soviet mother. In this process 
the ideal of governance of the state shifted, towards a Yugoslav ideal, based on workers self-
administration; socialist democracy. This meant that many federal responsibilities were transferred to 
decentralized bodies like the republics, the communes and their committees.  
Workers were also involved in Workers' Councils in companies.  
 According to Dragan Popovi  communes were tasked to stimulate the participation of citizens in 
the communal bodies (commissions, committees, and citizen‟s council). Furthermore there were 
voters‟ meetings, all meant to involve citizens in the governance of the state and the society.  
 
Through this system in both society and companies, citizens and workers were involved in decision 
making on many topics; investments, salary, taxes etc.  
 
This approach was not approved by all within the communist party elite and led to a division within the 
party between 1963 and 1972. Ideally the new approach meant that workers / citizens would have a 
large role in social and political life of the state. But all of this was very idealistic; many people chosen 
or appointed, were not capable of taking the responsibilities assigned to them as people‟s 
representative or committee member. Most of the members of the councils were less educated and 
inexperienced in management.  
They were not able to manage the profits made; instead of investing these profits in the company they 
worked for, it was spend on bonuses, extra wages and holidays.  
Literature dealing with communism even states that; communism provided „structural incentives‟ for 
corrupt behaviour. Corruption became part of daily life and became part of the culture, and transition to 
democracy and a market economy have not changed this completely, Sandholtz & Taagepera even 
say the form of democracy and market economy in BiH have been greatly influenced by this culture of 
corruption (Sandholtz & Taagepera 2005; 109). 
One of my respondents (respondent 47) from Mostar remembers citizen meetings, based on this 
Yugoslav state ideal. She remembers that these meetings were held to „listen‟ (emphasis placed by 
myself) to people‟s needs, organized along the lines of the chairmen of housing blocks. According to 
this respondent these meetings gave an unsatisfactory feeling as they were said to be for the citizens 
but instead they were used by the state to present their plans. The current approach of CP did not 
seem very different to her. Despite this, another respondent (respondent 32) described the pre-war 
time as much more organized. The state was functioning and life was organized. 
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PART III DRAWING CONCLUSIONS 
 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis I have studied in what ways the concept of Community Policing (CP) was used to 
improve the relationship between citizens and the police as a representative of the state of Bosnia 
Herzegovina (BiH), and how it influenced the level of trust between those two. At the heart of this 
thesis are the observations and interviews gathered during my 3 months field work period in the city of 
Mostar. To be able to draw conclusions based on this research I have focused my research on the way 
Mostar's citizens and police officers interact with each other. The Mostar Police service is being 
chosen as research subject as it operates in a city with its own specific history, considerably influenced 
by the war, challenged by the multi-ethnic character, and being a key city in the new state structure of 
Bosnia Herzegovina.  Furthermore Mostar was one of the first cities in BiH where the CP concept was 
introduced with help of the International Community (IC). The citizens of Mostar are, in my research, 
mainly represented by students and journalists. 
 
Looking back at the situation in Mostar, I need to conclude that both citizens and the state are still 
trying to find an uneasy balance. And this process sometimes comes across as a vicious circle they 
can´t seem to get out of. Citizens wait for a state that can be trusted, while the state needs citizens 
that are involved in the society at large, to perform better and built up trust among citizens. 
 
Daily life and CP 
One of the striking observations of one of my respondent working for EUPM, the EU police mission in 
BiH, was that citizens in BiH have not yet been able to fully understand the meaning of the word 
„verkeer‟ (the Dutch word for traffic). According to this respondent “the Dutch word for traffic is 
„verkeer‟, derived from the word „verkeren‟, (which can be translated as „working or living together‟) it 
is this basic agreement to live and work together on the street, in traffic, which is not taking place, in 
BiH, the way it should”. The respondent finds this characteristic for life in BiH. People, despite their 
differences could be expected to live together, and work together, to make everyone‟s life more easy 
and enjoyable. But people here seem to live their own life and don‟t seem to care so much about the 
people who are not close to them. Not realizing that their behaviour influences (positively and 
negatively) the lives of others. And this is exactly what‟s lacking, people who feel responsible for the 
society they live in.  
 
In Mostar, I observed a situation in which citizens of the so called „divided city‟ indeed lived their lives 
on their side of the city. But not because they feared the people on the other side, but mainly because 
they had everything they need on that side. This did not mean that there is a situation of separation. 
Not at all, people felt free to go to the other side, and occasionally do so, whenever convenient. But 
when there‟s no need to go, or they wouldn‟t. Instead they stayed by themselves.  
 
Both observations show an attitude which is problematic, as it is the responsibility of all citizens, that is 
considered to be important when it comes to safety and security, to take their own role in detecting 
unsafe situations and violations of the law. This can be everything from talking to a neighbour who 
plays his music to loud, to reporting a crime to the police. That is the responsibility that comes with the 
right they have to be protected by the state. One does not go without the other. But what we see in my 
thesis is that citizens hardly take upon them this responsibility.  
They live their own life, together with friends and family and the people within their ethnic community.  
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My explanation for this situation is that the war threatened people in their personal safety and showed 
them that both fellow countrymen and the state could not be trusted anymore. Instead they turned to 
„their own‟, hoping that they could still trust them 
 
Still the concept of CP could potentially bring both citizens and citizens and the police closer together, 
and increase the understanding for each other‟s position, but people seem to lack trust in the concept. 
The concept of CP shows resemblance with the ideal of the Yugoslav state, to involve citizens in 
decision-making processes. Problem was, that while citizens were involved they apparently weren´t 
listened to. Citizens with this experience are not likely to trust a similar concept, introduced after a war 
that disintegrated the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). And this is exactly what 
happened. None of the citizens I spoke to recalled concrete actions of the police to come into contact 
with citizens. And both CP police officers and citizens show sceptics towards such action. Police 
officers mentioned that such meetings didn‟t provide useful information, while citizens didn‟t believe 
that anything would be done with the issues they would raise.  
 
As we have been able to read in this thesis, due to the war the Yugoslav state broke down in ethnic 
fractions leading to inter-ethnic violence. The police, who had been representing the state, became an 
instrument of the fractions. By becoming an instrument in the war, trust in the police, and therefore the 
state, was seriously damaged. In a post-war society like that of BiH, one of the key elements in 
restoring trust is to provide safety and security through the restoration of law and order and by doing 
so preventing conflict from reoccurring. That is where the police came in. 
 
The new police 
The new police organisation that was built after the war was built on the foundations of the DPA and 
the new state structure that was designed. The IC was involved in the creation of that new police in 
BiH. A small part of that major operation was the introduction of the Community Policing concept as 
one of the many ways to positively influence trust among citizens and the state. Key to this concept is 
a police service that approaches citizens, to share information, to raise issues and to address safety 
related challenges together. It implies a new approach of the police towards citizens. Like my 
respondents within the Mostar police explained, police officers needed to keep far from the old, 
repressive way of policing.  Instead they choose, as they explained to me, to „talk talk talk‟ with the 
citizens of Mostar. This change of approach made that the police officers didn‟t feel secure about the 
way they should enforce the law anymore. Should they give an offender a fine, punish the offender by 
sending him to jail or should they talk and convince the offender to obey the law the next time? The 
result of this uncertainty was that police officers became very selective in preserving the law. More 
than necessary, and more than citizens understood, they choose not to address the offenders of the 
small offences that take place in the streets of Mostar every day, again to avoid to be seen as „to 
repressive‟.  
 This new approach of the police did not yet have the effect the police had hoped for. Instead, 
students tell me they are sceptical about the quality of the job done by the police. They consider the 
police, and the state it is representing, to be incompetent. While the journalist, who, through his work, 
has an insight in the work the police, stated that the police is doing a good job. Many of the students 
think that a tougher and more active police approach would increase peoples respect for the police 
and the law. 
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Clearly citizens and the police find it difficult to find a new balance when it comes to the police 
approach and the role citizens have in this. In my opinion it is unavoidable that in a post-conflict 
situation a new balance has to be found. The challenge for BiH is that BiH seems to be defying all 
theories of state- and nation building and by doing that creating challenges that link to the theoretical 
field of citizenship, as described in chapter 2. The state structure of BiH as agreed upon in the DPA is 
a construct that tries to combine nationalist aspirations of the three ethnic groups with international 
political interests in a way that seems hard to accept for any of the groups. The fact that the state form 
is still debated and  that there are several national aspirations undermining the central state makes it 
hard for people to place trust in the state, whatever the state form may be.  
 It is unclear to me whether or not the central state is sending out a message of unity, but for 
people to place trust in the institutions of the central state (like the police, arguable whether it 
represents the central state, but at least it‟s not linked to one of the ethnic groups anymore), it is my 
opinion that there needs to be a level of identification with something larger than their own group. 
Something like the nation of BiH. Now we have state institutions, like the police, without people 
identifying (and therefore trusting) with the nation of BiH. Citizens of this new state Bosnia 
Herzegovina need to develop a „new‟ sense of citizenship, especially because of the disturbed 
relationship between the citizens and between citizens and the state. To achieve this trust between 
citizens and citizens and the state need to be restored. I would like to argue that the same is 
applicable to the police officers. When the politicians would leave the debate on the state form for what 
it is (with or without changes to the current state structure) than police officers could stand firm for the 
laws of the state, which might decrease their selectiveness and improve their image, leading up to 
more trust in the police.  
 
Hope for the future 
Is there any hope for the future, reading about all the challenges BiH is facing? I would say there is! 
On a general level we see that Mostar is not as divided as it is portrayed in many articles about 
Mostar. The safety and security situation has dramatically improved over the last 17 years and on 
street level people are able to get along in a way that makes it possible for them to live a ´comfortable´ 
life without the fear of violence being omnipresent. But because politicians can´t seem to find a way to 
do the same, the vicious circle can´t seem to be broken. It might be that that this is the last big change 
that is needed to turn BiH in a positive direction. Politicians are like roadblocks in a road, or like 
unmaintained roads. They are hard and unsafe to drive on and people will only drive on those roads if 
necessary.  
Despite the fact that the IC is trying to take away these blockades and show the best way to design 
and maintain roads, their efforts could also be seen as interfering. As we could see with the police 
officers that were enforcing the law selectively, only because they were trained to keep away from 
repressive policing. Because of this (and other reasons) a situation emerged with insecure police 
officers that are not respected or trusted by citizens. It is like having a co-driver, constantly 
commenting your driving skills. This results in an insecure driver, and road users, who lack trust in that 
driver, and therefore take their distance to stay safe. The time has come for the IC to take another step 
back and let the state of BiH show that it earns the trust of its citizens, and let citizens of BiH and the 
police find that uneasy balance between rights and responsibilities of citizens on one side, and the 
police approach on the other side. Problem is that this will only work when all who are involved are 
committed to improve the situation for all citizens of BiH. 
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I find it very hopeful to see that the police officers seem to have been able to break with the past and 
leave the repressive approach behind. I find it unlikely that the police will fall back on this old way of 
doing things any time soon. And this is a success due to the contribution of the IC. 
Another hopeful sign I see is the fact that the students I spoke to are much more critical towards the 
state and their own role in society, than I expected. If they are able to keep this critical approach when 
their adults, I think there is a chance that they will form a generation that takes up a more active role in 
society. And by doing so, creating a connection amongst the different groups within society, and a 
connection with their state institutes.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5  Map Bosnia and Herzegovina (www.mapnavigation.net) 
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Appendix 2 
 
Map of Mostar 
 
 
Figure 4.6  Map Mostar (www.comune.fi.it ) 
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Appendix 3 
 
List of respondents 
 
Nr. Respondent  Description 
    
1 Researcher and Teacher in the 
field of International Security 
 Researching police reforms in Mostar 
2 Military Advisor for a diplomatic 
mission 
 Experienced military officers working both in Croatia 
and BiH 
18 Researcher in the field of Safety 
and Security 
 Centre for Security Studies Sarajevo 
19 Employee of an international 
education organization 
 Working there as communication officer 
27 EUPM police officer 
management level 
 Male, experienced police officer, from West European 
country 
28 EUPM police officer 
management level 
 Male, experience police officer, second mission in 
BiH,  from an Eastern European country 
29 EUPM police officer  Male, very experienced detective, from West 
European country 
30 EUPM police officer  Male, experience police officer, advisor to SIPA, went 
on a previous mission to Kosovo, from a Southern 
European country 
31 Journalist for local newspaper in 
Croat language 
 Female, Croat, general news 
32 Journalist for local radio station   Female, Bosniac, general news 
33 Journalist for local newspaper in 
Croat language 
 Male, Croat, crime reporter 
36 Political active, young man  Bosniac, Working for a NGO, grew up in the 
Netherlands 
37 Student at the University of 
Mostar, technical department 
 Male, Croat, board member of the local branch of an 
international student association  
38 Student at the University of 
Mostar, technical department 
 Male, Croat, board member of the local branch of an 
international student association  
39 Student at the Dzemal Bijedic 
University, technical department  
 Male, Bosniac, board member of the local branch of 
an international student association 
40 Commanding officer,  
Mostar Police 
 Special police Unit, riot police and special 
interventions 
41 Community Policing Officer, 
Mostar Police 
 Male, Bosniac, rank = cop (first rank) 
42 Community Policing Officer, 
Mostar Police 
 Female, Bosniac, rank = cop (first rank) 
43 Community Policing Officer, 
Mostar Police 
 Male, Croat, rank = cop (first rank), older than the 
other two CP officers 
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44 Mostar Police officer, 
management level 
In charge of education  
45 Lecturer at the Džemal Bijedić 
University, language department 
 Female, American, working for a language program 
initiated by the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo 
46 Working for NGO active in the 
field of education 
 Croat citizen, NGO is American, married to a German 
47 EUPM language assistant  Female, Croat, experience LA, worked for several 
international missions in BiH 
52 Student at the University of 
Mostar 
 Female, Croat, active in Church, political science 
student 
    
92 
 
Appendix 4 
 
Student discussions 
University of Mostar 
8
th
 of April 2010 
 
1 local safety would be better served with a police force that would be locally directed instead of 
a  cantonal police force, that is being directed by the cantonal government (as it is  now) 
2 Fighting organized crime in BiH should be a priority of the police. For the police to be effective 
 it should be reorganized and be organized so that it over arches canton borders. 
3 If the organization of the police (effectiveness, response time, costs etc.) would benefit from 
 organization on the basis of operational area's then you are in favour of that instead of the 
 current organization per canton. (note; part of a police reform proposal done by the EU. 
 Biggest argument against is the idea that entities would lose control over 'their' police) 
 
 
4 It is too much of a foreign expectation that civilians of Mostar will participate in community 
 meetings with police and municipality officials to discuss topics like safety. 
5 Respect for the police starts with the police tackling the major issue of corruption, or does it 
 work vice versa; respect for authority will break down the system of corruption. 
 
 
6 Inhabitants of Mostar prevent the institutions concerned with safety and justice (Police, 
 Prosecutor and Judges) from doing their work properly by participating in any form of 
 corruption. 
7 Youth delinquency would be prevented by a though approach of the police. Curfew for 
 youngsters under 17 and a ban on driving at night for drivers younger than 21 are therefore 
 good measures. 
 
 
8 The safety situation in BiH does not benefit from international presence in BiH. 
93 
 
Appendix 5 
 
Student pro-con debate  
University Džemal Bijedić of Mostar  
29th of April 2010 
 
Pro – Con debate preparation information 
 
 
I = The law that makes you wear a seat belt in a car is a waste of time and money. 
 
Pro  Being in favour of this statement you will probably be of the opinion that the police 
  has no time to enforce this law. There are far more important things to work on.  
  Besides that you could also be worrying about the lawfulness of this law. Isn't it an 
  individual right to decide what risk you take in for instance traffic. It is not as if you 
  are hurting anyone else by wearing no seat belt. It is the victim of a car crash his 
  or her own problem is no seat belt was worn. Let the law take care of more  
  important things. Instead the authorities might want to focus on education of  
  drivers and their passengers on the benefit of wearing a seat belt. 
  Other pro reasoning could be all the practical disadvantages of having to wear a 
  seat belt and the technical improvements that are and will be developed to protect 
  people in the car, without having to wear a seat belt. 
 
Con  Being opposed to this statement you can arguments could go into the medical  
  costs of victims of car accidents who were not wearing seat belts, the number of 
  people killed in car accidents, deaths that could have been prevented if these  
  people would have worn a seat belt. The need to protect people from their own 
  mistakes then there is the police officer, fire-fighter and medic who has to see all 
  the victims who did not wear a seat belt. Shouldn't we prevent all these terrible  
  accidents? 
   
 
II = Reporting even the smallest crime to the police is important to improve the safety 
  of the society. 
 
Pro = Being in favour of this .. you will be thinking about the need for accurate statistics to 
  detect trends in society. Trends like an increase of a certain crime in a certain area. 
  Having these statistics can help the police and local government to fight this form 
  of crime, and can give the citizens an argument to demand action. 
  A more abstract argument is that it is everyone's responsibility to make laws work. 
  You need people who enforce the law, but as they cannot be everywhere at all  
  times you need people to obey the law as well. Otherwise it will become a mess. 
  It might be so that not many people report their crime just yet, then starting this  
  social practices is even more important. It might lead to a drop in the number of  
  crimes. Finally you could just argue it is just the right thing to do. 
 
Con = Why would your report small crimes, it is a waste of time, the police won't bother 
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  solving the crime and even if they would try they will not be successful. 
  And why would be bother about these small crimes, are they so bad? Let them  
  have this car radio, let them demolish some things in the street.. why make a  
  problem out of all this?  'Nema problema'. 
  Besides, can you imagine the time it takes to go and report these crimes. People 
  have better things to do! If only they would make reporting a crime more easy. Let‟s 
  wait for technology to improve! 
 
Pro – Con debate preparation information 
 
General information: 
 
The organization of the police is linked to the state structure in BiH. 
Information on the police structure can be found at: 
 
http://www.fup.gov.ba/joomla/index.php 
 
To increase the cooperation between the police and the citizens of Mostar a project called Community 
Policing was initiated by a research center in Sarajevo. 
Information about this project can be found on: 
 
http://www.css.ba/projects/index.html#ongoing 
 
BiH has seen a large involvement of international organizations in many parts of society and state 
institutions. Now 15 years after the Dayton peace agreement many people say it is time for the 
international organizations to leave. Others think they still have an important job to do and should 
therefore not leave. In relation to the police the European Police Mission (EUPM) is the most important 
international organization. Find out about their mission and work: 
 
www.eupm.org 
 
Corruption is a topic often mentioned when talking about the police. Where does BiH stand in 
comparison to other countries. Have a look at this site; 
 
www.transparency.org 
 
Information on crime statistics: 
 
Whether or not the police does a good job is a subjective question. From your perspective you will be 
able to answer this question, but the chance that someone else will have a different answer is very 
much present. In 2004 a research was conducted. You can find this research at: 
 
http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/files/docs/publications/en/FunctRew/BiHPoliceFinalReport2004-06-
30ENPRINT.pdf 
 
The research can give an idea of the subjects that you can base your opinion on. As it is a research 
from 2004 it can be expected that the situation has changed. 
95 
 
 
Other info can be found on; 
 
https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=115557 
 
Information on car accidents: 
 
http://www.car-accidents.com/country-car-accidents/bosnia-herzegovina-crash.html 
 
http://www.unece.org/trans/roadsafe/unda/Halkida_Pres18_Bajrambasic.pdf 
 
http://www.anapolschwartz.com/practices/seat-belt-failure/seatbelt-statistics.asp  
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Student pro-con debate  
University Džemal Bijedić of Mostar  
 
Student debate on safety situation and police conduct in Mostar 
 
Have you ever wondered why police officers seem to drink so much coffee?  
And why people, who give the police coffee money, also complain about the police being corrupt? 
 
What did you do when you observed somebody breaking the law? Did you take action?  
Who would you talk to when structural forms of crime keep occurring in your neighborhood? 
 
Questions that all relate to the work of the police and the relationship between the police / the state 
and you, the inhabitants of Mostar 
Questions that interest me and questions that I hope to discuss with you. 
 
Who am I? I am Tom Kievit, a MA student Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology at the 
University of Leiden in the Netherlands. I am in Mostar for a research on the police and the way they 
deal with a project called Community Policing. And no Community Policing without the community. But 
does the Police manage to get in contact with the community and are they able to deal with the 
challenges? And is the community ready to be a partner for the police? 
 
Join the debate, be critical on the relationship between community and state and let yourself be 
challenged. What can you do to have the police work on the topics you feel are important!?  
 
Open discussion topics 
 
Crime 
Organized crime makes safety situation for people in Mostar unacceptable. 
 
Through rules on road safety (like the one that forbids young people below 21 to drive after 23:00 at 
night) roads are made safer. 
 
Individual police officer do a good job in fighting day to day crime. It is the bigger system (politics and 
corruption) that is preventing the police from being effective. 
 
Contact 
It is unlikely that people will go to the police to discuss their security situation. Their worries will not be 
taken seriously. 
 
People should trust the police in doing a good job and therefore should go to the police more with 
information and concerns. 
 
BiH has a civil society that is critically and actively participating follows in society. 
 
 
 
Corruption 
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Respect for the police starts with tackling the mayor issue of corruption 
 
People who join in corruption are as corrupt as the police officers who except it. 
 
The international definitions of corruption should not 1:1 apply to BiH.   
 
Impartiality 
Police is prejudiced and favours one above the other ethnicity. 
 
International community 
The safety situation in BiH does not benefit from the presence of international organizations like EUPM 
and IFOR. 
 
 
Pro – Con debate preparation information 
 
The organization of the police is linked to the state structure in BiH. 
Information on the police structure can be found at: 
 
http://www.fup.gov.ba/joomla/index.php 
 
Whether or not the police does a good job is a subjective question. From your perspective you will be 
able to answer this question, but the chance that someone else will have a different answer is very 
much present. In 2004 a research was conducted. You can find this research at: 
 
http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/files/docs/publications/en/FunctRew/BiHPoliceFinalReport2004-06-
30ENPRINT.pdf 
 
The research can give an idea of the subjects that you can base your opinion on. As it is a research 
from 2004 it can be expected that the situation has changed. 
 
To increase the cooperation between the police and the citizens of Mostar a project called Community 
Policing was initiated by a research center in Sarajevo. 
Information about this project can be found on: 
 
http://www.css.ba/projects/index.html#ongoing 
 
BiH has seen a large involvement of international organizations in many parts of society and state 
institutions. Now 15 years after the Dayton peace agreement many people say it is time for the 
international organizations to leave. Others think they still have an important job to do and should 
therefore not leave. In relation to the police the European Police Mission (EUPM) is the most important 
international organization. Find out about their mission and work: 
 
www.eupm.org 
 
Corruption is a topic often mentioned when talking about the police. Where does BiH stand in 
comparison to other countries. Have a look at this site; 
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www.transparency.org 
 
 
Pro – Con debate preparation information 
 
Choose two topics that steer up most discussion. 
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Appendix 6 
 
Coat of Arms and Flag of BiH 
 
 
 
 
Flag of the Federation of BiH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
Appendix 7 
 
Information EUPM 
 
The number of EUPM staff on 1st of January 2010 was 280. Of this 280, 150 were International Police 
Officers (from all EU-countries and six non EU-countries), 25 International contracted and 50 national 
staff members. EUPM works from 4 regional offices in the 4 sectors displayed in the figure below. 
Besides the 4 sectors EUPM works from their headquarters in Sarajevo, assisting the national police 
organizations, like SIPA. 
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Appendix 8 
 
Abbreviations  
 
BiH  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
CP  Community Policing 
CBP  Community-Based Policing  
CSS  Center Security Studies ; independent research, educational and training enterprise 
  in Sarajevo 
 
DPA  Dayton Peace Agreement  
 
EUFOR European Force 
EUPM  European Union Police Missions 
ESDP   European Security and Defense Policy  
 
FBiH  Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ; one of two entities of BiH 
 
HDZ  Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) ; political party for 
  Croats in BiH and Croatia  
HDZ 1990 Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990 (Croatian Democratic Union 1990) ; political 
  party for Croats in BiH, split of the HDZ of BiH 
HQ  Head Quarters 
 
IC  International Community  
IFOR   Multinational Implementation Force ; BiH 
 
KM  Konvertibilna Marka ; BiH‟s Convertible Mark 
KFOR  Kosovo Force ; NATO‟s force in Kosovo 
 
LA  Language Assistant 
LDA  Liberal Democratic party 
 
MAC   Mine Action Centre ; BiH 
MoI  Ministry of Interior ; BiH 
MUP  Special police unit in Yugoslavia 
 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO  Non Governmental Organization 
 
OHR  Office of the High Representative 
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
 
PRC  Police Restructuring Commission  
PFD  Public Forum Debate  
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RS  Republika Srpska  
 
SDB  State security service in Yugoslavia 
SFOR   Stabilization Force ; NATO force in BiH 
SFRY  Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
SIPA   State Investigation and Protection Agency ; BiH 
SSR  Security Sector Reforms  
SDC/DEZA Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation  
 
UDBA  Department of state security in Yugoslavia 
UNIPTF United Nations International Police Task Force ; BiH 
UNMIBH  United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force ; BiH 
 
YNA  Yugoslav National Army 
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Appendix 9 
 
CP sectors Mostar police 
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Appendix 10 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
